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Abstract: Research in anthropology has shown that kin terminologies have a complex combinatorial structure and vary systematically
across cultures. This article argues that universals and variation in kin terminology result from the interaction of (1) an innate conceptual
structure of kinship, homologous with conceptual structure in other domains, and (2) principles of optimal, “grammatical”
communication active in language in general. Kin terms from two languages, English and Seneca, show how terminologies that look
very different on the surface may result from variation in the rankings of a universal set of constraints. Constraints on kin terms
form a system: some are concerned with absolute features of kin (sex), others with the position (distance and direction) of kin in
“kinship space,” others with groups and group boundaries (matrilines, patrilines, generations, etc.). Also, kin terms sometimes
extend indefinitely via recursion, and recursion in kin terminology has parallels with recursion in other areas of language. Thus the
study of kinship sheds light on two areas of cognition, and their phylogeny. The conceptual structure of kinship seems to borrow its
organization from the conceptual structure of space, while being specialized for representing genealogy. And the grammar of
kinship looks like the product of an evolved grammar faculty, opportunistically active across traditional domains of semantics,
syntax, and phonology. Grammar is best understood as an offshoot of a uniquely human capacity for playing coordination games.
Keywords: cognitive anthropology; conceptual structure; coordination games; evolutionary psychology; grammar; kinship; kin terms;
language evolution; Optimality Theory (OT); recursion
1. Introduction
This article addresses a longstanding puzzle in the human
sciences: Kinship and language, very different in content,
are intriguingly similar in form. Kinship has to do with
aunts and uncles, matrilineages and patrilineages, and
ascending and descending generations, while linguistics
has to do with phonemes and syllables, morphemes and
word classes, and heads and phrases. But kinship and
language are similar in their combinatorial structure,
pointing toward general principles of cognition or com-
munication at work in both cases (Kroeber 1909, Le´vi-
Strauss 1963).
The parallels between kinship rules and language rules
were the subject of pioneering work several decades ago,
in the heyday of structural linguistics and structuralism.
Especially in the area of kin terminology, and especially
from the 1960s to the 1970s, researchers demonstrated
that the classification of kin reflects not just social facts,
but also cognitive and linguistic principles. Cross-cultural
regularities in kin terminology were documented, compar-
able to regularities in color terminology (D’Andrade 1971;
Greenberg 1966; 1975; 1990; Nerlove & Romney 1967),
and an assortment of formal methods was devised to
analyze systematic variation and universals in kin terminol-
ogy (Buchler & Selby 1968; Goodenough 1965; Lounsbury
1964a; 1964b; Romney & D’Andrade 1964; Scheffler 1968;
Scheffler & Lounsbury 1971; Wallace & Atkins 1960).
But intellectual fashions have changed since then. In
spite of important advances (Gould 2000; Hage 1997;
2001; Hirschfeld 1989; Kronenfeld 1996; 2009; Leaf
2006; Lehman 1993; 2001; Read 1984; 2001a; 2001b),
the study of kinship, language, and cognition now finds
itself in a marginal position in anthropology and cognitive
science. Cultural anthropology, with some exceptions, has
grown increasingly committed to cultural particularism,
and increasingly divorced from developments in cognitive
science. The minority of anthropologists who apply evol-
utionary theory to kinship mostly have not investigated
its cognitive aspects. (On the “fall of kinship” in anthropol-
ogy, see Sousa 2003 and commentators, and Shapiro
2008.) Meanwhile, as linguistics has grown increasingly
specialized – and especially as syntax has moved to a
dominant position in the field – some earlier connections
with other areas of inquiry have weakened.
In this article, however, I argue that the classic topic of
kinship and language deserves a fresh look in the light of
recent progress in linguistics and cognitive science –
and, in turn, that the study of kinship is relevant to
current debates about mind and language. The rest of
this section introduces advances in two areas – the
exploration of conceptual structure at the interface
between semantics and cognition, and the development
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of a new approach to rules of language called optimality
theory – and previews how they apply to kinship.
Conceptual structure. The study of human cognition has
received a major boost from the realization that there are
two distinct levels of language – ordinary and VIP, as it
were – which differ both in linguistic behavior and in
meaning (Grimshaw 2005; Jackendoff 1983; 2002; Pinker
1989; 2007; Talmy 2000a). The first, open-class or
lexical, level includes most nouns and verbs. The
number of open-class forms in any language is very
large, and virtually any imaginable concept can receive
an open-class form.
The second, closed-class or grammatical, level is a more
exclusive club. Forms at this level include prepositions like
in and on, demonstratives like this and that, inflections like
the plural -s and past tense -d, and word classes like mass
noun and intransitive verb (but not specific instances of
nouns or verbs). Within languages, closed-class forms
are limited in number: Compare the number of preposi-
tions, demonstratives, tenses, and word classes in
English with the number of nouns and verbs. Closed-
class forms are also restricted in the range of meanings
they bear. Across languages, some of the distinctions that
regularly make it into closed-class forms are: singular
and plural, bounded and unbounded, figure and ground,
near and far, present and past, unmovable/inalienable
and movable/alienable, and human and nonhuman. But
many more semantic distinctions – some quite impor-
tant – are seldom or never registered in closed-class
forms, including odd and even, legal and illegal, and absol-
ute size or duration (e.g., more and less than x feet long or
t years old).
The distinction between two levels of language is not
only interesting in its own right, but also potentially impor-
tant for investigating cognitive universals. Suppose, as
many lines of evidence suggest, that in learning about
words and the world, people draw not just on perceptual
data but also on an inventory of innate concepts. Then
open-class and closed-class forms reflect this inventory
in different ways. With open-class forms, universal con-
cepts are hooked up with one another to yield a virtually
unlimited array of culturally variable compound ideas
(Wierzbicka 1996). With closed-class forms, the internal
“atomic structure” of universal concepts shows up in regu-
larities in how related conceptual primitives are merged or
distinguished.
Two findings stand out from the study of closed-class
linguistic forms. First, forms carve out a small number of
semantic fields, including space, time, causation, mental
states, and social relations like possession. Second, there
are close parallels across fields. Specifically, nonspatial
fields seem to borrow much of their organization from
the conceptualization of objects and motions in space. In
language after language, time is treated as a more abstract
version of space, change in state as an abstract kind of
movement, causation as an abstract push, possession as
abstract location, and so on (Bierwisch 1996; Hurford
2003; Jackendoff 1983; Pinker 1989; 2007; Talmy 2000b).
Optimality Theory. While different linguistic domains –
semantics, phonology, morphology, syntax – have their
own organizing principles, there are also general prin-
ciples of rule-governed “grammatical” communication
operating across domains. Such at least is the implication
of research in Optimality Theory (OT), a powerful new
approach to rules of language, originally developed in pho-
nology but apparently of much wider application (Archan-
geli & Langedoen 1997; McCarthy 2001; Prince &
Smolensky 2004/1993).
OT doesn’t say what the rules of language are – rules
differ among linguistic domains – instead, it describes
how rules interact. According to OT, rules, or constraints,
don’t actively transform linguistic representations but act
as filters on randomly generated variation, with each con-
straint weeding out variants that violate it. Constraints may
be mutually inconsistent, so grammars manage trade-offs
between conflicting constraints through constraint
ranking. Constraints are put in rank order, with each con-
straint strictly dominating lower ranking ones: One viola-
tion of a constraint outweighs any number of violations
of all lower ranking constraints. OT covers cross-linguistic
universals and variation in grammar in a unified frame-
work: To a first approximation, languages all use the
same constraints but differ in their constraint rankings.
OT has inspired large body of research: As of this
writing, one major online resource, the Rutgers Optimality
Archive (roa.rutgers.edu), has 1,069 articles on file. Yet in
some ways OT is still finding its place in linguistics. For
example, recent theories of language evolution (Hauser
et al. 2002; Hurford 2007; Jackendoff 2002) have nothing
to say about the phylogenesis and adaptive significance
of OT. We may get a better idea of the nature and poten-
tial of the theory by comparing it to Utility Theory (UT) in
economics. Both UT and OT are theories of constrained
optimization. They posit that people mentally search a
large space of possibilities to discover an optimum,
either an optimal basket of goods or an optimal linguistic
output. Optimal doesn’t mean perfect. It means doing as
well as possible in the face of trade-offs between conflict-
ing constraints. Yet optimization works differently in UT
and OT (Prince 2007; Smolensky & Legendre 2006). In
standard UT, trade-offs and potential outcomes vary quan-
titatively, so economic optimization involves finding
maxima of continuous functions. In OT, rules are ranked
rather than numerically weighted, so grammatical optimiz-
ation is discrete and combinatorial. UT and OT thus seem
to cover two contrasting macro-domains of human behav-
ior, the economical and the grammatical.
Both theories of conceptual structure (as revealed by
closed-class forms) and OT approaches to grammar
apply to kin terminology – or so I argue here. The
surface complexity of kin terminology across cultures
results from the interplay of a conceptual system
adapted for representing kinship and other social relation-
ships, and a “grammar” system bridging conceptual struc-
ture and language with principles of optimal
communication, as laid out in Figure 1. The rest of this
article works its way upstream through this figure, first
laying out the principles governing kin terminology (sect.
2 to 4) and then advancing some hypotheses about the
conceptual structure of kinship and the human grammar
faculty (sect. 5).
The specific goals of this analysis are to offer an account
of why kin terminologies have the shapes they have, and,
conversely, to use constrained variation in kin terminolo-
gies as a window on two cognitive domains. What is
meant by the “shape” of kin terminologies should
become clearer as the exposition proceeds and I develop
an input-output account of kin terms: It includes both
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semantic contrasts among categories and the regularities
that account for how contrasts get extended out to ranges
of kinfolk, but it does not cover everything that people
think about kinship or all the ways people use kin terms
to talk or think about other things in the world. It is about
the structure, rather than the content, of kin terms.
Limitations of space mean that some important topics get
short shrift here. First, I touch on connections between
social organization and kin terminology – see the lower
and left areas of Figure 1 – but do not explore them at
length. I believe the evidence is strong that kin terminology
reflects, but doesn’t just reduce to, sociology; the focus here
is on cognition and language. Second, I bring up alternative
formal approaches to kin terminology where relevant, but
without extended, side-by-side exposition and comparison;
there is an outline of the relationship between this work and
alternative approaches at the end of the next section.
Finally, this article employs only as much of the formidable
technical apparatus of kinship theory and Optimality
Theory as seems appropriate to illustrate important
points. Other publications (Jones 2003a; 2003b; 2004;
2010) include more technical discussion, including kin
term derivations using OT “tableaus,” and supporting data.
2. Optimal kin terms, English and Seneca
2.1. English and Seneca
This section and following ones turn to two kin terminolo-
gies, American English (henceforth English) and Seneca,
to illustrate basic principles. English kin terms are probably
familiar to most readers (Goodenough 1965). The rules
governing English kin terms are similar to those in most
modern Western European languages and Japanese.
Seneca is another matter. The Seneca Indians are one of
the original five (later six) nations in the Iroquois League
of modern upstate New York. The comparison of English
and Iroquois provided one of the earliest demonstrations
that kin terms in different languages may be organized on
very different lines (Morgan 1954/1851; 1997/1871; Traut-
mann 1987).
Portions of the two terminologies are shown in Figure 2.
The figure gives terms in both languages for types of
siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, and cousins relative to an
anchor called Ego. Terms for distant generations (grand-
parents, etc.), descending generations (niece, grandson,
etc.) and affines (wife, brother-in-law, etc.) are omitted.
There is a strong consensus on terms among speakers of
each language. Spelling of Seneca terms follows Morgan,
sacrificing accuracy for accessibility.
We may note several things about Figure 2. Not only do
English and Seneca of course have different words for kin,
they also have different kin terminologies – two kin types
called by different terms in English may be called by a
single term in Seneca, and vice versa. Both terminologies
are regular: In neither case are terms scattered randomly
around the diagram. For example, English systematically
labels every Parent’s Sibling’s Child a cousin. Seneca is just
as systematic in its own way. Cousins related through
parents of opposite sex (‘cross cousins’ in anthropological
jargon) are ahgareseh, while cousins related through
parents of the same sex (‘parallel cousins’) are equated
with appropriate sibling types. (In this article, capitals indi-
cate kin types, italics indicate native-language kin terms,
and single quotation marks indicate glosses of kin terms.)
Some distinctions are quite important in both
languages: Kin in different generations are terminologi-
cally separate for all kin types shown. Other distinctions
are moderately important: In both languages a sex distinc-
tion holds for parents’ siblings and siblings, but not for
cousins (except where cousins are equated with siblings
in Seneca). Some distinctions are more important in one
language than the other: English cares more about the dis-
tinction between near and distant kin than Seneca, while
Seneca, but not English, distinguishes some kin by
whether they are parallel or cross, and by relative age.
Some aspects of Seneca kin terminology are probably
related to Seneca social organization. The Seneca were
matrilineal, organized in kin groups based on descent
through the female line (Morgan 1954/1851; Palmer 1934).
Small-scale descent groups, or lineages, were associated
with residence in longhouses. The core of each lineage was
a group of related women. A man left his family and went
to live with his wife’s kin when he married; a woman contin-
ued to live with her mother and sisters and their dependent
children and husbands. Inheritance and succession to office
Figure 1. From conceptual structure and grammar to kin terminology. The top row shows human universals; the bottom row shows
cultural variables. Arrows show causal links.
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were matrilineal as well: not from father to son, but from a
woman to her daughters, sisters, and sisters’ daughters,
and from a man to his brothers and sisters’ sons. On a
larger scale, each lineage belonged to one of eight named
clans, with multiple lineages in each clan. Clans were exoga-
mous (out-marrying), so that a woman and her husband
came from different clans. As a result, Ego belonged to the
same clan as his or her Mother, Mother’s Sister, and all
their children, while Ego’s Father along with Father’s
Sister and her children belonged to another clan, as did
the children of Mother’s Brother.
2.2. Applying OT
Social factors like those above probably influence English
and Seneca kin terminologies, but the terminologies are
also governed by cognitive/linguistic principles. Here, I
treat these in the framework of Optimality Theory. We
begin with two lists of the constraints governing a portion
of kin terminology in English and Seneca. The same con-
straints appear in both lists, but in different order.
English Seneca
DISTINGUISH
GENERATIONS
DISTINGUISH
GENERATIONS
DISTINGUISH DISTANCE DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN
MINIMIZE COUSINS MINIMIZE COUSINS
DISTINGUISH SEX DISTINGUISH SEX
MINIMIZE PARENTS’
SIBLINGS
MINIMIZE PARENTS’
SIBLINGS
MINIMIZE SIBLINGS DISTINGUISH GRADE
DISTINGUISH GRADE MINIMIZE SIBLINGS
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN DISTINGUISH DISTANCE
The constraints are of two kinds. One kind, taking the
generic form DISTINGUISH FEATURE, requires that kin
Figure 2. Some English and Seneca kin terms, in relation to Ego (center of chart). Circles are females, triangles males, squares either
sex. Relative age (older or younger than Ego) is shown for siblings and some cousins. Shading indicates different lines of descent
through females (matrilines).
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terms be multiplied as necessary to preserve information
about distinctions such as generation, genealogical dis-
tance, sex, and so on. The other kind, of the generic
form MINIMIZE KIN TYPE, requires that speakers use as
few terms as possible for kin types such as Cousin,
Parent’s Sibling, and so on. Clearly these requirements
for maximizing information and minimizing terms cannot
be satisfied simultaneously. Instead each language makes
a conventionalized trade-off between constraints by
ranking them, with each constraint taking strict pre-
cedence over lower-ranking constraints. The constraint
ranking defines the grammar of each language, establish-
ing a shared code among speakers and listeners.
Consider how the left-hand ranking governs the categ-
orization of, say, an Older Mother’s Brother’s Son (i.e.,
older than Ego). In English, this relative is merged with
other parent’s sibling’s children, as cousin. But there are
other possibilities. The kin type could be merged with
Parent’s Brother or with Older Brother. It could receive
its own separate expression, or be categorized as ‘older
cousin,’ sex unspecified. In OT, all these possibilities –
all possible distinctions and equations involving a given
kin type – are evaluated, in parallel, by the first constraint.
Only those candidates that incur the fewest violations of
the constraint survive; the rest are eliminated. The survi-
vors are then filtered through the second constraint, and
so on, until just one optimal categorization survives.
The first constraint in the English ranking, DIS-
TINGUISH GENERATIONS, demands that different gener-
ations of kin be kept terminologically distinct. This
eliminates any terminology that puts cousins in the same
category as uncles. The second constraint, DISTINGUISH
DISTANCE, demands that near and distant kin be distin-
guished. This eliminates any terminology equating
cousins and siblings. The third constraint, MINIMIZE
COUSINS, would be perfectly satisfied if English had no
cousin terms. But the two preceding constraints have
eliminated this possibility. Instead MINIMIZE COUSINS is
partially satisfied: it selects as the winning candidate a
single ‘cousin’ term, with no distinctions by sex or age.
The effacement of sex and age distinctions violates two
other constraints, DISTINGUISH SEX and DISTINGUISH
GRADE. (The latter enforces distinctions related to senior-
ity and social rank, including relative age.) But these rank
lower than MINIMIZE COUSINS, so the violations are moot.
With the constraints acting in the order given, ‘cousin’ –
equivalent to ‘parent’s sibling’s child’ – is the optimal
output.
Next, consider parents’ siblings in English. Since DIS-
TINGUISH DISTANCE and DISTINGUISH SEX outrank
MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS, these relatives are distin-
guished, from parents, and by sex, as aunt and uncle.
English sibling terms are similar. DISTINGUISH SEX
ranks higher than MINIMIZE SIBLINGS, which ranks
higher than DISTINGUISH GRADE, so English has two
sibling terms, brother and sister, distinguished by sex but
not relative age.
Seneca cousin and sibling terms follow a different logic.
The high rank of the DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS con-
straint means that Seneca, like English, avoids cross-
generation equations. But the next constraint on the list,
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, does something else. This con-
straint dictates that relatives in cross or adjacent matrilines
be distinguished, so that cross cousins (stripes in Fig. 2)
are distinguished from parallel cousins and siblings
(stippled or white). But the constraint allows kin in the
same matriline, or nonadjacent matrilines, to be merged.
(See next section for more discussion.) In combination
with MINIMIZE COUSINS this results in the Seneca combi-
nation of one term for “cross cousin,” and the equation of
parallel cousins with siblings.
Parents’ siblings in Seneca follow a similar pattern.
Father’s Sister and Mother’s Brother get separate terms
from other aunts and uncles, distinguished by sex, reflect-
ing the high rank of DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN and DIS-
TINGUISH SEX. Mother’s Sister and Father’s Brother are
equated with the parents in their respective matrilines,
Mother and Father, because MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIB-
LINGS trumps DISTINGUISH DISTANCE, the constraint
that keeps parents’ siblings and parents apart in English.
Finally, the ranks of DISTINGUISH SEX, DISTINGUISH
GRADE, and MINIMIZE SIBLINGS, result in siblings (and
parallel cousins equated with siblings) being distinguished
both by sex and relative age.1
2.3. Generating variation
There are many other ways of classifying cousins and other
kin. For example, French makes a sex distinction among
cousins that English and Seneca don’t. Consider the
French movie title Cousin, Cousine: A close translation,
following anthropological convention, would be Parent’s
Sibling’s Son, Parent’s Sibling’s Daughter. But the
English language remake of the movie was instead entitled
Cousins, losing the racy cross-sex pairing of the original.
Suppose, in the English constraint ranking above, we
move DISTINGUISH SEX up one place. With this constraint
now outranking MINIMIZE COUSINS, the new ranking
generates a kin terminology with a sex distinction among
cousins as well as siblings. This is how Optimality
Theory handles variation in kin terminology. The same
constraints, in two different rankings, generate English
and Seneca terminologies. A small change in the English
ranking generates another terminology, and further per-
mutations generate many more. With the right constraint
rankings, separate cousin terms disappear completely,
and Cousin merges with other kin types, in the same or
different generations. With other rankings, all siblings
are covered by one generic term, or they are distinguished
by relative age but not by sex. Each of these possibilities
is found, fairly frequently, among the world’s languages
(Murdock 1970; Nerlove & Romney 1967).
Kin terminology is prodigiously variable. Introductory
treatments of the topic often limit themselves to listing a
few major typological variants of, say, cousin terminology:
Thus English and French have “Eskimo”-style cousin
terms, while Seneca is “Iroquois” (Fox 1967; Stone 2000).
But no list of manageable size can really accommodate
the complex permutations and interdependencies invol-
ved: For example, English resembles Seneca, not
French, in ignoring sex distinctions among cousins. Yet
kin terminology is also highly constrained. Languages
around the world have independently hit on similar
patterns, while largely steering clear of other imaginable
possibilities. Kin terminologies are not perfectly regular,
but overwhelmingly so (D’Andrade 1971; Nerlove &
Romney 1967).
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OT offers an account of variation and universals in kin
terminology, as the outcome of variable rankings among
universal constraints. OT is a generative theory, going
beyond surface generalizations and one-culture-at-a-time
formal analysis to show how interaction between princi-
ples generates terminologies, without overgenerating and
producing rare or nonexistent terminologies.
In kin terminology, as in phonology, research in the frame-
work of OT builds on and synthesizes previous work. The
theory I present here very much depends on previous the-
ories of kin terminology, each of which, I suggest, elaborates
on a different aspect of kin terminology to offer a partial view
of the subject. The organization of terminology around dis-
tinctive features is the starting point for componential analy-
sis (Goodenough 1965; 1967). Markedness and prototype
effects receive particular attention in structural linguistic
analysis (Greenberg 1966; 1975; 1990; Hage 2001). The
extension of kin terms to genealogically distant kin is the
basis of reduction rules (Lounsbury 1964a; 1964b; Scheffler
1968). And the abstract algebra of kin categories, including
identity elements, reciprocals, relative products, and abstract
symmetries, is where kinship algebra begins (Read 1984;
2001a). Each of these receives some attention in the rest of
this paper: distinctive features in section 3.1, markedness in
3.2, genealogical extension in 4.1, and formal relations
between categories, and their relation to genealogy, in 5.2.
Yet each of these alternative approaches, I would argue,
has its limitations. Componential analysis is particularly suc-
cessful in discovering semantic contrasts among kin terms,
less successful in accounting for where contrasts are active
and inactive, and how contrasts are extended to more
distant relations. Markedness theory is a set of observations,
not a generative theory. Reduction rules and kinship algebra
handle terms for more distant relatives in a more natural, less
post hoc way than componential analysis, but don’t offer
much explanation of why particular reduction rules or struc-
tural equations operate, and not others. The rest of this
article will suggest how these limitations can be overcome
in the framework of Optimality Theory.
3. Constraints and scales
The previous section introduced several constraints as
needed to illustrate some basics of Optimality Theory. This
section proceeds more systematically, proposing a set of viol-
able constraints on kin terminology, and associated scales
limiting allowed permutations in constraint rankings. The
list may be incomplete, and some of the rules may turn out
to need reformulation, but this work has advanced far
enough to allow this conclusion: Constraints and scales are
not a hodge-podge; they form a system.
This system is set out in Figure 3. The left-hand column
gives seven faithfulness constraints. The right-hand
column lists three markedness scales. The middle
column diagrams these: Dotted lines show how faithful-
ness constraints distinguish kin types, and arrows point
toward less marked types. The figure is divided horizon-
tally into three parts. The top part shows a nonrelational,
absolute distinction, the sex distinction. The middle part
shows constraints and scales concerned with the position –
the genealogical distance or direction – of kin types rela-
tive to Ego. Finally, the bottom part shows constraints
and scales concerned with how the nexus of kinship can
be cut to yield bounded groups, such that a kin type may
belong to Ego’s in-group, or to an out-group.
I review constraints and scales following.
3.1. Seven faithfulness constraints
Kin terms typically fall into natural classes, defined by the
presence or absence of distinctive features (Goodenough
1965; 1967). This property of kin terminologies is
accommodated in OT by faithfulness constraints, which
forbid terminological mergers of kin types differing with
respect to some feature. Here I introduce a set of faithful-
ness constraints, and briefly contrast them with some tra-
ditional distinctive features.
1. DISTINGUISH SEX. A kin type’s sex is not a relation-
ship, but an absolute category. You are a parent or a
younger sibling in relation to someone, but a female or a
male on your own. All kin terminologies make some absol-
ute sex distinctions, which can be handled by a DIS-
TINGUISH SEX constraint.
2. DISTINGUISH DISTANCE. A distance function for con-
sanguineal kin types can be defined as follows: Let a consan-
guineal chain consist of (1) any number of parent types,
followed by (2) at most one sibling type, followed by (3)
any number of child types. Formulas fitting this format
include Younger Brother, Father’s Daughter, Mother’s
Sister, and Older Mother’s Mother’s Brother’s Son’s Son.
Count as one link each of the following: Parent, Sibling,
and Child, except that Parent’s Child, if present, counts as
one link not two. Then Older Brother and Father’s Daughter
are one link from Ego, Mother’s Sister two links, and Older
Mother’s Mother’s Brother’s Son’s Son five links. DIS-
TINGUISH DISTANCE is violated when kin at different con-
sanguineal distances are equated with one another.
3. DISTINGUISH GRADE. Some kin types are fully reci-
procal: if A is grandparent to B, then B is always grandchild
to A, and the converse. Some kin types are partially recipro-
cal: if A is aunt to B, then B is sometimes niece to A, and the
converse, depending on their sex. Full and partial recipro-
cals are equidistant from Ego, so the previous constraint,
DISTINGUISH DISTANCE, does nothing to distinguish them.
Instead another constraint, DISTINGUISH GRADE, rules
out any equation of reciprocals.
But DISTINGUISH GRADE does more than this. It is con-
cerned more generally with differences in grade or rank,
distinguishing kin who outrank Ego from those outranked
by Ego. The directed axes along which kin may rank higher
or lower than Ego include:
† Relative age Older Sibling vs. Younger
Sibling, for example,
† Ascending vs.
Descending generations
Parent, Parent’s Sibling, or
Grandparent vs. Child,
Sibling’s Child, or
Grandchild,
† Matrilateral vs.
Patrilateral cross kin
Mother’s Brother’s Child vs.
Father’s Sister’s Child,
and
† Man-to-wife vs. Woman-
to-husband affines
Man’s Wife’s Brother vs.
Man’s Sister’s Husband.
Any of these axes can be used to assign grades or ranks to
kin types (not to be confused with constraint rankings!), so
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Figure 3. Seven faithfulness constraints and three markedness scales. Heavy outline shows Ego. Crossing a dashed line means
changing the value of a distinctive feature. Following an arrow means moving toward unmarked kin.
TOP PANEL
An absolute distinction – sex – is shown as a dotted line separating male and female symbols.
MIDDLE PANEL
Heavy outline shows Ego.
The distinction between near and distant kin is shown by the dotted circle separating two squares. An arrow points toward near kin, who
are less marked.
The distinction between kin ranked higher and lower than Ego is shown by a dotted horizontal line separating two squares. An arrow
points toward high ranked kin, who are less marked.
LOWER PANEL
Three group-generating constraints are represented in two different ways.
First, the inset diagram shows the elementary conceptual operations involved in distinguishing matrikin, patrikin, and generations: in
the trio of Father, Mother, and Ego, three dotted lines cut off Father only, Mother only, or both, from Ego. Arrows point toward less
marked, in-group kin.
Second, three peripheral diagrams show how these cuts, applied to all father-child, mother-child, or parent-child links, generate
matrilines, patrilines, and generations, respectively.
The distinction between consanguines and affines is represented at the bottom by a dotted line separating spouses, with marriage shown by¼.
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that, for example, Older Sibling ranks higher than Ego,
and Younger Sibling lower. Along any axis, DISTINGUISH
GRADE is violated whenever kin outranking Ego are
equated with kin outranked by Ego, as long as ranks are
not reversed on another axis.
Rank distinctions in terminology commonly have some
basis in social hierarchy. The first two axes above are
based on the hierarchy of senior and junior kin. The last
two may come into play where “wife-givers” outrank
“wife-takers,” or vice versa (Needham 1958; Parkin 1997).
The two preceding constraints are concerned with
where a kin type is positioned relative to Ego in the web
of kinship. The next four constraints are concerned
instead with where a kin type is positioned relative to a
group or category to which Ego belongs. Since (barring
close inbreeding) the open, bilateral network of kin con-
nections among individuals has no natural borders,
groups in kinship space must be constructed by treating
some kinds of kinship links as defining within-group
bonds, and others as defining between-group boundaries.
4. DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN. This constraint treats a
mother-child link as a bond, and a father-child link as a
boundary. It allows terminological mergers among the
maternally linked kin around Ego, including Sibling,
Mother, Mother’s Sibling, and Mother’s Sister’s Child,
but is violated by mergers between Ego’s matrikin and
those across a paternal boundary, like Father and his
matrikin (Father’s Sibling and Father’s Sister’s Child) or
Mother’s Brother’s Child. The constraint also allows
members of these out-groups to merge with one another.
Applied throughout the genealogy, this principle divides
kin into maternally linked groups bounded by paternal links.
With some kin types, it isn’t clear which side of the bound-
ary they fall on. Father’s Brother’s Child – two paternal
links away from Ego’s matrikin and one paternal link from
Father’s matrikin – doesn’t obviously belong to either
insider or outsider matrikin. The simplest assumption con-
sistent with the cross-cultural evidence is that this ambigu-
ous kin type can be equated with either a cross cousin, a
parallel cousin, or a sibling without violating DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN. Its fate must be settled by other constraints. In
the Seneca case, the classification of Father’s Brother’s
Child is settled by the next constraint in the ranking, MINI-
MIZE COUSINS, which bars the kin type from being equated
with any variety of cousin; it ends up instead being classified
as some type of sibling.
5. DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN. This constraint is the sex-
reversed version of DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, treating a
father-child link as a bond, and a mother-child link as a
boundary. In some cases, this and the preceding constraint
act interchangeably on aunt, uncle, and cousin terms, con-
sistent with the fact that many societies with patrilineal
descent groups, and presumed high rank for DISTINGUISH
PATRIKIN, have more-or-less the same kin terminology as
the matrilineal Seneca. Two separate constraints are
necessary, however, because in other cases DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN and DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN have differing
effects, producing matrilineal or patrilineal skewing. (For
the role of these constraints in skewed Crow and Omaha
cousin terminologies see Jones 2003b. For effects on sex-
of-speaker distinctions among siblings, see Jones 2010)
6. DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS. If we go through a
genealogy and snip the connections between parents and
children, but keep siblings together, and their spouses
and cousins, we divide the network of kin into discrete,
nonoverlapping generations. The corresponding con-
straint requires that kin in separate generations be distin-
guished from one another. Generational distinctions are
found in every kin terminology. In some cases, genera-
tional and sex distinctions are almost the only ones active.2
7. DISTINGUISH AFFINES. Let a kinship formula consist
of any number of consanguineal chains (see above), each
separated (and maybe preceded and/or followed) by a
spouse term. Then DISTINGUISH AFFINES treats any of
the links between consanguines (kin by birth) as a bond
and the links between affines (kin by marriage) as a bound-
ary. It is violated when affines are equated with consan-
guines, or affine’s affines with either. A low rank for
DISTINGUISH AFFINES results either in affines merging
with consanguines (e.g., Brother-in-law ¼ Brother) or
consanguines with affines (e.g., Mother’s Brother ¼ Wife’s
Father), depending on the rank of different markedness
constraints. Sometimes DISTINGUISH AFFINES works
with other constraints to divide kin into marriageable
and nonmarriageable classes. In these cases, the machin-
ery for categorizing kin is enlisted to regulate not just
kin terminology, but also the moral grammar of marriage
rights and obligations (Le´vi-Strauss 1969) – a vast topic
about which I will say no more here.
By way of conclusion, it’s worth noting how these faith-
fulness constraints differ from the traditional distinctive
features found in other work on kin terminology. Specifi-
cally, the constraints listed above omit the familiar
lineal/collateral and parallel/cross distinctions. The
results here suggest that these distinctions are not part
of the generative machinery in their own right, but
derive from the interaction of more elementary con-
straints. For example, the distinction in English between
lineal (or direct) mother and collateral aunt (Romney &
D’Andrade 1964; Wallace & Atkins 1960) results here
from the interaction of DISTINGUISH DISTANCE with
markedness constraints. No extra constraint is needed
specifically to enforce the lineal/collateral distinction.
The parallel/cross distinction, too, may be derivative. In
the present analysis, Seneca Father’s Brother’s Child is
grouped with Mother’s Sister’s Child as a kind of sibling,
not because the two have “parallelness” in common, but
by default, because the interaction of DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN with other constraints selects an unmarked
expression for the ambiguously positioned Father’s
Brother’s Child. Two faithfulness constraints privileging
maternal and paternal links – DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN
and DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN – seem to obviate a third
specifically devoted to distinguishing parallel and cross.
3.2. Three markedness scales
There is more to the grammar of kinship than turning dis-
tinctive features on or off. This is why, after some initial suc-
cesses, early attempts to define kin categories purely in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions ran into trouble.
“Whole category definitions have the problem of becoming
extremely complex and hard to follow (and thus cognitively
unreasonable. . .) and fly in the face of much ethnographic
usage information regarding focality and the special status
of focal referents” (Kronenfeld 2006, p. 210). This other
side of kin terminology can be handled in OT through
markedness constraints and markedness scales.
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Consider this neat sequence, from English terms for affines:
Wife wife unmarked
expression
Brother’s Wife sister-in-law markedness sensu
stricto
Uncle’s Wife aunt syncretization/
contrast
neutralization
Cousin’s Wife Ø (null
expression)
defectivation
The list shows a series of linguistic phenomena falling
under the heading of markedness. Markedness is the lin-
guistic flip side of cognitive prototypicality: The less proto-
typical a concept, the more marked the corresponding
expression (Greenberg 1966; 1975; 1990; Hage 2001).
Markedness sensu stricto involves converting a prototypi-
cal expression into a less prototypical one by adding a mark
(like -in-law, grand-, or step-). Markedness can also take
other forms, as shown above.
The varieties of markedness above fall along a scale. As
genealogical distance from Ego increases, less and less
effort is made to tailor distinctive terms for kin types.
Wife gets a term to herself. Brother’s Wife wears a term
borrowed from another relative (sister), but altered to fit
her (with the added suffix -in-law). Uncle’s Wife wears a
term borrowed from another relative (Parent’s Sister),
and not altered to fit her. And Cousin’s Wife gets no
generally accepted term of her own at all.
This sequence illustrates a general rule: More terminological
resources are allocated to closer kin. This can be phrased as an
implicational, or if-then, rule about cross-linguistic variation: If
two kin terms differ in markedness, then the more distant is
generally the more marked, other things being equal. In OT,
this can be handled by a markedness scale: not a constraint
per se, the scale limits allowed permutations of constraint rank-
ings. In the case of genealogical distance, the scale stipulates
that markedness constraints minimizing distant terms
shouldn’t rank lower than constraints minimizing close kin
terms. For example, MINIMIZE COUSINS should rank at
least as high as MINIMIZE SIBLINGS, implying that if DIS-
TINGUISH SEX outranks MINIMIZE COUSINS, it outranks
MINIMIZE SIBLINGS too. This implies in turn that if a language
makes asex distinctionamongcousins, itmakes a sexdistinction
among siblings, but not conversely. Similar reasoning applies to
the relative age distinction. English, Seneca (both compounds
and roots), and French all conform to these rules.
Not just genealogical distance, but other distinctive fea-
tures and faithfulness constraints in Figure 3 have pre-
ferred, unmarked directions associated with them. There
is good cross-cultural evidence for the following three
markedness scales (Hage 2001):
A. MINIMIZE FAR KIN  MINIMIZE NEAR KIN (associ-
ated with DISTINGUISH DISTANCE and DISTINGUISH
AFFINITY). Cousins are marked relative to siblings, grand-
parents relative to parents, children’s spouses relative
to children, siblings’ spouses’ siblings relative to siblings’
spouses. More generally, given a compound kin type XY
at a greater consanguineal or affinal distance than either
of its component types, X and Y, we expect markedness
scales of the form MINIMIZE XY  MINIMIZE X and MINI-
MIZE XY  MINIMIZE Y. Note that there is no implication
about the markedness of XY relative to some other kin type
Z. For example, Parent’s Parent is marked relative to
Parent, but not necessarily relative to Child.
B. MINIMIZE JUNIOR KIN  MINIMIZE SENIOR KIN
(associated with DISTINGUISH GRADE). Younger siblings
are marked relative to older siblings. Nieces and
nephews are marked relative to aunts and uncles. Grand-
children are marked relative to grandparents. More gener-
ally, other things being equal, if X is senior to Ego and Y is
junior, we expect a markedness scale of the form MINI-
MIZE Y  MINIMIZE X.
Directional distinctions other than senior/junior dis-
tinctions don’t have consistent associated markedness
scales. Take brothers-in-law. Cultures vary in whether
they assign a higher rank – and more terminological dis-
tinction – to the wife-giver who relinquishes a sister, the
wife-taker who marries her, or neither. There is no univer-
sal scale of Wife’s Brother relative to Sister’s Husband.
C. MINIMIZE CROSS KIN  MINIMIZE PARALLEL KIN
This scale is a summary of two scales. One of these, associated
with DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, makes Father’s Sister and
her children marked relative to Mother’s Sister and her chil-
dren. The other, associated with DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN
makes Mother’s Brother and his children marked relative
to Father’s Brother and his children. More generally, cross
kin, linked through opposite-sex relatives, are marked
relative to parallel kin, linked through same-sex relatives.3
Languages mostly follow the markedness scales above,
but otherwise they freely invent markedness constraints
of the form MINIMIZE KIN TYPE as they see fit. For
example, both English and Seneca treat aunts and uncles
symmetrically, implying they have a single constraint,
MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS, regulating these terms.
But other languages observe fewer (or more) distinctions
among aunt terms than uncle terms, implying that they
split MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS into two constraints,
MINIMIZE AUNTS and MINIMIZE UNCLES, with the
former ranking higher (or lower) than the latter.
4. Optimality and derivations
Before stepping back to assess these findings, consider one
more topic: the extension of kin terms to indefinitely
distant kin, like second and further cousins. This has
been an important area of research in kin terminology,
and it may have a wider significance as well. Kin term
extension involves recursion, and the revision of OT
needed to accommodate it may have implications for
grammatical recursion more generally.
4.1. Further cousins
As we have seen, Seneca classifies first cousins as cross cousins
or siblings, depending on the sex of connecting parents. But
what about a second cousin, an Older Mother’s Mother’s
Brother’s Son’s Son, say? One might imagine that the machin-
ery of kin classification would choke on such a super-sized
input, as English does on Cousin’s Wife. But in Seneca the
relative in question as ahgareseh – ‘cross cousin.’ Other
second-cousin types are likewise classified as cross cousins
or siblings, with siblings further distinguished by sex and
relative age (Lounsbury 1964a).
In some cultures, kin term extensions are socially impor-
tant – dividing distant kin into marriageable and unmarriage-
able categories, for example. This doesn’t apply among the
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Seneca, but the extension of the parallel/cross distinction to
more distant cousins is highly systematic all the same. Anthro-
pologists have developed several approaches to account for kin
term extensions in Seneca and other languages, including
reduction rules (Buchler & Selby 1968; Gould 2000; Kronen-
feld 2009; Lounsbury 1964b; Scheffler 1968) and kinship
algebra (Read 1984; 2001a). There are important differences
between these approaches (more on this in the next section),
but here we are interested in what they have in common.
Both offer what linguists call a derivational account of kin
terms, in which arriving at appropriate terms for distant kin
takes many small steps rather than one giant leap.
This is very different in spirit from standard Optimality
Theory. Given an input, standard OT says, “Find the
output, whatever it may be, that best satisfies constraints
1, 2, 3, and so on.” A derivational theory says, “Apply
rule 1 to transform the input. Apply rule 2 (or maybe
rule 1 again) to transform the result. And so on.” These
approaches to kin terminology can be reconciled, but
this requires a revised version of OT. The revised
version says, “Find the output, whatever it may be, in
the immediate neighborhood of the input, that best satisfies
constraints 1, 2, 3, and so on. Repeat, using this output as
the new input. Keep repeating until a steady state is
achieved.” The journey from input to output, however
long, will proceed in small steps.
Below I consider how one widely used derivational
approach, the method of reduction rules, may be incorpor-
ated into OT. First, the sequence below shows how
reduction rules work on a second cousin input in Seneca
(following Lounsbury 1964a). On the left are kin formulas,
on the right, rules that transform one formula into the
next. It is convenient (but maybe not absolutely necessary)
to assume that, with each move, at most one pair of adjoin-
ing elementary kin types changes.
Older Mother’s Mother’s
Brother’s Son’s Son
Reduce “___ Mother’s
Brother’s ___” to “___
Father’s ___”
Older Mother’s Father’s
Son’s Son
Reduce “Father’s Son” to
“Brother”
Older Mother’s Brother’s
Son
Don’t reduce “Mother’s
Brother’s ___” to
“Father’s ___”. Eliminate
sex and relative age.
‘cross cousin’ (ahgareseh)
The last part of the sequence, from Older Mother’s Broth-
er’s Son to ‘cross cousin,’ restates a familiar result for first
cousins. In Seneca, Mother’s Brother’s Child cannot be
subsumed under a sibling term: this would violate DIS-
TINGUISH MATRIKIN, the constraint keeping adjacent
matrilines apart. Further constraints dictate that cross
cousins are not distinguished by sex or relative age.
But something else is going on at the beginning. Here, the
formula Mother’s Brother is embedded on both sides in a
larger formula. And this doubly embedded Mother’s
Brother is treated differently. According to the rule on the
right, a Relative’s Mother’s Brother’s Relative (written “___
Mother’s Brother’s ___”) should be replaced with that Rela-
tive’s Father’s Relative (written “___ Father’s ___”). This is
unexpected, because Mother’s Brother and Father belong
to adjacent matrikin, and in the case of first cousins, aunts,
and uncles, Seneca is meticulous about keeping adjacent
matrikin separate. But apparently when Mother’s Brother is
buried deeply enough inside a larger expression, the contrast
between adjacent matrikin is neutralized. This is a marked-
ness effect: A distinction observed with one kin type is
ignored when that kin type is part of a larger formula.
OT is good at managing trade-offs between distinctive
features and markedness. One might imagine that a con-
straint ranking like the following would handle Seneca
cousin extensions:
MINIMIZE 2ND, ETC., COUSINS
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN
MINIMIZE COUSINS
DISTINGUISH SEX
DISTINGUISH GRADE
MINIMIZE SIBLINGS
This is a portion of the ranking previously given for
Seneca, with the addition at the top of one constraint,
MINIMIZE 2ND, ETC., COUSINS, which decrees that
second and further cousin terms must be eliminated
even at the expense of merging adjacent matrilines.
But it takes more than just adding markedness constraints
to manage kin term extensions. The ranking above gives the
wrong results if we follow standard practice and allow moves
of any size. In the present case, one potential move goes
directly from the second cousin input to a sibling type like
‘older brother.’ This move obeys the MINIMIZE COUSINS
constraint, and the next two as well, so ‘older brother’
should be the optimal output. More generally, all second
and further cousins should be classified as siblings. Standard
OT effectively short-circuits the piece-by-piece replacement
given by the reduction rules above, giving results contrary to
those in Seneca and many other languages.
We could get around this by declaring, by fiat, that
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN extends cross and parallel distinc-
tions out indefinitely in the appropriate fashion (Woolford
1984). But there are several problems with this. First, the pro-
posed redefinition is ad hoc, with no motivation or grounding
in markedness theory or otherwise. Furthermore, across cul-
tures there are several different ways of extending the paral-
lel/cross distinction, so we would be forced to introduce
additional versions of DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN to accommo-
date this variation. Finally, it is psychologically and ethnogra-
phically implausible that a formula like Older Mother’s
Mother’s Brother’s Son’s Son is processed in one gulp.
A better solution is to incorporate the iterated processes
featured in derivational theories into a revised version of
OT. This means accepting a restriction on the size of
moves, but allowing the output to be fed back into the
input repeatedly. It means that on any one move, a con-
straint like REDUCE 2ND, ETC., COUSINS will accept
“partial payment” – a small move away from second or
further cousin terms, such as replacing an embedded
Mother’s Brother with an embedded Father. Given this
revision, we can generate the full array of Seneca cousin
terms out to indefinite distances. (In practice, the
Seneca usually gave up after third cousins.) Thus, by
switching from one-shot, global optimization to multistep,
local optimization, OT can capture the advantages of deri-
vational approaches, with the added advantage that deriva-
tional rules aren’t just stipulated, but derive systematically
from constraint rankings.4
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4.2. Local optimality and minimal moves
The case for a more derivational, local version of Opti-
mality Theory would be stronger if it applied to more
than just kin terminology. Encouragingly, both phonology
and syntax have been moving in this direction lately.
In phonology, standard OT, in spite of its successes, has
trouble accounting for some phenomena. For example, in
American English (McCarthy 2007, pp. 1–2), it apparently
takes two steps to get to the standard pronunciation of
planted, the past tense of plant. On the first step, /plænt/
and /-d/ are combined, but an extra [ e] is added – thus
[plænt. ed]. This avoids the articulatory challenge of pro-
nouncing two dental stops in immediate succession. But
unless speakers are being hypercorrect, there is normally a
further change in pronunciation. The [t] is dropped, yielding
[plæn. ed]. The [ e], introduced to solve the problem of a now-
absent [t], is opaque – not motivated on the surface. For a
derivational account this is not a problem: [ e] is added at
one step, [t] is dropped at the next. But it is a problem for
standard OT. What markedness or faithfulness constraints
could possibly account for an added [ e] that makes the
output both more marked and less faithful to the input?
Probably the most promising approach to phonological
opacity within OT involves moving from global to local
optimization. The argument is set forth at length in
McCarthy (2007). In McCarthy’s revised version of OT,
candidate chain OT, only minimal moves in the immediate
neighborhood of the input are allowed. The optimal output
is selected in this neighborhood, the output is returned as
input, and the process is repeated until no more locally
optimal changes can be made. Optimization takes place
according to strictly ranked constraints, as in standard OT.
All of this is very similar to the integration of OT and
reduction rules proposed above for kin terms. For
example, in candidate chain OT, some constraints may be
written so that they are activated only after other constraints
have been brought in to play. Similarly, with Seneca cousin
terms, the parallel/cross distinction is effectual only after a
formula has been boiled down to a first cousin expression.
In syntax as well, linguists have begun to explore loca-
lized versions of OT. These involve building up phrase
structure trees one small step at a time, with each step gov-
erned by OT (Heck & Mu¨ller 2006; Mu¨ller 2003). This
research has the potential, if preliminary results hold up,
of reconciling optimality and derivational approaches to
syntax, which have grown far apart in recent decades.
In short, there is reason to suppose that kin terminology,
phonology, and maybe syntax have a common architecture
reflecting the principles of OT. But in each case, there are
problems with the standard, global version of OT. It is
liable to “short circuits,” getting wrong answers by taking
big jumps from marked input to unmarked output. It
also gets computationally implausible as combinatorial
possibilities multiply. The alternative, local optimization,
moving from input to final output in small steps, may be
a general design feature of grammar.
5. From conceptual structure to grammar
The study of kin terminology delineates what look like two
pieces of evolved psychology. These work together in regu-
lating individual learning and cultural evolution of kin terms,
but are functionally distinct. They may be phylogenetically
distinct as well, with the conceptual structure of kinship
ancient, partly shared with other primates, and evolutiona-
rily derived from more primitive domains of conceptual
structure (Seyfarth & Cheney 2008), and with grammar
recent and uniquely human. I review each in turn.
5.1. Conceptual structure 1: Constraints and the space
of kinship
Kinship is normally conceptualized in spatial terms.
Kinship maps always utilize a spatial imagery. I have seen no
exception to this. People around the world commonly speak
of “sides,” “lines,” “distant” or “close” relatives, and reckon
relationships “upward” or “downward.” Because of this, the
best way to capture the conceptual structure of systems of
kinship definitions without using one’s own cultural con-
ceptions as an obscuring filter is usually to ask for diagrams,
not lists. (Leaf 2006, p. 308)
Here I take this observation a step further by comparing
the conceptual structure of physical space, as revealed
by previous analyses of closed-class linguistic forms, with
the conceptual structure of kinship space, as revealed by
constraints on kin terms.
Consider the following scene: There is a focal object or
figure. This object stands at some distance and in some
direction and orientation in relation to a background
object, or ground. The ground is at least as spatially exten-
sive as the figure. Information about figure and ground is
limited, but includes such distinctions as whether they are
simplex (a single object) or multiplex (a group of objects
treated as one thing). Information about the relationship
between figure and ground is also limited. It is, roughly
speaking, topological rather than metric, and digital
rather than analog. It may include relationships like near
and far, above and below, or inside and beside, but not
actual measurements of distance or position.
This description could be a representation of material
objects in physical space. It doesn’t fit the rich represen-
tation of objects and space in conscious perception, but
corresponds to a more pared-down conceptual represen-
tation in which most information about shape, texture,
color and kind of objects, and about spatial metrics, has
been stripped away. This mode of representation is mani-
fest in English spatial prepositions, and across a wide
range of languages in a variety of closed-class forms
concerned with space (Levinson & Wilkins 2006). But
(I will argue) this description also fits the conceptual struc-
ture of kinship. The parallels are evident in Figure 3,
where constraints on kin terms are divided horizontally
into those concerned with (1) absolute qualities of the
figure (the referent of the kin term), (2) the relationship –
distance and direction – between figure and ground, and
(3) the nature of the ground (the anchoring individual or
group to whom the figure is related).
Taking these in turn: In the grammar of physical space,
the bare, existential thing-hood of the figure is typically
indicated by assigning it a noun. In kinship space, likewise,
even though kinship is a relationship, kin types are mostly
treated as abstract “things” by assigning nouns to kin
terms. (Dahl & Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2001; for scattered
exceptions where kinship is indicated by verbs, see Evans
1999.) And in kinship space, as in physical space, only a
very limited subset of potentially relevant information
about the figure actually registers grammatically. Usually
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the only nonrelational information about kin types that
makes it into kin terms is their sex.
The second class of constraints, those concerned with
kinship distance and rank, also shows obvious parallels
with spatial grammar. For example, in both kinship
space and physical space, the grammatical system mainly
trades in quasitopological or qualitative, rather than
metric, information. Thus age distinctions in sibling
terms normally encode whether the sibling type in ques-
tion is older or younger than Ego (as in Seneca), or, less
often, the sibling’s birth order: first, second, third, and
so on. They don’t normally encode age differences in
years, or absolute ages. Nor do affinal distinctions register
how long a couple has been married.
Finally, to understand what the third class of constraints
on kin terms is up to, we turn once again to parallels with
the conceptual structure of physical space. In closed-class
forms relating to physical space, a commonly registered dis-
tinction is that between simplex objects (a bird, an island, a
star) and bounded collections of objects (a flock, an archipe-
lago, a constellation) (Jackendoff 1991; Talmy 2000b). The
same distinction is at work in kin terminologies: Kin terms
can register the relationships of individuals to other individ-
uals (near or far, higher or lower), but they may also register
the relationships of individuals to more extensive back-
ground groups or categories (inside or across the group
boundary). In the analysis here, three constraints – those
distinguishing matrikin, patrikin, and generations – are sen-
sitive not to the relationship between a kin type and an indi-
vidual Ego, but to the relationship between a kin type and a
bounded group to which Ego belongs.
Thus the findings here extend one of the major discov-
eries in the study of conceptual structure: kin terminology,
like other abstract semantic domains, such as time, change
of state, and possession, borrows much of its organization
from the conceptual structure of space. What is new here
is not the idea that we can talk about kinship space and
kinship distance, but the tracing of close parallels in con-
ceptual structure in both cases. Optimality Theory is an
important part of the analysis, because the distinctive
features uncovered using OT manifest the parallels with
spatial cognition especially clearly.
5.2. Conceptual structure 2: Genealogy and the nature of
the input
The conceptual structure of kinship has something in
common with other domains of conceptual structure, but
it has its own logic as well, deriving neither from concep-
tual structure in general, nor from Optimality Theory. For
example, consanguineal distance is measured in a special
way, starting from neighboring elements and counting
links up and then down. This is more like pedigree dis-
tance, as measured by geneticists or genealogists, than
physical distance as measured by surveyors. This subsec-
tion considers what’s special about the structure of kin ter-
minology, with a focus on what the present theory has to
say about one of the most contentious issues in anthropol-
ogy, the relationship between kinship and genealogy.
Anthropologists distinguish between genealogical defi-
nitions of kin terms – how genealogical positions map onto
terms – and categorical definitions – how terms are related
to one another. Up to this point, our application of OT to
kin terminology has been straightforwardly genealogical.
The input to the machinery of kin classification was stipulated
to be a kin type – a genealogical formula – like Mother’s
Older Sister. The assumption, never explicitly defended,
was that however much kin terms vary, they are built up
from elementary types shared across cultures. An implication
is that kin terms are intertranslatable: terms from one
language can be defined using terms from another language
(sometimes with the addition of extra distinctions, like Older
or Younger). For example, in explaining Seneca aunt terms to
an English speaker, one could say that in Seneca, mother’s
sister but not father’s sister is equated with mother. Conver-
sely, one could explain English aunt terms to a Seneca
speaker by saying that English equates both the ahje (‘older
sister’) and the kaga (‘younger sister’) of noyeh (‘mother’)
with ahgahuc (‘father’s sister’) rather than with noyeh.
But there are problems with a strictly genealogical
approach to kin terms. It is commonly observed that
people can, and often do, apply kin terms without knowing
all the genealogical connections involved (Keesing 1975;
Levinson 2006a; Read 2001b). To see how this is possible,
note that a Seneca speaker can figure out that the ahje of a
noyeh is a noyeh without actually knowing whether the kin
involved are genealogical or classificatory older sister and
mother. Another common observation is that in some
societies even an individual known to be unrelated by birth
or marriage – a resident anthropologist, perhaps – may be
assigned a place as someone’s daughter or brother, and
then enfolded systematically into the whole network of kin.
Nongenealogical kinship is not fatal to the OT approach to
kin terms; it can be accommodated by expanding the range
of allowed inputs. Specifically, OT can handle nongenealogi-
cal inputs as long as these are amenable to evaluation by the
kin term constraints, which are concerned with questions
like “Is the input female or male?” and “Does the input
belong to the same generation as Mother?”
Suppose, given a Seneca constraint ranking, we try the
input ‘mother’s’ ‘older sister,’ where the terms in single
quotes are understood, not as genealogical formulas –
what an English speaker might call “real” mother or older
sister – but as glosses on Seneca categories. This input is
well-formed, because even without knowing the exact gen-
ealogy, we can say that equating the input with ‘sister’ violates
DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS, equating it with ‘father’s
sister’ violates DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, and so on. Applying
constraints as before we get the correct optimal output:
‘mother’s older sister’ merges with ‘mother.’5 Thus pluralism
about allowed inputs in OT makes room for both genealogy
and category. Allowing nongenealogical input is consistent
with evidence that people can figure out appropriate kin
terms using either explicit genealogical reckoning, or termi-
nological shortcuts, or both, depending on the context.
So what does the formal analysis of the language of kinship
tell us about the relationship between kinship and geneal-
ogy? Many anthropologists argue that, because kin terms
are often applied where genealogies are unknown or non-
existent, a genealogical definition of kinship is unworkable
(Read 2001a; 2001b). Some go even further and argue that
definitions of kin terms, and theories about how people
become kin and what kin share, are so widely variable as to
call into question whether kinship even exists as a proper
subject for cross-cultural study (Schneider 1984). According
to some skeptics, anthropologists should abandon the study
of kinship for the study of folk ideas of “relatedness,” an
open-ended polythetic domain which might not overlap
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much with Western notions of parenthood and consangui-
nity (Carsten 1997).
But simply dismissing the connection between kinship
and genealogy in this way means ignoring one of anthropol-
ogy’s great empirical findings: Pretty much every society has
a system of kin terms. These are recognizable as kin terms by
the way genealogy maps onto them. “It is clear that our infor-
mants quite generally ‘know’ which genealogical relatives go
in which kin categories” (Lehman 1993, p. 99). Figure 2
shows a portion of this mapping for English and Seneca,
and similar figures can be found in hundreds of articles
and books on kinship. Somehow, the distinctive features
that kin terminologies care about are systematically related
to genealogical distinctions. According to the present
theory, this follows from the restriction that inputs,
whether genealogical or categorical, must be well-formed –
amenable to evaluation by the kin term constraints. The
result is a systematic correspondence between genealogical
and kin term distinctions, mediated by the workings of OT,
so that, for example, a faithfulness constraint concerned
with consanguineal distance helps to generate a kin termi-
nology with a lineal/collateral distinction (sect. 3.1).
There is a paradox here. Kin terms (according to many
anthropologists) don’t have genealogical definitions, but
(according to considerable evidence) are genealogically
structured. The present theory offers one possible resol-
ution to this paradox: recognizing two levels of mental rep-
resentation for kinship, corresponding to the content and
conceptual structure of kin terms. (For content/structure
distinctions in other semantic domains, see Grimshaw
2005; Pinker 1989; 2007). While the content of individual
kin terms may vary widely and idiosyncratically across cul-
tures and be deeply entangled with local theories of pro-
creation and shared substances, the conceptual structure
of kinship manifest in the grammar of kin terms is more
universal – and shows every sign of being adapted for
tracking genealogical connections.
5.3. The grammar faculty
Talking about kin – more specifically, using terms for differ-
ent kin types – is a different problem than thinking about
them. Thinking about kin involves fitting one’s thoughts to
local facts about kinship. Mastering a kin terminology
involves, additionally, fitting one’s words to local communi-
cational conventions. Talking about kin is one example of a
coordination game, in which the goal is to choose, not the
one right answer, but the same answer as everyone else.
Playing coordination games is something of a human speci-
alty – maybe even the key human behavioral specialization
(Levinson 2006b; Tomasello et. al. 2005). One approach to
the grammar of kinship, then, and to grammar in general,
is to consider its place among games of coordination and
communication (Blutner et al. 2006).
One way to play a coordination game involves a kind of
mind reading, in which signaler and recipient cooperate by
carrying out on-the-spot simulations of one another’s
inferential and performative dispositions (Sperber &
Wilson 1995/1986). If you and I both know that we are
trying to coordinate our behavior, we may be able to
arrive at a shared understanding through one-off signals
we mutually recognize as intentional signs obeying
maxims of cooperative communication. This kind of
mind reading allows human beings to cooperate even
without a shared language, as in situations of first
contact between cultures.
Some communicative acts go beyond one-off exchanges
by reproducing conventional signs. The learning of conven-
tional signs is governed by further cooperative maxims
(Bloom 2000). The learner not only connects a sign with a
meaning, but also assumes that other members of the com-
munity will make the same connection when they interpret
or produce the sign. She assumes that novel signs have
novel meanings, rather than being synonyms of familiar
signs (Diesendruck & Markson 2001).
Finally, conventionalization may go one step further. The
precedents set by communicative acts may be generalized to
produce systematic rules for encoding information. Human
communication thus runs along a spectrum, from less to
more conventionalized, from pragmatic to grammatical.
The contrast between pragmatic-inferential and gram-
matical-encoded communication is a commonplace in lin-
guistics. But for many authors, grammar is just a synonym
for syntax or morphosyntax (Sperber & Wilson 1995/
1986). This article takes a more inclusive approach. Pho-
nology is grammatical, and, according to the argument
above, so is kin terminology. Grammatical principles may
govern other semantic fields – including body parts,
colors (Jones 2010; Kay & Maffi 1999), and spatial relation-
ships (Levinson & Wilkins 2006) – as well as the interface
between semantics and morphosyntax – including pro-
nouns and subject choice (Aissen 1999) and verb argu-
ment structure (Legendre et al. 2006) – and morphology
and syntax more generally (Legendre et al. 2001).
Taken as a whole, this work implies that there is more
to grammar than semantics, phonology, morphology or
syntax in isolation. The rest of this article advances a strong
hypothesis about this extra something, arguing that part of
the uniquely human suite of adaptations for playing coordi-
nation games is a grammar faculty, adapted to facilitate the
construction of locally shared codes of communication and
interaction. This faculty interacts with, but is distinct from,
domain-specific adaptations in conceptual structure, phonol-
ogy, and syntax. In each domain, the grammar faculty solves
several problems: (1) using ranked constraints to generate
grammatical outputs, (2) matching the learner’s constraint
rankings with community rankings, and, more tentatively,
(3) discovering constraints. I consider these in turn.
1. How ranked constraints generate grammatical output
is well-trodden ground in Optimality Theory. Not so well
understood is why OT works the way it does – why, particu-
larly, it resorts to ranking rather than quantitative maximiza-
tion to handle constraint trade-offs. The grammar faculty
hypothesis implies one answer (suggested independently
by other researchers: Smolensky & Legendre 2006), that
constraint ranking is adapted to the demands of communi-
cation and other coordination games.
By way of illustration, consider the functional demands of
two tasks, allocating assistance to kin, and communicating
about them. At its simplest, the first task is a matter of house-
hold economics, of distributing scarce resources among
oneself and one’s relatives. According to a well-known
result in evolutionary theory, this can be treated as a maximi-
zation problem (subject to some restrictions: Frank 1998).
The evolutionarily optimal solution maximizes a quantity
called inclusive fitness. The second problem is different.
Given the problem of what to call different kin, there is an
enormous array of possibilities for separating, marking,
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merging, and omitting terms. As members of a language com-
munity make trade-offs between supplying information and
avoiding effort, the crucial consideration is that they make
the same trade-offs. OT solves this coordination problem
readily, asking of speakers and hearers only that they share
a constraint ranking. With a shared constraint ranking, the
Seneca, for example, can settle on Mother’s Sister being
called ‘mother,’ with further implications for other relatives
(every Mother’s Sister’s Child is some type of sibling),
without having to precisely equate quantitative feature
weights or encyclopedic knowledge. Just as particulate
inheritance in genetics improves the fidelity of replication
between generations, the strict ranking of discrete constraints
makes it easier for language communities to reproduce stan-
dardized codes. Although more theoretical work needs to be
done, it is plausible that OT grammars flourish where they do
because of their advantages for communication.
2. Since constraint rankings vary across cultures, they
have to be learned. This process is fairly well understood,
at least in outline. Given a shared constraint set, language
learners can solve the induction problem of generalizing
from limited input to rules of language by using a
procedure called constraint demotion to match their con-
straint rankings with those in the local speech community
(Tesar & Smolensky 2000). Briefly, this works as follows:
The learner begins with some constraint ranking – generally
one in which markedness constraints outrank faithfulness
constraints. When she hears others speaking in a way incon-
sistent with her current ranking, she identifies the con-
straints responsible for the inconsistency, and moves them
far enough down in her constraint ranking to remove the
inconsistency – but no farther – repeating as often as
necessary. This procedure converges fairly quickly on the
correct constraint ranking: With n constraints, the number
of possible constraint rankings, ignoring scales, is n!, but
the number of informative examples needed for the con-
straint demotion algorithm to work is a manageablen . (n-1).
Applied to kin terms, constraint demotion implies that when
a child learns that Mother’s Sister is equated with Mother she
is not just learning a single word. She is also learning a pre-
cedent that will affect other kin terms she learns. More specifi-
cally, she is learning that MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS
outranks DISTINGUISH DISTANCE, which blocks the incli-
nation to learn distinct terms for certain more distant kin,
like Mother’s Sister’s Child (given the scale MINIMIZE FAR
KIN  MINIMIZE NEAR KIN). But not conversely: If she
hears a Cousin called Sibling, this will not block her learning
that his mother is called something other than Mother
(D’Andrade 1971). The grammar faculty hypothesis thus has
still-untested implications for how kin terms are learned.
3. The grammar faculty faces one further problem.
According to OT, constraints or constraint schemas are
universal. But where do universals come from? This area
of OT is not well-understood, but we can at least
compare two possible kinds of answer.
Constraints could be innate. In each of the domains in
which grammar operates, language learners might face a
fixed menu of constraints ready to be ranked. For each
domain there would be a separate evolutionary story about
where constraints come from. Applied to kin terms, this
would imply that not just the conceptual structure of
kinship, but actual constraints on kin terms – or maybe
more abstract constraint schemas for space-like conceptual
structure – are built into humans by natural selection.
This simple solution is not very plausible for kin terms, or
in general. In phonology, where the topic has received most
attention, a recent review concludes that “the innateness
hypothesis faces two obstacles: it fails to provide credible
accounts of either the epigenesis or phylogenesis of [con-
straints]” (Bermu´dez-Otero & Bo¨rjars 2006). The alternative
is that constraints are neither innate nor culturally acquired,
but discovered. Theories of constraint discovery are not as
well-developed as other areas of OT, but in general terms,
constraint discovery involves a learner’s grammar machinery
monitoring her psychological operations – perceptual, con-
ceptual, and motor – on the lookout for salient prototypical
and distinctive features likely to be mutually relevant to
speakers and hearers. (Bermu´dez-Otero & Bo¨rjars, 2006,
review several proposals for phonology.) Constraint discov-
ery is a coordination game, with each player trying to zero
in on a set of constraints likely be chosen by everyone else.
On this view, grammar would have a well-defined function,
but its scope would be open-ended. Grammars could grow
opportunistically, colonizing any “grammar-friendly” cogni-
tive or perceptual domain in which universals of psychology
provide common ground for developing shared codes.
Thus, the study of kin terms does not lead to the discovery
of one special-purpose module: there is no Kin Term Acqui-
sition Device. Instead, there is a conceptual structure of
kinship, partly homologous with conceptual structure in
other domains, partly of specialized design. And there is a
grammar of kinship, bridging the gap between thoughts
and words with communicational principles of more
general application. The study of kin terms, in other
words, leads beyond kin terms, to “fundamental structures
of the human mind” (Le´vi-Strauss 1969, pp. 75, 84).
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NOTES
1. Following the example of Lounsbury (1964a), the constraint
ranking for Seneca glosses over the fact that Seneca “words” for sib-
lings are compounds, with no sex distinction in the root (Kay 1975).
This can be accommodated in an OT framework by using several
constraints distinguishing sex, with different ranks. One set of
constraints, part of Seneca rules for compounding, automatically
imposes sex distinctions on a non–self-reciprocal like Older
Sibling, but not on a self-reciprocal like Cousin (roughly she-
older-sibling-me or he-older-sibling-me versus we-cousin-each-
other). Another constraint, closer to kinship semantics sensu
stricto, handles sex distinctions among roots.
2. There is not just one, but a family of generational constraints
active across cultures. The extra constraints can be assembled out
of existing constraints using a standard technique from OT called
constraint conjunction (McCarthy 2001, p. 18). A conjunctive con-
straint combines two constraints; it is violated only ifboth of its con-
stituent constraints are violated. A constraint active in many kin
terminologies combines DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS and DIS-
TINGUISH DISTANCE. This constraint, DISTINGUISH GENER-
ATIONS & DISTANCE, bars any terminological merger of kin
types in different generations at different distances from Ego,
but allows child (generation -1) to merge with parent (þ1), or
grandchild (-2) with grandparent (þ2). Another conjunctive con-
straint, DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS & GRADE, bars any
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terminological merger of kin types between ascending and des-
cending generations, but allows grandparent to merge with
parent, or grandchild with child. In other words, if two kin types
m and n generations away from Ego are merged, DISTINGUISH
GENERATIONS & DISTANCE is happy as long as m and n have
the same absolute value, and DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS &
GRADE is happy as long asm and n have the same sign. Both grand-
child/grandparent and grandparent/parent mergers are common
across cultures (Murdock 1970). In English they are found in the
prefixes and roots, respectively, of grandkin terms.
3. The three scales cover most markedness relations in kin ter-
minology, but not all. Greenberg (1966) suggested provisionally
that female kin are universally marked relative to male. But evi-
dence for this is conflicting; the relationship seems to be reversed
in some languages, including Seneca (Lounsbury 1964a). Another
markedness gradient entails that elaborated, specific kin types are
marked relative to unelaborated and generic: Parent’s Younger
Brother is marked relative to Parent’s Brother, which is marked
relative to Parent’s Sibling. Instead of adding constraints and
scales to handle this, we can simply stipulate that more specific
types incur more violations of MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS
than less specific types. Finally, gradations of markedness (as in
English affinal terminology, above) involve the interaction
between markedness scales for kin terminology and other mark-
edness scales covering varieties of markedness (Jones 2010).
4. Some complications should be noted. First, we can better
capture how markedness constraints generate reduction rules
in local OT by rewriting MINIMIZE SECOND, ETC., COUSINS as
MINIMIZE ___ PARENTS’ SIBLINGS’ ___, which calls for the
doubly embedded material to be replaced, with the replacement
subject to the remaining ranked constraints. Second, note that in
the reduction sequence, Father’s Son is replaced by Brother. In
the OT approach, no explicit rule is needed to produce this
result, as long as there is no faithfulness constraint explicitly pre-
venting it, which fits the cross-cultural data. Third, we give the
optimal replacement for a doubly embedded Mother’s Brother
as Father. But this follows only if possible replacements are
limited to consanguineal kin in the same generation, which in
turn follows only if two constraints not shown here, DISTINGUISH
AFFINES and DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS, have a high rank. If
we relax this assumption, and give a low rank to either of these
constraints, we get various common non-Iroquois terminologies,
such as Dravidian or Crow (Lounsbury 1964a; 1964b).
5. Not every possible combination of kin terms is a well-
formed input. A Seneca speaker couldn’t give the correct term
for a child of mother’s ahgareseh (‘cross cousin’), for example,
without knowing the cross cousin’s sex, which ahgareseh omits.
The corresponding input is ill-formed unless information is
added to give DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN enough to work on.
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Abstract: Jones introduces an intricate machinery of kin classification
that overcomes limitations of previous accounts. I question whether
such a machinery is plausible. Because individuals never need to learn
the entire spectrum of kin terminology, they could rely on data-driven
learning. The complexity of Jones’s machinery for kin classification
casts doubt on the existence of innate structures that cover the
complete linguistic domain.
Jones claims that his extended framework of Optimality Theory (OT)
overcomes the limitations of previous accounts of kin terminology.
His application of the study of conceptual structure to kin terminol-
ogy and his finding that the latter “borrows much of its organization
from the conceptual structure of space . . . [and] the tracing of close
parallels in conceptual structure in both cases” (sect. 5.1) promises to
integrate kin terminology within human cognition.
In spite of these promising aspects of the paper, several problems
remain. First, Jones has given us no new reason to believe that
kinship terminology has to have a universal grammar (UG).
Taking kinship UG for granted, he never addresses standard criti-
cisms of UG in the linguistic domain from developmental (e.g.,
Behme & Deacon 2008; Edelman & Waterfall 2007; Elman et al.
1996; Monahagan & Christiansen 2008; Redington et al. 1998;
Sagae et al. 2004; Solan et al. 2005; Tomasello 2003; 2006) or evol-
utionary (e.g., Arbib et al. 2008; Botha 1999; Christiansen & Chater
2008; Deacon 2007; MacWhinney 2005; Studdert-Kennedy 1998;
Tomasello 2008) perspectives. While it seems possible that the uni-
versal rules Jones discusses exist, he has not shown that all humans
rely on the same innate “template” to assign kinship terms. Given
the complexity of constraints and rankings that become already
evident in the two languages Jones discusses in detail, it appears
questionable that the suggested version of OT could apply to all
existing human cultures without spiraling into a computationally
unmanageable system. Nor is it evident how such an intricate
“machinery of kin classification” (sect. 5.2) might have evolved
though natural selection. The constraints and trade-offs suggested
just for the small segment of existing kinship terms Jones discusses
give a flavour of the complexity required by a system that covers
universally all human societies. And Jones does not even consider
complicating factors such as within language variation of kinship
assignments, polygamous or same sex marriages, divorce, and
remarriage. It would appear that kinship terminology needs to
remain flexible to account for the fluidity of the input, and Jones
does not make it clear how an innate system could offer such
flexibility.
Jones observes that kin terminology is highly constrained:
“Languages around the world have independently hit on similar
patterns, while largely steering clear of other imaginable possibili-
ties. Kin terminologies are not perfectly regular, but overwhel-
mingly so” (sect. 2.3). He takes this as support for his theory. Yet,
it is also possible that kin terminologies are similar because what
they describe is similar: There are limits on how human beings
can be related to one another, how property can be passed on to
the next generation, how sexual relationships (e.g., marriage) can
be executed, and more. When learning kin terminology, individuals
face a very limited specific subset of the potentially possible kin
arrangements. Thus, it is imaginable that they learn the relevant
kin terms from the input they receive without having to rely on
an innate system that has to accommodate all possible arrange-
ments. Furthermore, some of Jones’ examples appear to be post
hoc. Seemingly, we have to know how English and Seneca assign
kinship terms before we can design the system that accounts for
these assignments. Potential counterexamples are then accounted
for by invoking additional “rules.” Take the Seneca derivation of
“Older Mother’s Mother’s Brother’s Son,” which results in ‘cross
cousin.’ Jones admits that this violates constraints invoked earlier
because “in the case of first cousins, aunts, and uncles, Seneca is
meticulous about keeping adjacent matrikin separate” (sect. 4.1).
Yet, given that ‘cross cousin’ is the term used by the Seneca,
Jones holds that “apparently when Mother’s Brother is buried
deeply enough inside a larger expression, the contrast between
adjacent matrikin is neutralized. This is a markedness effect.”
(sect. 4.1). It is not clear how Jones’ system could have predicted
when to invoke the markedness effect had we not already known
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what the output is. This holds true even if we accept that Jones uses
a revised form of OT that incorporates iterated processes which
restrict the size of moves and allow the output to be fed back into
the input repeatedly. It may be true that this revision “can generate
the full array of Seneca cousin terms out to indefinite distances”
(sect. 4.1). But, given that “cousin terms to indefinite distance”
have no practical application in actual language use and that indi-
viduals often struggle to assign kin terms to distant relatives, it is
not clear that such a system exists and how it could have evolved.
Overall, it would have been helpful had Jones shown how his
system can predict unfamiliar kinship terms after receiving only
partial input from an arbitrarily chosen language. If those predic-
tions do not match with the observed terms, it stands to reason
that the proposed system has only limited applicability.
Finally, Jones may be correct to suggest that even though the
content of individual kin terms varies widely across cultures “the
conceptual structure of kinship manifest in the grammar of kin
terms is more universal – and shows every sign of being
adapted for tracking genealogical connections” (sect. 5.2).
However, it does not follow without further argument that a uni-
versal grammar of kin terms exist. Just as the existence of
language universals has been challenged recently (e.g., Evans
& Levinson 2009) it remains to be seem whether or not the
suggested kinship universals exist. Given that individuals grow
up in particular communities and thus encounter there one
specific subset of kin-terminology the coordination problem
Jones discusses (sect. 5.3) could be resolved by data-driven learn-
ing. Learning kin terminology does not occur in isolation but is
embedded in a broader context of language learning. Here like
elsewhere it is plausible to assume that learners rely on multiple
cues to arrive at the correct solution. And, considering that kin
terms only cover a very small segment of human cognition, the
complexity of Jones’ proposed machinery needed to handle this
segment casts doubt on the existence of innate structures that
cover the complete linguistic domain.
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Abstract: In this commentary, I focus on Jones’ suggestion of a close
connection between the domain of space and that of kinship. I expand
on that suggestion by introducing the concept of frame of reference
and show how it can possibly participate to the generation of kinship
systems.
Jones makes extensive use of Optimality Theory (OT) to obtain a
fresh new look at kinship as mental knowledge. OT has been typi-
cally used in the study of language, mainly phonology, but also
morphology, semantics, and syntax. The successful application
of OT in the study of kinship opens the possibility for Jones to
speculate about general principles of human cognition.
Jones himself, though, is eager to point out that OT has funda-
mental limitations. In fact, he states “According to OT, constraints
or constraint schemas are universal. But where do universals come
from? This area of OT is not well-understood” (sect. 5.3). This very
important issue about OT reminds me of what I regard as a short-
coming of Lakoff’s cognitive semantics (Lakoff 1987; 1988. For a
similar shortcoming see also prototype theory, Rosch 1978). Here,
fundamental organizations of knowledge are pointed out, but how
these essential aspects of cognition come to be is left unexplained
(Lakoff clearly points out that these organizations are rooted in
our bodily structures, but he does not delineate what kind of
mental processes are involved at those critical stages).
What is crucial to both approaches (Jones’ and Lakoff’s),
however, is the realization (and suggestion) that spatial knowl-
edge contributes in a significant way to the organization of
other domains of knowledge, for example, kinship and others.
That is, it appears that some fundamental aspects of the way in
which human mentally organize knowledge about space is essen-
tially replicated in other domains, and specifically in the concep-
tual structures module (see Jackendoff 2002, for mental modules;
and Bennardo 2009, for the significance of space).
It is here that I see the relevance of Jones’s analyses. After
taking the OT route to the analysis of kinship, he realizes (and
strongly suggests) that “kin terminology, like other abstract
semantic domains, such as time, change of state, and possession,
borrows much of its organization from the conceptual structure
of space” (sect. 5.1). This is a line of thinking that I have
pursued extensively in the last decade (see Bennardo 2009)
and that I find very productive in elucidating a number of cogni-
tive phenomena besides supporting a particular mental architec-
ture such a that proposed by Jackendoff (1997; 2002).
Space, as an ontological prime, is assigned a module of its own –
“spatial representations” – in Jackendoff’s (1997) modular archi-
tecture of the mind, wherein it is connected to other modules
including the “conceptual structures” one. I expanded on this
proposal (Bennardo 2009) and argued for a primacy of the
mental organization of spatial knowledge that is later reduplicated
in other domains of knowledge, such as time, possession, traditional
navigational practices, traditional religion, kinship, and social
relationships. This suggestion is also supported from the evidence
available in developmental psychology about the very early pres-
ence of complex spatial knowledge in infants (e.g., Mandler 2004).
Jones’ proposal, then, strikes a familiar chord within my line of
thinking, and it might be of interest to slightly expand on this
part regarding space. One fundamental content of the “spatial
relationships” module is that of Frame of Reference (FoR) (see
Bennardo 2009; Levinson 2003). Choosing a FoR, or perspec-
tive-taking, is a universal prerequisite of any spatial description.
A FoR is a set of coordinates (three intersecting axes: vertical,
sagittal, and transversal) used to construct an oriented space
within which spatial relationships among objects are identified.
There are three major types of FoR: relative, intrinsic, and absol-
ute. A relative FoR is centered on a speaker and it remains cen-
tered on the speaker when the speaker moves; for example, when
one says, “The ball is in front of me.” An intrinsic FoR is centered
on an object and it remains centered on the object when the
object moves; for example, “The ball is in front of the car.” An
absolute FoR uses fixed points of reference, for example,
north, south, east, west, as in “The town is south of the river.”
And there are subtypes of the absolute that use one axis (e.g.,
land-sea), or even only one point (e.g., Mecca, sacred mountain).
In Bennardo (2009), I labeled this latter type “radial,” wherein
Ego is back-grounded and other-than-ego is fore-grounded.
All three FoRs share some minimal conceptual content like
“Ego,” “field of Ego,” “other-than-Ego,” and “vectorial relation-
ship between the two” (toward or away from). For the intrinsic
FoR, the “other-than-Ego” element has a field different from
Ego’s, while the other two FoRs use only Ego’s field. Focusing
on Ego obtains the relative FoR, focusing on other-than-Ego
(in the same field of Ego) obtains the absolute FoR.
Using conceptual organizations of space of this type – that is,
FoR – would generate different kinds of kinship systems such as
classificatory (with focus on sibling/s or other-than-Ego) and
descriptive (with focus on Ego) (Bennardo & Read 2008). In
other words, it is the fact that this complex spatial knowledge –
in the form of FoRs obtained developmentally very early
(Mandler 2004) – contributes to the generation of other
domains of knowledge that makes an OT approach appear expla-
natory (in this case of kinship phenomena). In fact, any FoR, once
generated, may be thought of as a constraint on the generation
of other knowledge organizations in many domains, including
kinship. What is clearer though in this case is the fact that we
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can now see where constraints come from and how they are gen-
erated from conceptual primes, for example, Ego, other-than-
Ego, vectors, and so forth (see Levinson 2003, and Lehman &
Bennardo 2003, for spatial primitives).
I am convinced that works like Jones’ are pushing the field of
kinship in the right direction, that is, toward a deeper under-
standing of the working, both content and structure, of the
human mind. Witness to that is the mere fact that I found
myself talking about the role of space in human cognition to
the readers of this commentary.
Will Optimality Theory colonize all of higher
cognition?
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Abstract: To establish Optimality Theory as a framework in
anthropology, or as a general model of higher human cognition,
researchers have to demonstrate OT is convincing in a number of ways.
This commentary summarizes some of them – based on experience
obtained in contemporary linguistic OT – including factorial typologies,
exact formulation of candidate sets and constraints, and computational
plausibility.
By concluding that “[g]rammar could grow opportunistically,
colonizing any ‘grammar-friendly’ cognitive or perceptual
domain,” Jones envisages a fruitful future to OT-based
approaches to culture. I certainly have shared his optimism,
since I presented an attempt to apply Optimality Theory to
religious rituals elsewhere (Biro´, in press).
However, for this “colonizing enterprise” to be fruitful, one
must establish its goal and match the strategy. OT can
“conquer” anthropology and cultural studies in three different –
even if not necessarily mutually exclusive – ways. Either, OT is
used as a pure technique; or, an OT-based linguistic model is
enlarged to also encompass cultural phenomena; or, OT
becomes a general model of the underlying brain mechanisms
shared by language and other realms of (higher) cognition.
In what follows, I review these three “colonizing” directions,
discussing which strategies potential “conquerors” ought to
follow, what pitfalls they must avoid.
1. Optimality Theory as a technique. To most linguists, OT is a
model accounting for observed typologies. For an oversimplified
example, imagine that the languages of the world belong to three
types: some always stress the first syllable of the word, other
languages stress the last one, and other again stress the penulti-
mate syllable; none of them put the stress on the second syllable
as a rule. This observation-based typology can be explained using
three constraints: 1. prefer early stress; 2. prefer late stress;
3. penalize word-final stress. The six permutations of these
three primitive constraints will reproduce exactly the three
language types, and importantly, this model also correctly pre-
dicts the lack of the fourth type. (For a longer explanation, see
Biro´, in press; or Biro´ 2006, sect. 1.1.)
Similarly, if anthropologists decide to borrow OT as a tech-
nique to account for kinship terminologies, they should first list
all attested types; then propose constraints; and finally demon-
strate that all attested types correspond to some constraint per-
mutation, but no permutation corresponds to an unattested
type. Ideally, the number of types in the exhaustive typology is
relatively low, and the number of documented cultures is large
enough for the difference between attested and unattested
types to be statistically significant. For the model to be convin-
cing, a few primitive constraints must explain a larger number
of complex types. Only by keeping this in mind can scholars of
culture avoid the quick-rise-quick-fall story so typical of many
theories borrowing a method from a different discipline.
As the number of constraints grows, the number of their per-
mutations grows factorially. Yet, software tools (among many
others, OTKit by Biro´, available at: http://www.birot.hu/OTKit/)
help exploring such factorial typologies. These tools force the lin-
guist to be very concrete: the candidate set and the constraints
must be explicitly defined. Unfortunately, these two basic build-
ing blocks of OT are only implicit in too many papers, including
Jones’. It is even unclear to me whether he optimizes kinship
terms or kinship term systems.
2. Optimality Theory as a tool to include culture into
language. The history of anthropology in the twentieth century
will probably discourage many cognitive scholars of culture
from adopting yet another linguistic theory. Therefore, those
choosing this second, “colonizing” direction, such as Jones,
must make clear how the relation between “language,” “think-
ing,” and “culture” is expressed in the proposed model.
Within the OT camp, this approach corresponds to including
nonlinguistic constraints into the linguistic computations, simi-
larly to Jones, who adds vocabulary constraints based on anthro-
pological research. However, for a linguist, the lexicon of the
language is learnt and arbitrary, and it is unclear how one
would apply constraints on the lexicon. When an adult speaker
produces a sound stream for the meaning ‘mother’s older
sibling’s son,’ the candidates are words in the language with
already fixed meanings. True, certain logic transpires the
system of kinship terminology, unlike other terminologies; and
yet, do we have evidence for the distinction between a mother
and an aunt, between a noyeh and an ahgahuc, being processed
differently from the distinction between a table and a chair, or
between a dog and a monkey? A possible research direction for
this approach would be to demonstrate: a child learning the
relative importance of “matrikin distinction” over “distance dis-
tinction” in the target language suddenly improves her perform-
ance even on previously unheard kinship terms, but no such
effect is discernible with the relative importance of “four-legged-
ness” over “surface color” in other domains.
3. Optimality Theory as a shared underlying mecha-
nism. Smolensky and Legendre (2006) demonstrate how OT
can describe linguistic phenomena in a way that is not only
descriptively adequate, but also computable, learnable, and
most importantly, which can be implemented in a neurologically
plausible network. Convinced that OT and OT-like approaches
(such as Harmonic Grammar) have the potential to become a
framework for research on higher cognition in general, and not
only in linguistics in particular, Biro´ (in press) presents a model
for religious rituals. Jones (2004) argued earlier for the same
OT mechanism lying behind social and linguistic cognitions,
and kinship constraints being neither linguistic constraints, nor
technical analogues: similarly to linguistic constraints, they exem-
plify the general building blocks of human cognition.
This third research strategy entails that we argue for more and
more cognitive domains to share OT as a formalism describing
their underlying mechanism. Moreover, the interest shifts from
plainly reproducing observed facts in higher cognition (language,
kinship terminology, religious rituals, mathematics, arts, etc.) to
other aspects of the underlying mental mechanism. For instance,
to issues such as the time and memory needed to find the best
candidate using psychologically realistic algorithms, or the
error rate of these algorithms. It may turn out, for instance,
that Harmonic Grammar is more plausible as a model than
Optimality Theory, because the weights are easier to implement
with (artificial or real) neurons (Smolensky & Legendre 2006),
and its implementation is also less prone to error (Biro´ 2009).
Anthropologists adopting OT must be aware that they are aiming
at a moving target: The supposedly universal theory of language cur-
rently varies from linguist to linguist. Nevertheless, I am confident
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that anthropologists can contribute to establishing together a solid,
OT-based model of general human (higher) cognition.
Kinship terms are not kinship
doi:10.1017/S0140525X10001949
Maurice Bloch
London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.
m.e.bloch@lse.ac.uk
www2.lse.ac.uk/anthropology/people/bloch.aspx
Abstract: The target paper claims to contribute to the conceptualisation
of kinship but is, in fact, only concerned with descriptive kinship
terminologies. It uses Optimal Theory to analyse this vocabulary but it
is not clear if this is to be understood as a psychological phenomenon.
Jones does not make clear how this special vocabulary might relate to
kinship in general.
The field of kinship is broad. It concerns the representations and
practices, explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, which
are concerned with the genetic links that exist between individ-
uals. Culture and history lead to wide variation in this field,
thus genetic links may be represented saliently or not at all.
They may have great significance for what people do or only
little. Kinship representations may be represented as a
bounded set, or be inextricably mixed with representations
which have nothing to do with genetic links or allusions to
these. These representations may involve speech acts or not.
When they do, we find among such speech acts what have
been called “kinship terminologies.” The sociologically most
important type of kinship terminologies are terms of address
such as “Dad” and “Auntie.” These terms of address do not
form a closed system and cannot be understood unless taken
together with other forms of address such as pronouns, names
and other linguistic and pragmatic phenomena. For example, in
English, parents do not normally use a kinship term of address
but first names when talking to their children. Then, there is
another group of terms: the so-called descriptive terms. These
occur when one wants to specify a relationship. In a natural
setting, the use of such terms is less frequent than it is for
terms of address, and it is the descriptive terms which are the
subject matter of this paper. My first point is, therefore, that
the title of the paper misleads as to the scope of argument
since it purports to be “human kinship” in general.
Descriptive kinship terms form a bounded set; but this fact is
mere tautology because of the meaning of the English word
“kinship.” Whether descriptive kinship terms form a cognitive
bounded set must remain an open issue and Jones supplies no
evidence that they do.
Words that can be called descriptive kinship form a variety of
different formal systems. There have been a number of proposals
for analysing such systems and these are well reviewed here. The
proposal to use Optimality Theory for such an analysis is convincing.
The question, however, is: What is the significance of this? Jones
claims to, at the very least, make a contribution to the study of the
conceptual structure of descriptive kinship terminology. I am not
quite sure what is meant by this claim. Does it mean that speakers
somehow go through the rule procedures implied by Optimality
Theory when deciding which word to use? If that is the claim,
then I regret that Jones presents little or no evidence for such
mental procedures. The author also claims that the rule procedure
for Optimality Theory explains how the child learns the proper use
of descriptive kinship term. Again this may be so; but he cites no
developmental study of the learning of kinship terms.
The main conclusion of the article is “that constraints are
neither innate nor culturally acquired, but discovered.” This
may be so; but I would have thought that none of the three pos-
sibilities exclude each other and probably all three are true.
Even, in any case, if the paper has demonstrated this, this dem-
onstration would then apply to all those apparently systematic
bits of our vocabulary (closed class forms) and the conclusion
would be in no way specific to kinship. The article thus does
not advance our understanding of the conceptualisation of
kinship as such.
The cognitive path through kinship
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Abstract: Integral to the discipline of anthropology are both science and
holism. The application of Optimality Theory to two partial kin
terminologies narrows analysis to descriptive value, fragments
phenomena, and constrains data selection, which precludes significant
knowledge. Embedded in this critique is a call to move analysis from
fragment to whole and from descriptive features to deeper levels of
knowledge underlying kin terms, thereby leading to a cognitive path for
holistic understanding of human phenomena.
Anthropology is a robust, four-field science with kinship studies
at its heart. The title Human Kinship is misleading. It should
be Kinship Terminology. Reducing kinship to terms and terms
to linguistic referents leaves out much of the anthropology of
kinship. Kin terms are minimally linguistic phenomena but
contain social, cultural, conceptual, cognitive, and algebraic
dimensions as well.
Human kinship is broad and multidimensional, encompassing
more than selective kin terms from two cultural systems con-
sidered as linguistic referents. Jones claims that certain kin
term–constraining features based on properties of Optimality
Theory act as faithfulness constraints whose sequential order
shifts in correspondence with a specific kinship terminology.
Kin terms used are consanguineal with some mention of the
affinal. Analysis of kinship terminologies, though, must link
three universal forms of kinship: consanguinity and affinity and
sponsorship, each of which is equally and interdependently sig-
nificant to understanding human kinship. Consanguinity refers
to relations conceived in some cultures as sharing the biological
substance of blood, while in others (as in Arab kinship
systems), it is metaphorically perceived as a human body with
components linked by nerves or a central nervous system.
Terms for kin group segmentation among Badawis (Bedouin
groups) are corporeal, referring to body parts (limbs, thighs,
etc.) forming a whole. The central notion of ‘asabiyya,’ translated
in the literature as “solidarity,” introduced as a core concept in
the first, still current, organized theory of kinship formulated in
the 14th century by the Arab social philosopher Ibn Khaldun
(Ibn Khaldun 1961), is a term referring to a state of bondness
resulting from shared nerves. Only purity of breed is expressed
in blood terms. All of this challenges the unsubstantiated gener-
alization that “kinship is normally conceptualized in spatial
terms,” which misconstrues the reference from Leaf (2006).
The second class of kinship, affinity, is formed by ties created
through marriage. The third, which I expediently refer to as spon-
sorship, is universal and appears cross-culturally in different
forms such as spiritual parenthood (godparenthood), adoption,
suckling, blood exchange, and so forth, with evidence of its pres-
ence in ancient times. All three forms have kin terms that interest-
ingly may differ, overlap, or supersede each other. A current,
exploratory research study on suckling kinship among Qatari
Gulf Arabs (El Guindi 2009–2010) suggests interdependence
among terms and behaviors in all three kinship domains. The
present study prebiases conclusions by only nominally utilizing
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in its set of features affinal terms and altogether leaving out
(perhaps due to deficiency in existing data records) the third form.
Other concerns include the following:
1. A claimed universality even though application is only
demonstrated for two partial kin terminologies, English and
Seneca. For instance, Faithfulness Constraint of Sex is based
on a proposed Male-Female polarity. Can the devised system
accommodate the many ethnographic cases of a “third sex”
(Wikan 1978, among other studies)? However, the other polarity
of bond-boundary has positive potential if developed further.
2. An asserted homology between kin terminologies (con-
sidered a linguistic domain) and other domains, such as spatial
structure. A homologous conceptual structure enters analysis at
a different level, and hence seems superfluous to the main goal
of describing the differences among kinship terminologies.
3. The social and the mental dimensions are assumed to be at
the same level of abstraction. Figure 1 in the target article men-
tions social organization and social cognition. We know that social
organization exists at the level of society. But what is social cogni-
tion? Is it being claimed that cognition, too, exists at the level of
society? Is it cognition of the social? Is cognition social? Or is it a
Durkheimian-style, societally derived or determined cognition?
4. Ambiguity in the use of the notion of shape: “[shape] is
about the structure, rather than content, of kin terms” (sect. 1).
Is shape the same as form? Is form structure? If so, then concep-
tual structure as presented is at a low level of abstraction, quite
distant from cognitive structure.
5. Producing an “account of why kin terminologies have the
shapes they have” (sect. 1; emphasis added) becomes a partial
description of the physical features of a particular set of data
from Seneca and English kinship terminologies. A selective
data pool is insufficient for conclusive generalizations and analy-
sis of partial data does not automatically lead to understanding
the whole. Nor should the whole be assumed.
6. The author generously borrows [Optimality theory (OT)] and
[Utility theory (UT)] from other fields (linguistic, economics, etc.),
and vocabulary such as time, space, cognition, social organization,
OT, UT, kin terms, shape, conceptual structure, semantic contrasts,
constraints ranking, language, markedness theory, open-class,
closed-class, faithfulness constraints, markedness scales. These voca-
bulary borrowings are neither convincingly motivated nor coherently
linked. They might serve interdisciplinarity, but do not serve science.
7. The stated goal that “constraint ranking defines the
grammar of each language, establishing a shared code among
speakers and listeners” (sect. 1.2; emphasis added) presumes,
but does not take us onto, a road to cognition.
8. Jones claims that “In language after language, time is treated
as a more abstract version of space” (sect. 1), which is substantiated
by neither ethnography nor theory (see Hubert 1905). Having
recently completed an ethnographically grounded monograph on
the notion of time and space, I disagree (El Guindi 2008). Time
and space are equally abstract notions variably manifested in differ-
ent forms. Time has been theoretically dealt with in isolation from
space by nonanthropologists and anthropologists alike, until the
French tradition called L’Anne´e Sociologique (later Annales Socio-
logiques), both school of thought and journal, linked the two. It was
Henri Hubert who lifted both to the appropriate level of abstraction
(see El Guindi 2008, pp. 32–35, for full discussion of this develop-
ment). His ideas formed the foundation for my building a new
theory of Islam (El Guindi 2008) based on the concept of rhythm
as it penetrates time and space.
Human systems are complexly integrated. It is difficult to see
how deploying OT by identifying a sequential list of features
reordered to describe kin terms of two cultural systems will
lead to understanding human cognition. To advance understand-
ing kinship terminologies, we cannot lose sight of anthropology’s
holism. I argue that analysis of any sociocultural domain using an
abstract conceptual structure with generative, processual proper-
ties embedded in cultural knowledge will lead more productively
to a cognitive path (El Guindi 2006).
Why do we need to coordinate when
classifying kin?
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Abstract: We suggest that there are two coordination games when it comes
to understanding kin terminology. Jones’ article focuses on the linguistic
coordination inherent in developing meaningful kin terminologies,
alluding briefly to the benefits of these kin terminologies for coordination
in other domains. We enhance Jones’ discussion by tracing the links
between the structure of kin terminologies and their functions.
Jones hypothesizes that the grammar faculty is an adaptation for
playing coordination games (sect. 5.3, para. 6), allowing an indi-
vidual to discover constraints, match his or her own constraint
rankings with those of other speakers, and generate mutually
intelligible classifications of kin. Jones does not fully develop an
evolutionary account that explains why human propensities for
coordination games should be applied to the domain of
kinship, however. In other words: Why do we need to coordinate
when it comes to classifying kin?
Evolutionary explanations of human kinship often begin with
theories of kin selection (Hamilton 1964). As cultural anthropol-
ogists often remind us (Sahlins 1976), however, kin terminologies
rarely classify kin in ways that correspond with genetic related-
ness. As a result, many cultural anthropologists see kin selec-
tion – and evolutionary theory more broadly – as irrelevant to
our understanding of human kinship (McKinnon 2005). Focusing
on the role of coordination games in the structure and function of
kin terminologies may provide a solution to the apparent dis-
parity between the ways that kin terminologies define relatedness
and the evolutionary advantages of nepotistic behavior.
Several researchers, including Jones himself (2000), have
emphasized how kinship enables individuals to identify common
interests and coordinate their actions accordingly (Chagnon
2000; Cronk & Gerkey 2007; Fox 1979; Irons 1981; Van den
Berghe 1979). We suggest that there are actually two coordination
games when it comes to understanding kin terminology. The first
game determines whether two individuals can arrive at a mutually
intelligible and agreed upon term for different kinds of kin. This is
simply a specific instance of the broader coordination game pre-
sented by language in general (Hume 1740; Lewis 1969; Sugden
2004). The second game builds on the shared meaning of kin
terms by combining them with cultural norms and values that
inform how two individuals should act toward kin. Jones focuses
primarily on the first coordination game and alludes only briefly
to the second. Exploring the relationship between these two
coordination games may provide a more comprehensive under-
standing of the structure and function of kin terminologies.
Efferson et al. (2008) demonstrated that individuals can spon-
taneously use symbolic markers to solve coordination problems.
Although these markers were arbitrary at the start of the exper-
iment, they acquired meaning and became reliable guides for
solving the coordination problem when two conditions were met:
(1) individuals differed from one another in an important but unob-
servable way, and (2) individuals were allowed to choose markers
freely and flexibly (p. 1848). Efferson et al. note that the conditions
enabling symbolic markers to serve as guides for solving coordi-
nation games should apply “whenever people have a shared interest
in distinguishing among themselves in terms of their unobservable
information” (p. 1848). Identifying kin and interacting with them
often requires a significant amount of coordination, and kin ter-
minologies may allow related individuals to distinguish among
themselves in the way that Efferson et al. describe.
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Although there is evidence suggesting that kin can to some
extent recognize one another without kin terms or other symbolic
markers (Lieberman et al. 2007), there are many important ways in
which related individuals differ from one another that are difficult
or impossible to observe. Genetic relatedness is one such trait, but,
as Jones rightly emphasizes, there are others. In human social
groups, where kinship is often inextricable from economic, politi-
cal, religious, and reproductive affairs, an individual’s sex, age,
rank, descent group, and alliances may be as important as
genetic relatedness, if not more so. This is because the kinds of
coordination problems that humans need to solve involve
complex calculations of costs and benefits in multiple currencies
that eventually have consequences for reproductive success.
The next step is to investigate how kin terminologies help individ-
uals solve coordination problems beyond the domain of classifi-
cation. Alvard and Nolin’s (2002) research on cooperative whale
hunting in Lamalera, Indonesia, shows how kinship can help
people solve coordination games. In Lamalera, descent groups
coordinate whaling by providing the equipment, skill, and labor
that lets individuals earn greater returns for their effort than solitary
productive activities. Whaling crews are composed of related indi-
viduals, but Alvard (2003) has shown that descent group member-
ship better predicts the composition of whaling crews than genetic
relatedness. Unlike genetic relatedness, which varies from individ-
ual to individual in a whaling crew, descent group membership can
be the same for all members. Interestingly, research by Nolin
(2010; in press) shows that the subsequent distribution of whale
meat in Lamalera follows genetic relatedness between households.
Lamaleran whalers use descent groups defined by kin terminolo-
gies to solve the coordination game of whaling, and then they use
the logic of kin selection to spread the spoils.
If humans possess an adaptation for solving coordination games,
we should expect this adaptation also to apply in contexts that do
not necessarily involve kin. Efferson et al.’s experimentswithsymbolic
markers support this idea, and there is evidence from other
approaches, as well. Cronk (2007) conducted experiments in Kenya
with trust games that were framed with a reference to osotua, a
need-based gift-giving relationship among Maasai. Maasai partici-
pants responded to the framed games in ways consistent with the
central principles of osotua: They were attuned to signs of need, trans-
ferring more money when the other player appeared to need help.
Given that Maasai are familiar with the osotua concept, it may not
be surprising that the osotua framing influenced how they played the
game. However, when the experiment was conducted with Ameri-
cans who were learning about osotua for the first time, the results
were nearly identical (Cronk & Wasielewski 2008). This quick adop-
tion of osotua norms and values may stem from a broader human
susceptibility to being influenced by cultural norms that facilitate
coordination. If solving coordination problems has been important
throughout our evolutionary history, then we may have developed
an alertness for and ability to quickly adopt such norms.
Kinship terminology: polysemy or
categorization?
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Abstract: The target article offers an analysis of the categorization of
kin types and empirical evidence that cross-cultural universals may
be amenable to OT explanation. Since the analysis concerns the
structuring of conceptual categories rather than the use of words, it
differs from previous OT analyses in lexical semantics in what is
considered to be the input and output of optimization.
A hypothesis of the target article is that grammar – as conceived in
Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 2004) – is a general cog-
nitive capacity underlying cognitive universals in a range of cogni-
tive domains D; the test case is D ¼ kinship terminology.
Because we find the target article unclear or ambiguous on a
number of key points, and because OT’s route to defining a D-
theory – call it T – is abstract and unfamiliar, we reformulate the
hypothesis, through a concrete metaphor involving three machines.
To determine the name of Mother’s Sister in Seneca, we begin
with machine C, which displays the genealogical tree of Figure 2 of
the target article (omitting shading and labeling). We select the
Mother’s Sister node of the tree; the machine produces an
indigo card I containing a bit-string of n 0s and 1s. Next, on the
machine G, we insert indigo card I after setting a dial to
“Seneca”; G produces an orange card O, also containing a string
of n bits. Finally, on machine V we insert orange card O after
setting a dial to “Seneca”;V responds with a word through its loud-
speaker (noyeh).
C is conceptual structure, which is universal (¼ not language-par-
ticular): C has no dial. TheoryT provides C’s genealogical graph, the
types of nodes, and so forth. C produces an indigo card I in a univer-
sal alphabet. Each symbol on I corresponds to the þ(1) or –(0)
value of a feature f k (e.g., +female). T specifies the universal
mapping from the tree on C’s screen to the bit-string of feature
values on card I – defining the universal feature-set f f kg.
G is an OT grammar, which receives indigo-card-input I and
produces orange-card-output O. The bit-string on O depends on
G’s dial setting, a language L ¼ Seneca. The elements of L are all
the different orange cards’ bit-strings that machine G can produce.
All points of C that yield the same orange card can be thought of
as constituting one of L’s D-categories; for example, Mother’s
Sister and Mother are in the same Seneca kinship category.
V is the vocabulary; it receives G’s output, the orange card O
representing a category, and, depending on the setting of its
language dial, produces a distinct name for that bit-string/cat-
egory. This name can then be used to refer any relation in that cat-
egory; it is ambiguous in the same sense that a category name is
ambiguous about which category member is being referred to.
T specifies the workings of G. Conceptually (not computa-
tionally), each possible output bit-string is evaluated by a set of
universal constraints provided by T. Markedness constraint Mk
(“MINIMIZE[þ f k]”) states that valueþ for feature f k is dispreferred
or “marked”. Faithfulness constraint Fk (“DISTINGUISH- f k”)
demands that f k’s value on orange O match f k’s value on indigo
I. Constraint conflicts are resolved by ranking: Possible output A
is preferred to possible output B if the highest-ranked constraint
that has a preference between them prefers A. If no bit-string A is
preferred to B, then B is optimal; B is the grammar’s outputO. Cru-
cially, ranking is language-particular – determined by the G’s dial.
Thus the hypothesis is that a theory T of a domain D can
provide all these specifications: Crucially, the universal con-
straints in the grammar G which, via OT computation, explain
crosscultural patterns in the conceptual distinctions conveyed
by different languages’ D-vocabularies.
At first sight, the outcome of optimization in kinship seems to
result in polysemous terms (one word ¼ several meanings) for
different kin types. Previous OT work on polysemy has focused
on the optimization of communication by means of polysemous
terms (e.g., Fong 2005; Hogeweg 2009; Zeevat 2002; Zwarts
2004; 2008;). A word is assumed to correspond to a fixed set of
semantic features. In production (which means word choice in
this domain), the input is the meaning a speaker wants to express
and the candidates are the bundles of features conflated by the
lexicon of her language. Similarly, when a hearer interprets a
word, the input is the bundle of features that are stored for this
word and the candidates are any combination of semantic features.
The optimal interpretation for a word will consist of all features in
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the input that are not in conflict with the (linguistic) context. In con-
trast, in the target article, an input is an elementary kin type from a
set shared across cultures (e.g., Mother’s Sister) and the output is a
kin type with fewer (or the same) marked feature values (e.g.,
Mother), entailing that the complex and simple type share a term:
noyeh in Seneca. It appears that noyeh is not polysemous – it
simply refers to Mother, but can be used to refer to Sister’s
Mother because this latter type has first been “reduced” to the
first type. From the perspective of the hearer this view would be
problematic when the intended meaning was the more complex
type: It is not clear by what process a hearer could arrive at the
interpretation Sister’s Mother upon hearing noyeh.
However, according to the reformulated hypothesis above,
the output of the interpretation is an abstract category subsuming
both Mother and Sister’s Mother and the analysis concerns
the structuring of conceptual categories rather than the use of
words. In other words, where the optimization in the above-men-
tioned works takes place in machine V, optimization in the target
article takes place in machine G. As such, optimization in kinship
is simply neutralization of featural differences and, surprisingly,
has more in common with previous OT analyses in the domain
of phonology than with OT analysis in the domain of polysemy.
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Abstract: Kinship systems are best explained functionally, in terms of the
conflicting needs of the society concerned, rather than in terms of
universal constraints, whether Optimality Theory or other; but OT is
particularly unsuitable as it rules out taxonomies. A conceptual analysis
of kinship terminology shows, not that “grammar” extends to kinship,
but that general cognition has the formal power to handle grammar.
Jones argues that any kinship system has to find a balance between
splitting and lumping – between the need to distinguish relatives
who are different and the need to generalise about those who are
similar. Needs such as these are part of any functional account of
how languages change and develop (Nuyts 2007) as “stable engin-
eering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints” (Evans &
Levinson 2009). It is easy to imagine a functional account of the
data that Jones lays out: of why, for example, English lumps
cousins together while Seneca lumps older sisters with older
female cousins. As Jones says, these differences are probably
related to the social structures of the societies concerned, so we
already have an explanation for them. Why, then, do we also
need cognitive constraints, such as his proposed OT constraints?
One possible argument would lie in the process by which chil-
dren learn kinship terminology, which, according to Jones, would
be speeded up if the child knew the constraints and just had to
learn their rankings (sect. 5.3). This argument would work only
if constraints were innate; but Jones himself thinks this is unli-
kely. Moreover, we don’t need innate constraints to explain
how the learning of one term and its meaning might facilitate
the learning of a later term. An even easier explanation is that
the later term’s meaning incorporates the meaning of the
earlier one. For example, when a child learns to lump a mother
together with her sister, as in Seneca, a concept is created that
can then be recycled in lumping together siblings and cousins.
Another possible argument would be that the constraints “gen-
erate” (as Jones puts it) a limited range of kinship systems,
thereby explaining why only these are found; similarly, but at
the level of the individual, once a child has learned the correct
rankings, the child’s mind “generates” the correct meanings for
the language’s potential kinship terminology. But once again
the explanation fails if not only the rankings but even the con-
straints themselves have to be learned. And once again alterna-
tive explanations are easily available: Languages have only
those kinship systems that are socially useful, and children
learn only the terminology to which they are exposed.
My conclusion is that general cognitive constraints on kinship
terminology are redundant. Kinship systems themselves evolve
under social pressures in a society and are best explained in
terms of the social, communicative and cognitive benefits to indi-
viduals of learning to lump and split in one way rather than
others. If kinship systems in different societies show differences,
that is because different pressures apply to different human
societies; and if there are limits to this variation, it is because
these societies are subject to similar social pressures.
As for kinship terminology, this evolves to fit the kinship
system, so once the system is explained, we are already heading
for an explanation for the terminology. It’s true that the fit may
be imperfect; for example, there may be gaps in the terminology
such as the lack of an English equivalent for the everyday
German word Geschwister, meaning “sibling.” However, it
seems unlikely that any general constraint could predict this
difference between English and German. (One explanation we
can’t give is that a term isn’t needed because the concept
doesn’t exist in the English kinship system; this must be wrong
because we can only define “cousin” in terms of “sibling,” as
the child of a sibling of a parent.)
If constraints of all kinds are redundant, there’s little point in
discussing the merits of particular proposals for constraints such
as the OT account that Jones develops. However, it is worth point-
ing out one general limitation of the OT mechanism when applied
to the mapping between concepts and words. At least as presented
here, it seems to exclude the possibility of a taxonomic organis-
ation of meanings. For instance, if the ranking of DISTINGUISH
SEX explains why we have to distinguish mothers from fathers,
how can we accommodate the term parent? The fact is that, at
some points, languages typically give us a choice between splitting
and lumping; so we can either split our mother from our father, or
we can lump them together as our parents. These lumped con-
cepts don’t seem to be covered by Jones’ analysis, but they play
an important part in the English system because we recycle
them in defining more distant relatives following the pattern
suggested above for “cousin”; so an aunt is the sister of a parent
and a grandfather is the father of a parent.
In spite of these reservations about the approach that Jones takes,
I agree totally that “The study of kin terms . . . leads beyond kin
terms to ‘fundamental structures of the human mind’” (sect 5.3).
Kinship terminology has featured in some of my own work
(Hudson 1996, pp. 85–88; 2007, pp. 237–38; 2010, pp. 47–50)
as an example of what I call “I-society,” our mental representation
of society, comparable with Chomsky’s “I-language.” Like Jones,
I believe it is important to consider the conceptual structures that
we use for kinship, and to consider what they tell us about the
mind and about language. But my argument runs in the opposite
direction from his. Whereas he finds a “grammar” in kinship ter-
minology, I find structures like those of kinship in grammar; for
example, as he points out, both kinship and grammar allow recur-
sion. Moreover, my conclusion is that if our minds can cope with
the complexities of I-society, then they also have the ability,
without any specialised “modules,” to cope with the complexities
of language (Hudson 2009; 2010, pp. 50, 160).
In short, the best explanation for the facts of language, includ-
ing kinship terminology, is not OT or any other theory specific to
language, but a general theory of cognition combined with a
general theory of the functional demands of communication.
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Kin term diversity is the result of multilevel,
historical processes
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Abstract: Explanations in the domain of kinship can be sought on several
different levels: Jones addresses online processing, as well as issues of
origins and innateness. We argue that his framework can more usefully
be applied at the levels of developmental and historical change, the
latter especially. A phylogenetic approach to the diversity of kinship
terminologies is most urgently required.
Kinship is unique as a domain of human experience for which we
have a vast cultural and linguistic record. That record has lan-
guished unattended for too long, and Jones is to be commended
for his attempt at reinvigorating kinship studies towards the under-
standing of our species-typical cognition. We have many points of
agreement with the program laid out in the target article (and else-
where: Jones 2000; 2003a; 2003b; 2004), especially with the
general scientific aim of generating testable hypotheses from
models and theory and seeing what the data have to say.
We agree with Jones that there are shortcomings in many
approaches to kinship terminologies (sect. 2.3). None of these
approaches provides a workable model that really captures
what is going on in people’s heads when they “do kinship” – or
what goes on in speech communities when kinship terms
change. Optimality Theory provides an ingenious approach to
these problems, and the OT constraints that Jones proposes are
for the most part plausibly motivated: They are based on univer-
sals of human experience, and they articulate human social
priorities in the domain of kinship.
A weakness of Jones’ account is that it is not clear about the
timescale (or timescales) on which this kinship-directed version
of OT operates. Within linguistics, OT is invoked at the timescale
of online processing (McCarthy 2007b). Jones uses OT at this
proximate level but also discusses OT as part of ultimate,
“origin” explanations (cf. coordination games and the evolution
of language, sect. 5.3). We question the plausibility of using OT
at these two markedly different timescales and find it more satis-
fying to think of a generalised model operating in language acqui-
sition and change. Kinship terminologies are semantic systems
used by speech communities to coordinate social behaviours,
and therefore in our view the relevant timescales at which the
constraint rules of kinship operate are developmental – how do
children acquire their culture-specific set of constraints and
then employ them in the life course? – and historical – how do
those culture-specific constraint arrangements change over time?
These two timescales are crucial components for good expla-
nations of linguistic diversity. The variation in kinship terminol-
ogy across human societies is not random (sect. 1) because, as
Jones himself has outlined (Jones 2003a), it reflects Darwinian
concerns – for example, sex, status, group membership, and so
forth. There is a very small cross-cultural literature on the acqui-
sition of kinship terminology, but developmentalists are unre-
solved on the relative importance of semantic complexity in kin
terms versus the importance of the child’s exposure to sets of
relatives as referents (Benson & Anglin 1987; Ragnarsdo´ttir
1997). In any case, to the extent that there are reliably recurring
patterns of human infant experience, ontogenetic processes may
further constrain the available variation. Most important, in any
society the kinship terminology has a history: Individuals are
not acquiring a terminology from, and languages are not con-
structing a system from, a space of infinite variation. This then
immediately reduces the amount of variation that needs to be
accounted for by the OT framework. Just as evolutionary devel-
opmental biologists have recognised the importance that both
developmental constraints and historical evolutionary processes
play in explaining organismal diversity (Breuker et al. 2006), so
too are both important in understanding evolved diversity in
kinship terminologies.
Evolutionary diversification produces hierarchically related
taxa, and because these taxa cannot be considered independent
data points, biologists have developed a range of computational
phylogenetic methods that take history into account for compara-
tive analyses. These methods have been successfully applied to
linguistic and cultural evolution as well, notably with the con-
struction of large-scale language phylogenies (e.g., Gray & Atkin-
son 2003; Gray et al. 2009; Holden 2002; Kitchen et al. 2009).
These trees provide statistical models of population history
with which we can investigate cultural evolution: Hypotheses
about coevolution, rates of change, directional models, ancestral
states, borrowing, and the mode of evolution can all be addressed
(e.g., Gray et al. 2007; Mace et al. 2005). Many studies have
focused on kinship traits (Fortunato & Mace 2009; Holden &
Mace 2003; Jordan et al. 2009), and we have begun to apply
these methods to kinship terminologies in Austronesian and
Bantu to test sequential models of sibling term evolution that
are implied by markedness theory (Jordan, in press; forthcom-
ing). We think that Jones’ program holds the most promise if
combined with a comparative phylogenetic approach that is
implemented at the level of language change. One productive
integration would allow us to detect if the outputs of constraint
rerankings over time (i.e., rule changes throughout a language
family) correlate with the empirical data when phylogeny is
taken into account.
The constraints Jones proposes (Fig. 3 of the target article) are
relatively uncontroversial as a starting point for describing the
raw conceptual material, but historical affordances will deter-
mine the nature of how these play out in different language
groups. Arguments about the primacy of these basic constraints
therefore must wait until the empirical work is done. We need
to understand the processes that have generated the observed
cross-linguistic variation; these can inform speculation about
what might be species-typical. As with other domains such as
colour (Kay & Regier 2003) or the human body (Majid et al.
2006) the nature of variation needs to be understood before we
can make any grand or ultimate claims about universality and
innateness in cognitive mechanisms. One of the attractions of
the OT framework is that despite Jones’ presentation it doesn’t
require our buy-in to any universal “atomic structures” of
kinship (sect. 1). They may exist, but we don’t need to appeal
to them to explain the historically derived patterns of kinship ter-
minologies across languages.
Some facts of Seneca kinship semantics
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Abstract: Jones’s analysis of Seneca kinship semantics gets some of the
facts about close relatives wrong, and his mechanism for extending the
analysis to distant relatives does not work.
Jones’ analysis of Seneca kinship is inadequate. He restricts his OT
analysis to Ego’s and the first ascending generation and within these
generations to only parents, aunts, uncles, siblings, and first cousins.
Seneca kinship terminology covers the infinity of possible kin
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relations in Ego’s and the two adjacent generations. To account for
more distant relatives, Jones suggests, but does not provide, a set of
rewrite rules intended to reduce more distant kin relations to those
just listed. The OT analysis correctly classifies the restricted set of
kin relations in Ego’s and the first ascending generation to which
it is applied, but fails on the close kin of the first descending gener-
ation (children, nephews, nieces). The full model, relying on the
kind of reduction rules Jones suggests, cannot correctly classify
the more distant kintypes.
For his OT analysis of close kin, Jones does not consider the first
descending generation, that of Ego’s children and niblings (nieces
and nephews). Here the OT analysis fails. Ego’s sister’s child is a
member of Ego’s matriline, regardless of Ego’s sex. So according
to Jones’s OT constraint ranking, in which DISTINGUISH
MATRILINE outranks all other relevant constraints, Ego’s
sister’s children are classed with Ego’s children. In Seneca they
are not. A man’s sister’s child is not classed with his children
because a man and his sister are of opposite sex. Matriline member-
ship is irrelevant. The classification of a man’s sister’s child as a cross
relative exemplifies a semantic distinction that governs the classifi-
cation of all of the infinity of kintypes in Ego’s and the two adjacent
generations in Seneca. Parallel collaterals are merged terminologi-
cally with Ego’s lineals or siblings (henceforth, for convenience,
“lineals” tout court) of the corresponding generation; cross relatives
are terminologically distinguished from Ego’s lineals. This perva-
sive distinction, to which we now turn, is implicit in Lounsbury
(1964) and explicit in Kay (1975).
The Iroquois cross-parallel distinction is given in (1).
(1) Lineal relatives (including siblings) are Iroquois parallel.
Two collaterally related kintypes are parallel iff the furthest sep-
arated, same-generation nodes on the genealogical path connect-
ing them are of the same sex. Collateral relatives that are not
parallel are cross.
The definition is most easily unpacked in terms of the tra-
ditional terminology of English cousin numbering. The children
of siblings are first cousins, the children of first cousins are
second cousins; the children of nth cousins are (nþ 1)th
cousins. These are the “integral” cousins, cousins of the same
generation. For nonintegral cousins, two relatives are ith
cousins j times removed iff one is an ith cousin of a jth generation
ancestor of the other ( j . 0). What counts for the Iroquois cross-
parallel distinction, is the relative sex of the “ith” cousins (or sib-
lings). Iff that pair of integral cousins or siblings are of the same
sex, Alter is a parallel relative of Ego.
Looking back at the subset of relatives analyzed by OT, mother’s
sister and father’s brother are parallel, and mother’s brother and
father’s sister are cross because of the relative sexes of those
sibling pairs. No mention of matriline membership or of minimiz-
ing-kinterm-sets is necessary. Similarly, in Ego’s generation, the
first cousins whose respective parents are of the same sex are paral-
lel and therefore merged with siblings; those whose respective
parents are not of the same sex are cross and therefore not so
merged. Again issues of matriline membership and/or minimizing
cousin versus sibling categories are otiose. In the first descending
generation, alter is classed with Ego’s children (parallel) iff he or
she is the child of Ego’s same-sex sibling. Classifying in this gener-
ation on the basis of matriline gets the facts wrong.
Seneca kinship terminology extends outward from Ego indefi-
nitely in Ego’s and both adjacent generations. Jones is aware that
even in Ego’s and the first ascending generation classification of
more distant relatives, for example, second cousins, on the basis of
matriline membership doesn’t work. He proposes an unspecified
set of reduction rules, which, successively applied, are intended to
eventually rewrite longer kintype expressions to the small set ana-
lyzed by OT. (Since the OT analysis on offer does not work for
any descending generation, we must imagine a new OT analysis
that works for a small subset of first descending generation kintypes,
to which an infinite set of kintypes will be reduced by the reduction
rules.) These rules are by definition local. “It is convenient (but
maybe not absolutely necessary) to assume that, with each move,
at most one pair of adjoining elementary kin types changes” (sect.
4.1, emphasis added). The single example given reduces a genealogi-
cal path by application of two rules, each replacing two adjacent
nodes with a single node that shares either the sex or the generation
of one of the nodes it replaces. But no set of such local rules can
account for the Seneca cross/parallel facts because the Seneca
cross/parallel distinction is based on the relative sex of two arbitra-
rily separated nodes, the two most distant same-generation nodes.
For example, Ego’s father’s mother’s father’s mother’s brother’s
daughter’s son’s son’s child is terminologically classed as Ego’s
sibling because Ego’s father and alter’s father are of the same sex.
Nothing else matters.
One could of course imagine rewrite rules that looked at nonad-
jacent nodes. Or one might perhaps add some condition(s) on
strictly local rules that would have this effect. But any such moves
would just come down to a needlessly complicated notational
equivalent of the definition of Iroquois cross-parallel given in (1).
That definition effects the accurate classification of all Seneca kin
in the relevant generations, without recourse to (a) separate form-
alisms for close and different kin, (b) ordering of constraints (OT),
or (c) reduction rules. No set of local reduction rules of the kind
Jones hints at can do the job because the key dependency is nonlo-
cal. Additionally, the OT analysis of the finite subset fails on the
facts in the first descending generation. The rejected model, l’il
ol’ componential analysis, gets the whole job done accurately with
less machinery (Kay 1975; Lounsbury 1964).
Language and kinship: We need some
Darwinian theory here
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Abstract: Common to language and kinship is digital format. This is a
discovery, not an innate feature of human cognition. But to produce a
testable model, we need Darwinian behavioural ecology.
Kinship rules and linguistic rules, notes Jones, “are intriguingly
similar in form.” In each case, we have not graded and corre-
spondingly disputable meanings but sharp digital contrasts and
correspondingly abstract logical computations. To explain this,
the author initially posits an “innate conceptual structure of
kinship” interacting with the language faculty’s “optimal gramma-
tical communication” principles. Toward the end of the article,
however, this idea is abandoned. “The alternative,” the author
now explains, “is that constraints are neither innate not culturally
acquired, but discovered.” Humans are equipped neither with an
innate Kin Term Acquisition Device nor with a hard-wired
Language Acquisition Device. Instead, the relevant hard-wiring
has a broader function: It equips us to play “coordination games.”
The idea has support among many evolutionary psychologists
and anthropologists. What’s needed here, however, is some Dar-
winism. If we’re to come up with a testable model, we need to
specify at least some details of the “coordination games” we envi-
sage our evolving ancestors to have been playing. Sex isn’t just in
the head, any more than are costly burdens such as pregnancy,
birth, lactation, or childcare. Behavioural ecology is the relevant
discipline here, dealing as it does with the costs and benefits of
real biological strategies operating in the real world.
At some point during the evolution of our species, sex and repro-
duction became subject to the rule of law (Knight 2008; 2009). Like
any legal system, a formal kinship system is designed to minimize
scope for disputation: It does this by eliminating shades of grey.
You are either a sister or a wife; to a relative of the opposite sex,
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you can’t be somewhere in between. Jones understands that this
principle – critical to both language and kinship – is a “discovery”
and not a consequence of cognitive hard-wiring. If humans are to
coordinate their efforts in defining and enforcing the law, they
must necessarily draw distinctions in this way. To suggest this,
however, is only to make a start in asking the really interesting ques-
tions. Who initially benefited from this extraordinary development?
Did males drive the whole process, as Le´vi-Strauss (1969) suggests?
Or were females actively involved? As soon as sex differences are
taken into account, we can start constructing a model detailed
enough to be testable in the light of archaeological, ethnographic
and other evidence.
Conceptual implications of kinship
terminological systems: Special problems
and multiple analytic approaches
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Abstract: I raise issues concerning Jones’ Seneca analysis, its relationship
to analyses of Dravidian-, Crow-, and Omaha-type systems. These affect
the convincingness of his kinship study, and thus the wider conclusions
that he wants to draw regarding human cognition and language.
It is always interesting to see a new approach emerge – especially
in an area as long studied as kinship terminologies. Our under-
standing of terminological systems has benefited from the
multiple and diverse perspectives represented in the analytic
work of Lounsbury (1964a; 1964b), Romney (1965; Romney &
D’Andrade 1964), Read (2001a), and Gould (2000), among
others, and I hope comparable contributions will come from
Jones’ approach. But for that contribution to be realized some
further information is needed, beyond what is in this paper. In
what follows I highlight some of the major needs.
First, major innovative contributions in this area have come
out of detailed formal treatments of complete systems – versus
only illustrative examples. Jones does provide such an account
for part of Seneca, but not for the part that is most distinctive
and of most theoretical interest – the range of cousins out
beyond what we call first cousins. He does address the issue,
but only in a thin programmatic way – a way whose success
does not seem inevitable or obvious.
Second, the Seneca detail is important because it is in that detail
that Iroquois-type systems (including Seneca) differ from Dravi-
dian-type ones. And that difference is very important because Dravi-
dian-type terms (and thus cross/parallel determinations) map cleanly
onto some social groups such as moieties, while Iroquois-type ones
absolutely do not (see Lounsbury 1964a). In this sense, “matriline”
(sect. 4.1) seems much more relevant to Dravidian than to Iroquois.
In a paper such as the present one, complete analyses of a number of
contrasting systems is too much to ask, but one would like to have
seen some illustrative detail concerning how the two types would
each be dealt with, and thus the two distinguished.
Third, a similar problem is posed by Crow- and Omaha-type
systems (sometimes spoken of as “skewed” systems) in which
basic kinterm categories systematically cross generational lines
(see Lounsbury 1964b). The comment about lowering the rank
of DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS in note 4 does not do it,
for the same reason that the treatment of Seneca cousins did not.
Finally, there is the “what does it buy you?” question. The rel-
evance of the paper to the linguistics and universals of thought
issues that open and conclude the paper depends on the success
of the kin terminology analysis. What is the task whose success is
at issue? That is, we already have in kinship approaches that rep-
resent semantic contrasts, approaches that model native speaker cal-
culations, approaches that facilitate cross-system regularities and
thus define types, approaches that clarify the relationship of ter-
minologies to social features, and approaches that aid the inductive
process of finding a system’s regularities. What analytic or theoreti-
cal kinship questions does this new approach particularly speak to?
I look forward to seeing treatments of these issues in future
publications.
Pragmatic and positivistic analyses of kinship
terminology
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Abstract: Jones’ article suggests that the anthropological analysis of
kinship has followed a single line of development based on a single
underlying conception of meaning and method. In fact, there have
been two opposed lines of development. Jones’ conception is
positivistic. The other is pragmatic. Pragmatic theory is superior on
every recognized criterion. This briefly describes the differences.
Jones assumes a referential theory of meaning drawn from eth-
noscience and logical positivism. He cites Dwight Read and me
without recognizing that we argue for a very different, pragmatic,
conception (Leaf 1971; 2007; 2009; Read 2001; 2007). Pragmatic
theory is demonstrably more parsimonious, precise, and
powerful.
Referential theories are set up in terms of words and their
referents. Pragmatic theories are set up in terms of ideas and
their uses. Jones offers a list of universal parameters for classify-
ing what kinship terms refer to and justifies it by invoking the
supposed success of OT in linguistics. Read and I, by contrast,
have demonstrated (not just suggested) that terminologies are
systems of interrelated definitions, and that their internal order
derives from computational rules contained in the core of
terms that define the “direct” relations around the user, or self.
Referring to relatives is just one of the many uses of such concep-
tual systems.
Jones begins by distinguishing two levels of language: “ordin-
ary” and “VIP.” Ordinary is “open class or lexical,” which
“includes most nouns and verbs.” He describes VIP as “closed-
class” but otherwise only by example. The examples are gramma-
tical markers. He puts kin terms in the VIP class. It is a crucial
step in the argument, and it is unjustifiable. Languages have
many closed classes, including classes of nouns and verbs.
Kinship terminologies do form closed systems, but not classes
in this sense.
Jones then argues that grammar uses spatial and temporal
imagery, and this is also true of kinship terminologies. Quoting
me, he notes that kinship terminologies always use spatial
imagery. Such spatial categories appear to him to be innate,
but their relative weight can vary. The order in which such cat-
egories dominate one another act on random linguistic (referen-
tial) variation to produce the patterns of meaning in any given
terminology.
Jones’ Figure 2 offers his comparison of English and Seneca.
This represents only three generational levels: self, the one
above, and the one below. Both terminologies define more pos-
itions than these, and more importantly both use categories
that Jones’s analysis cannot recognize because they are cultural
and local.
In fact, terminologies can be represented comprehensively.
This can be done at several levels of abstraction, beginning
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with the kind of diagram produced during field elicitation that I
have called a “kinship map” (Leaf 1971) and carrying through
algebraic reconstructions demonstrating their underlying gen-
erative rules. I have published the kinship map for English pre-
viously, contrasting it with Punjabi and addressing the same
issues of spatial representation that are relevant here (Leaf
2006; 2009, p. 92). Read (1984; Read & Behrans 1994) has
demonstrated its mathematical logic, and Read and Fischer
have constructed a computer analysis that can regenerate it
and any other system that is available on the Internet with the
Kinship Analysis Expert System (Read 2006).
The English terminology has three important features that
Jones’s analysis obscures or misses entirely, and that OT
apparently cannot encompass. First, positions can be extended
vertically forever: Just keep adding the prefix “great.” The
same number of prefixes mark the reciprocal terms. Jones
recognizes generation, but not the idea of extensibility.
Second, by contrast, in the horizontal direction “cousin” is a
boundary. There is no relation beyond cousin. All terminolo-
gies must logically have boundaries in order to be closed,
but Jones does not recognize the problem of finding them.
And third, cousin in English is actually not specific to a
single generation, so generation as a constraint does not dom-
inate all others.
Every kinship terminology defines kinship in its own specific
way based on its own conceptual contrasts. There are resem-
blances but no precise universals. The English idea of being
related is strongly associated with the idea of common ancestry.
To produce it, the terms consistently distinguish lineal versus col-
lateral relation, sex, and generation in the direct descent line
only. Outside the direct descent line, the terms distinguish only
whether one is a sibling or sibling-spouse of a lineal or a descen-
dant of such a sibling-spouse. The idea of an ancestor who is not a
relative is a self-contradiction.
Seneca is indeed very different. Figure 1 is the kinship map for
a female self (indicated by the gray circle). I have constructed it
by asking the table of terms in Morgan’s Ancient Society for defi-
nitions beginning with the core positions around self, just as I
would have asked a group of live informants. Despite two
terms that appear to be variant pronunciations of a single
name, the consistencies emerge clearly.
Here, the þ2 and -2 generations are boundary positions.
The terms for the þ3 and -3 generation are the same, although
Seneca recognize individuals who are their more distant ances-
tors. So the second feature is that an ancestor is not necessarily
a relation. The third conspicuous feature is that positions form
groups based on a specific contrast between own matrilineal
clan as against all other clans – not “matrikin.” Own brothers
and sisters are grouped with mother’s sister’s children and con-
trasted with all other relations on one’s own generation. Chil-
dren of ha-nih (father and father’s brother) who are also
children of own mother are in own sibling group, children of
other ha-nih are in the all others group. The same logic
applies on the -1 generation. Finally, the difference between
the male and female terminologies is that in the male terminol-
ogy own children are grouped with other children of males on
one’s own generation, which Morgan does not explain but
which seems to emphasize again the importance of the differ-
ence between descent through males and descent through
females – as did Iroquois political organization. What the
terms consistently distinguish are generation, clan, mother’s
and father’s side, marital versus descent relation, sex of
speaker, and sex of linking relative.
Seneca terminology embodies Seneca social conceptions
just as English terminology embodies English social conceptions.
Seeing how they do so brings us face to face with the cultural and
social basis of thought itself. Empirically unnecessary speculation
on the possibility of innate ideas is a distraction.
Advancing our grasp of constrained variation
in a crucial cognitive domain
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Abstract: Jones’s system of constraints promises interesting insights into
the typology of kin term systems. Three problems arise: (1) the conflation
of categories with algorithms that assign them threatens to weaken the
typological predictions; (2) OT-type constraints have little psychological
plausibility; (3) the conflation of kin-term systems and kinship systems
may underplay the “utility function” character of real kinship in action.
The neglect of kinship in current anthropology and in the cogni-
tive sciences is not far short of a scandal. Humans are the
Figure 1 (Leaf). Seneca, Female Speaking
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categorizing species, and kinship systems categorize our own
most significant others, so reflecting fundamental forms of
social organization. In small-scale societies, kinship forms the
backbone of the political and economic organization, and even
in complex societies, it plays a significant role (Kuper 2009).
Moreover, kinship is one of two primordial foundations for rela-
tional cognition – the other being, as Jones notes, spatial
relations (kinship identifies a person by a relation to Ego;
spatial relations identify a place relative to a landmark, where a
place is rather more abstract than a person). Advanced relational
reasoning is the big divide between us and the other primates:
Even our cousins the chimps have a hard time doing relational
thinking (Penn et al. 2008). It is likely that language and relational
reasoning are mutually implicated, although which provides the
foundation for the other is controversial (Loewenstein &
Gentner 2005). Many small-scale societies have such complex
kinship systems that they have exercised professional mathemati-
cians, while still being mastered by kids.
So, Jones has done us a big favor by putting kinship back on the
cognitive science agenda with an interesting new twist. It has long
been obvious that despite exuberent variation in the kinship
systems of the world, there seem to be a limited set of underlying
types (see, e.g., the important work by Godelier et al. [1998], unfor-
tunately not referenced by Jones). Jones gives us a very neat way to
think about this pattern in the diversity, in terms of differentially
ranked principles for grouping and distinguishing kin. Previous
approaches, such as componential analysis and reduction rule
analysis (see Tyler 1969 for a range of approaches), have each cap-
tured part of the phenomenon but somehow have failed to give us
an exhaustive way to think about the typology of kinship systems. A
componential analysis, for example, might characterize cousin as
þcollateral, þsame generation, unmarked for sex, while brother
might be þlineal, þsame generation, þmale (Romney &
D’Andrade 1969), while a reduction rule analysis might tell us
that a mother’s brother’s son’s son is like a mother’s brother’s
son, so counts as a kind of (less prototypical) cousin.
Jones’ system uses just eight “faithfulness constraints,” or
instructions, to group or individuate kin of different kinds, which
are further constrained by three “markedness constraints” giving
us implicational scales of the kind “if you distinguish different
kinds of cousins, you should distinguish different kinds of siblings.”
What this actually amounts to is a way of formulating metacon-
straints over componential analyses of different kinship systems.
If you reorder his constraints, some distinctions will be made
and others not – so you can’t have all your cake and eat it too.
The markedness constraints will ensure that there is, for
example, a greater lumping of distant kinsmen and greater splitting
of close kinsmen. The whole system of Jonesian constraints then
acts to constrain the possible componential analyses available to
kinship systems. This looks as though it might be a major
advance in the typology of kin term systems, although it will
need testing on a representative sample of the exuberant variation
(if there are 7,000 languages in the world, there are 7,000 kinterm
systems, even if many of these will prove isomorphic – note
though that Tamil, for example, has a dozen or more distinct kin
term systems adapted to the different castes: See Levinson 1977).
Now, this system doesn’t capture the notion of prototype
kin and their extensions, so nicely captured in the reduction
rule analysis of Lounsbury (1969), and argued for on psychological
grounds by Malinowski. Here Jones plans an addition to the OT
framework with a recursive application of the constraints. It is
hard to see exactly what the implications for typology might be,
but it must multiply the possibilities enormously, so undermining
some of the attractions of the OT approach. It would seem better
to keep separate the categories from the algorithms that assign
referents to them, for the simple reason that we know that individ-
uals use more than one manner of assigning kin to categories
(Levinson 2006). This implies that the prototype structure of kin
categories should form part of the primary category structure,
not part of the assignment algorithm.
A major issue though is the psychological reality of all this. This is
the Achilles’ heel of OT analyses, which are typically derived by
detailed comparison across languages: They are thus constructed
with all the metalinguistic hindsight of the (hypothetically) omnis-
cient analyst. It is quite unwarranted (despite the normal claims of
OT) to think that any one native speaker has this kind of meta-
knowledge in his or her head. To learn a kin term system a child
starts off by learning “names” for those around her, then grasps
the relational character (other kids have “moms” too), then
learns the extensions – and kin terms are one domain of language
where explicit instruction and correction are common (see Hirsch-
feld 1989 for review). Thus an individual can learn to use the
system without having an overview of how it works. Kinship
systems are a wonderful example of culture as the second great
invisible watchmaker – intricate systems without a designer.
They are honed by cultural evolution, can be exceedingly
complex like the Australian systems, and because they have to
serve important social functions of regulating reproduction and
social conduct, they are directly under selection by the social
systems they must integrate with. Jones’ constraints, if they cor-
rectly capture the typology of extant kinship systems, may do so
not because the categories are antecedently in our mind, but
because these are the ones that societies need to work with.
Jones’ paper bristles with other interesting ideas. Particularly
interesting, perhaps, is the idea that kinship systems have a
digital character – unlike the analog (or gradient) nature of
utility functions – because they are solutions to communicative
coordination games. Here as elsewhere, Jones perhaps fails to
draw a sharp enough line between kin term systems (linguistic in
nature) and kinship systems (systems of reproduction, marriage,
inheritance and authority). Note how the kin-selection metric
(Hamilton’s rule) does not map neatly onto any known kin term
system – a Seneca cousin, for example, is treated as equal to
Ego’s sibling, even though the cousin shares 12.5% of his or her
genes with Ego and the sibling 50%. In some ways the kin-term
system will regulate the kinship system (e.g., in the kind of behavior
appropriate to categories), but in other ways (e.g., inheritance) the
two may part company. The kin-term system is part of the language
and communication system, the kinship system is part of a social
organization. Insofar as they are coincident, and kinship is
digital, this is part of the magical power of language to construct
the categories of our world (Levinson 2003).
Exploring the conceptual and semantic
structure of human kinship: An experimental
investigation of Chinese kin terms
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Abstract:We designed an experiment to test the application of optimality
theory (OT) in kinship terminology studies. Specifically, we examined the
OT constraints within a set of behavioral data using Chinese kin terms.
The results from this behavioral approach support and extend Jones’
linguistic approach by identifying underlying cognitive mechanisms that
can explain and predict behavioral responses in kinship identification.
In the target article, Jones proposed that optimality theory
(OT) is a universal principle for constructing human kinship
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terminology. However, his arguments focus mainly on the lin-
guistic aspects of OT and kinship representation and relatively
overlook the cognitive aspects, such as: How does the human
mind process kin terms and what are the behavioral conse-
quences of these processes? As cognitive psychologists, here we
provide a discussion of the OT from a behavioral approach.
Specifically, we focus on the filterlike OT constraint ranking prin-
ciples Jones proposes and use an experimental design represent-
ing the kinship space to examine how the five linguistic OT
constraints Jones proposes fit our behavioral data using
Chinese kin terms, and how these results could modulate the
constraint ranking principles.
One key feature of the OT, according to Jones, is that con-
straints “act as filters on randomly generated variation, with
each constraint weeding out variants that violate it . . . each con-
straint strictly dominating lower ranking ones” (sect. 1; emphasis
ours). From a cognitive psychology perspective, this assumption
of serial filtering processes has big implications for how people
access and process the meaning of kin terms at different con-
straint ranking levels. Because cognitive resources are always
limited (Halford et al. 1998), kin terms filtered by constraints
ranked higher should be processed differently than those filtered
by constraints ranked lower, thus resulting in different behavioral
patterns for kin terms that are governed by different constraint
levels. We argue that this cognitive hypothesis is an important
extension of Jones’ approach, allowing us to examine the cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying linguistic OT principles.
To test this hypothesis, we proposed to (1) develop a behavior-
al task that can measure kinship representation; and (2) apply the
task to a language with kin terms complex enough to distinguish
between constraints and constraint rankings.
Behavioral task: The Five Elements Kinship Identiﬁcation
(FEKI) task. All possible kinship relationships in three gener-
ations can be represented by a schema of “kinship space” with
five elements that distinguish SEX, GENERATIONS, DISTANCE
and Relative age (Liu et al., submitted) (Fig. 1, left). The one
element in the first generation represents the grandparent unit;
the two elements in the second generation are siblings and rep-
resent parental units; whereas the two elements in the third gen-
eration are not siblings but corresponding offspring of the second
generation, and represent child units. In the experiment, partici-
pants first saw this schema with only a prime unit (indicated by a
circle outline) that was randomly presented around one of the
five elements; then another schema was simultaneously shown
with a prime unit and several male or female target units. The
task was to orally report the kinship term representing the
relationship between the prime unit and the farthest target unit
(e.g., four female units in Fig. 1 left represent mother, grand-
mother, aunt and cousin, respectively).
Chinese: A language with complex kin terms. Chinese has a
very complicated kin term system (Kroeber 1933). In Chinese,
kinships are distinguished by SEX, DISTANCE, GRADE,
PATRIKIN, GENERATIONS and AFFINES, resulting in 33
kinship terms in modern Mandarin Chinese without affines.
This number increases dramatically with affines and marks. For
example, Huang and Jia (2000) listed 52 Chinese kin terms
with affines, whereas Chen and Shryock (1932) identified a
total of 270 terms with affines and marks. For decades, this com-
plicated kinship terminology system has not received much atten-
tion from anthropologists using traditional descriptive methods.
However, we argue that Chinese kinship terms provide a rich
and previously untapped resource in kinship terminology
studies and accordingly, in the current discussion, we use
Chinese kin terms to test the filter-like OT principle.
We examined the five faithfulness constraints proposed by
Jones using reaction time (RT) data obtained from 22 Chinese
speakers with the FEKI task (Fig. 1, right). DISTANCE. RTs
increased with four kinship levels, p , 0.001, which is mostly
due to the Distance difference. SEX. Sex differences were
found only in level 3, between uncle terms (shu, bo, jiu) and
aunt terms (gu, yi), p , 0.05. PATRIKIN. Differences
between Patrikin terms were found only in level 4, such that
cousin terms in the father-child side with prefix “tang-” received
faster RT than those in the mother-child side with prefix “biao-”,
p ¼ 0.09. GENERATIONS and MARKEDNESS SCALES.
We found significant effects of Generations between contrasts
of Grandparents vs. Grandchild in level 2, p , 0.05, and
Parent’s Sibling versus Sibling’s Child in level 3, p , 0.01.
These Generation effects also intermingled with Markedness
scales effect. The RTs of kin terms with marks (e.g., “wai-
outside” and “nu¨- female” for Grandchild and Sibling’s Child)
were slower than those without marks (e.g., Grandparents and
Parent’s Sibling). GRADE. We did not find significant difference
between Relative age, the only Grade constraint (see sect. 3.1 of
the target article) distinguished in Chinese.
As implied by the filterlike OT principle Jones suggests, kin
terms governed by different constraints (e.g., DISTANCE,
GENERATION, PATRIKIN, SEX and Relative age) indeed
showed different behavioral patterns, although they all are distin-
guished in Chinese kin terms. How do these behavioral results
moderate the constraint ranking principles? We suggest that con-
straints that yield more RTs differences should be ranked higher
than those that yield fewer differences. According to the assump-
tion of serial filtering processes, constraints ranked higher might
Figure 1 (Liu et al.). (Left) An illustration of the Five Elements Kinship Identification (FEKI) task. (Right) Reaction time data for 33
Chinese kin terms obtained with the FEKI task. Those constraints with significant reaction time differences were marked.
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consume more cognitive resources than those ranked lower,
resulting in different behavioral patterns for kin terms regulated
by the former but similar behavioral patterns for kin terms regu-
lated by the latter. Thus, the constraint ranking for Chinese kin
terms, based on a behavioral approach, could be DISTANCE,
GENERATION, PATRIKIN, SEX and GRADE. Comparing
this result from behavioral approach with the one from the lin-
guistic approach used by Jones may provide interesting insights
into the underlying mechanism of why Jones’ OT constraints
work, and perhaps even how they work.
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Abstract: The choice of emphasis in kinship studies has often resulted in
incompatible theoretical models of kinship that are mutually undermining
and contradictory. Jones’ attempts to reconcile disparate approaches to
kinship using OT is useful, however; seeing kinship as a specialized
system for representing genealogy may be unwarranted in the light of
recent advances in mathematical approaches to kinship terminologies.
Jones’ contribution to kinship is remarkably persuasive and coher-
ent. He draws together relatedness-centric approaches to kinship
(for example Carsten 1997) with what might be understood as
more mathematical or formal approaches to kinship (see for
example Goodenough 1965; Read 2001). Within sociocultural
anthropology there seems to be something terribly attractive in
seeing and understanding the use of kinship as merely an
adjunct of relatedness in some fuzzy and poorly defined situa-
tional sense. Jones astutely deals with the mathematical regularity
that appears to be pervasive in kinship terminologies while
attempting to account for empirically demonstrable inconsistency
and ambiguity in kinship instantiation.
It is logical and predictable that simple (and self-consistent)
systems produce complex, inconsistent clusters or relationships;
however, the reverse is highly improbable and perhaps impossible.
Jones is well aware of this and skillfully suggests that the innate con-
ceptual structure of kinship (the part with the demonstrable math-
ematical regularity), is subject to principles of optimal grammatical
communication present more generally in language. Optimality
Theory (OT), Jones argues, renders inconsistency in observed
usage comprehensible despite what would appear to be strong
restriction on the range of algebraic models present in real societies.
Kinship is of course not alone in demonstrating that persistent con-
ceptual structures may be modified by grammars of communication.
Jones makes an intriguing argument about kinship borrowing
its conceptual structure from that of space; however, rather
than being useful for describing physical space, kinship-space is
a specialized genealogy-representing tool. Jones seems to be
making a similar argument to Bennardo (2009), except that
whereas Bennardo begins with space and attempts to demon-
strate how culturally specific conceptual models of space are fun-
damental to a broad range of knowledge domains, Jones instead
appears to begin with kinship and notes the pervasive spatial
referents that appear to form part of the logic of kinship itself.
Bennardo’s work has the advantage of more elaborated formal
models of space, while one of the great strengths of Jones’ contri-
bution lies precisely in his attempt to reconcile radically different
analytical conceptualizations of kinship.
While I must admit to being largely persuaded by Jones’ mas-
terful analysis, nevertheless, there is perhaps one important
point of concern worth noting. The conflation of kinship with gen-
ealogy has a very long history within anthropology (going right
back to Morgan and arguably earlier), and while Jones is very
careful to avoid any clumsy conflation, he nevertheless argues
somewhat forcefully that kinship systems are spatially informed
conceptual systems that are highly specialized for representing
genealogy. It is self-evident that kinship is used by people for
ordering genealogical relations; however, there seem to be some
dangers in such an argument. First, that genealogy somehow
becomes reduced to reproduction and subsequently to possibly
misleading sociobiological arguments about simplistic Darwinian
forces operating on kinship via genealogy. Following from this, the
risk that correlation coupled with longstanding folk beliefs about
kinship result in erroneous attributions of causation. Unquestion-
ably, there are constraints on kinship just as there are constraints
on genealogy, but perhaps it would be more accurate to say that
genealogy takes the form it does because of the particular form,
or structure, of kinship systems, which are themselves the result
of fundamental constraints on ordering, or relation-creating
knowledge systems produced by human cognition.
Attempting to understand genealogical ordering through an
analytical set of terms a priori assumed to be organizationally hom-
ologous is precisely the problem that leads to the unease with
kinship studies in the first place (see Leaf 1979 for a more
fulsome discussion of the move away from rigorous formal
approaches to kinship). Read (2006), Fischer and Read (2005),
and Leaf (2005) have recently demonstrated that a number of
kinship terminologies can be produced without reference to any
notion or instance of genealogical relatedness. In other words,
the kinship terminologies themselves are constrained by something
that has no need for any reference to genealogical relatedness. This,
then, renders the idea that kinship is somehow a highly specialized
system for representing genealogy more than a little problematic. If
the system can be produced without reference to genealogy then it
seems at the very least one must consider that genealogies take the
forms they do because of the independent kinship terminologies
used by the societies in which they are produced.
Finally, one might, following Bennardo, make a similar case for
notions of space arguably being independently constrained by
more rudimentary principles of reciprocity and recursion and
suggest that it is indeed genealogy that is the entirely dependent
variable in the equation. Such a concern, to be sure, does not
negate the significance and utility of Jones’ application of OT
to make sense of a more comprehensive view of social ordering
in societies; rather, it suggests that while Jones is right to try to
make sense of such phenomena in their entirety, he may inadver-
tently reinforce a demonstrably unsound assertion that genealogy
is somehow driving kinship terminologies.
Getting the constraints right
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Abstract: While the idea of applying Optimality Theory to kinship has
potential, this commentary draws attention to problems with the
constraints proposed. Particularly, DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN appears to
recapitulate an error of linking matrilineal descent to Iroquois kinship too
closely and more generally mixing descent with true kinship parameters.
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Applying Optimality Theory to kinship to yield the kinds of vari-
ation between and within languages found is certainly on the face
of it a good idea. The OT approach can also model change
(Anttila & Young-Mee 1998), predicting which rerankings of con-
straints are possible diachronically, and relatedly, where two
variant sets of kin equations cooccur, as in the “overlay” analysis
of skewing (equations between adjacent generations; Kronenfeld
2009; McConvell, in press).
One of the key desiderata of OT is a universal and robust set of
constraints. In this article, some of the constraints incorporate ques-
tionable assumptions. For example, constraints such as DIS-
TINGUISH MATRIKIN are said to lie behind the Seneca system of
classificatory kinship, with its distinction between cross and parallel
kin. DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, although not rigorously defined,
appears to refer to relationships ofdescent, specifically matrilineality.
Lounsbury (1964/1969 pp.193, 210) analysing the Seneca case,
refers to the “classic but erroneous anthropological view concern-
ing the ‘Iroquois’ type of kinship systems . . . that this kind of
system classifies kin by membership in unilineal descent
groups.” Recognition of this error, and the strong distinction
then drawn by Lounsbury between “Iroquois” and “Dravidian”
systems, was a breakthrough in kinship studies, further elaborated
by Scheffler (1971). It is disappointing to see a constraint appar-
ently so closely related to this same error in this article.
Lounsbury (1964, p. 210) pointed out, “the classic [erroneous]
theory predicts correctly only to the immediate (closest) uncles
and aunts . . . and first cousins. Beyond this its predictions are
half right and half wrong.” In this article we are initially presented
with data from the immediate kin only, so the problem is not mani-
fest. Once we go beyond that, though, we encounter contradictions
between unilineal descent lines and the Iroquois/Seneca system.
In an “Iroquois” system, for example, the child of female Ego’s
female cross cousin is classified as Ego’s son or daughter, even
though that child is not in the same matrimoiety or matriclan as
Ego; presumably this violates DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN. Child of
female Ego’s male cross cousin, on the other hand, is Ego’s
niece/nephew (brother’s child).This pattern is in contradistinction
to the “Dravidian” pattern of naming cross cousins’ children and
other relations which does match well with lineal institutions.
We see some more distant kin discussion later in the target
article. The application of Lounsbury style “reduction rules” to
second cousins, Older Mother’s Mother’s Brother’s Son’s Son
reducing to Mother’s Brother’s Son, includes a reduction of
MB to F, a transgression of DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN and appar-
ently ad hoc. This is part of the derivational apparatus imported
to “fix up” OT constraints to generate correct terms for extended
kin. The list of constraints used, however – prominently DIS-
TINGUISH MATRIKIN – may be at the root of the problem. The
string “Mother’s Mother’s Brother’s Son’s Son” (MMBSS) con-
tains the same substring “child of female Ego’s male cross
cousin” (MBSS) as one of the examples discussed above.
Woman’s MBSS, we saw, is classified as “brother’s son,” in an Iro-
quois system, hence MMBSS is reduced to MBS without resort
to replacing MB by F in the derivation.
What this points to is that the relevant constraint in an OT system
must directly cope with such reductions, and not miss the mark as
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN does, or have to be propped up by impor-
tation of Lounsbury-style rules. More globally, the Iroquois and
Dravidian systems include many minor variants in how cross- and
parallel kin are defined. There is a need for a constraint, or family
of constraints, which allows for such variation to be captured by con-
straint rankings. The distinction between cross cousins and parallel
cousins (the latter equivalent to siblings) exists in many systems, uni-
lineal and not. In some form it is certainly a candidate for universal
constraint status – the “classificatory” principle in kinship as
Morgan termed it. A related constraint could be DISTINGUISH
CROSS/PARALLEL However variations on this compute the same-
sex/opposite-sex metric in different ways. This is not the place to
elaborate, but I am simply illustrating that different ways of imple-
menting OT constraints in kinship are open.
Constraints should be made up of very basic transparent par-
ameters and not draw in notions from outside that like descent. If
this methodological principle is followed, it is then possible to
compare occurrence of terminological patterns with other pat-
terns such as lineal descent. If the two are combined in the
basic mechanisms such comparisons are compromised.
Debate about the appropriateness of proposed constraints is
going to be needed to lay a firmer foundation for the further
development of this initiative. I would advocate disposing of
any constraint like DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN. Its meaning is not
clear, but even if it could be clarified, the patterns it is trying
to explain have nothing really to do with “matrikin.”
The sections attempting to construct a place for kinship in a
very broad ontogeny of cognitive patterning are less than convin-
cing. Claims that spatial and kinship cognition are closely related
universally evidently so far rest on slim foundations of some ana-
logous structuring. In English and other European languages
there is certainly to some extent a common language for these
domains, but it is not clear how widespread this is in cultures,
or whether cognitive behaviour in the two domains can be
shown to be parallel or sharing a common basis. Once again,
however, this is a research area that offers enticing prospects.
Typological variation of kinship terminologies
is a function of strict ranking of constraints
on nested binary classification trees
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Abstract: Jones argues that extending Seneca kin terms to second cousins
requires a revised version of Optimality Theoretic grammar. I extend
Seneca terms using three constraints on expression of markers in
nested binary classification trees. Multiple constraint rankings on a
nested set coupled with local parity checking determines how a given
kin classification grammar marks structural endogamy.
Jones deserves enormous credit for first applying OT grammar to
kin classification nearly a decade ago (Jones 2003). His latest
model, however, founders when he extends Seneca terms to
second cousins because he tries to conjure lineal/collateral
and parallel/cross distinctions from interactions among many
constraints. This strategy is surprising since he incorporated
those distinctions into his earlier model, and he cites Hage
(2001), who used them in binary tree representations to
account for markedness relationships and diachronic change in
terminologies.
Here I describe an OT-based model that does properly assign
Seneca G0 terms. This account illustrates what I think is at stake
in Jones’s attempt to bootstrap an underlying representation
(UR) for kin space.
My model’s UR is a nested set of asymmetric binary classification
trees (Fig. 1). Kin types are classes defined at terminal nodes for
each generational tree, and second collaterals in a descending gen-
eration are partitioned by projections from collateral terminals
in ascending generations. Left-to-right precedence is fixed
relative to the LIN0 Ego node by the nodal dominance hierarchy.
Input to the grammar can be any chunk of this nested structure
and output is the surjective mapping of the input onto itself that
best satisfies a strict ranking of one faithfulness and two markedness
constraints: MAX, which requires expression of each input marker
in the output; NOCO, which bans collateral (CO) and side
markers (C, F) in the output; and NOALIGN, which bans
expression of side and parity markers (//, X) in the output.
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There are four effective rankings of these constraints, each
of which generates an optimal partitioning corresponding to one
of the classification systems first proposed by Lowie (1928):
(1)
Bifurcate collateral rankings mark both cross and parallel col-
lateral classes; bifurcate merging rankings only mark cross collat-
eral classes and merge parallel collaterals with lineals; lineal
rankings, indifferent to parity, merge all collaterals; generation
rankings merge all collaterals with lineals.
Constraint rankings, coupled with parity checking, cause
MMBSS (mother’s mother’s brother’s son’s son) to merge with
MBS in a Seneca cross collateral G0 output class (see Fig. 1).
UR terminal markers define first collateral parity, but local rules
determine which side marker is used to check the parity of
second collaterals in descending generations. Seneca exhibits
“Iroquois” rather than “Dravidian” parity in Gþ1 (Trautman &
Barnes 1998): Parity for a descendent of any Gþ1 second collateral
is determined by checking its sex against the Gþ1 side marker that
most immediately dominates its Gþ2 parent. G0 parity in both
systems is inherited from the Gþ1 parent. Since MMBS is cross
in Seneca, MMBSS is also cross. “Dravidian” parity for descen-
dents of Gþ2 cross types is checked against the parent kin type’s
contralateral side. In that case, MMBS is parallel, and the
MMBSS G0 descendent type can’t merge with MBS.
Consistent with Hage’s argument (Hage 2001), different rank-
ings can be applied in parallel to different generations. The
optimal output tree for Seneca is:
(2)
The Gþ2 ranking merges all collateral types with lineal types in the
LINþ2 class. The Gþ1 ranking merges parallel first and second col-
lateral types with the LINþ1 class and combines cross first and
second collateral types into a superordinate Xþ1 class that
occupies the position held by the neutralized COþ1 marker. The
G0 ranking merges all child types of LINþ1 parallel types in a
single LIN0 class and all child types of Xþ1 cross types into a
single class defined by the projection of the Xþ1 marker onto G0.
Lexical coding trees for each generation are formed from (2).
The Seneca G0 tree is:
(3)
An optimal output tree partitions classes only to the level of
expressed UR markers. Within-class partitionings, for example
the partitioning of the LIN0 class in (3), result from interaction
between constraints on the lexicon and partial ordering of gener-
ations by the number of partitions in an optimal output tree.
Interactions between parity checking and constraint rankings
impose these partial orders. If, for example, G0 parity were
checked against Ego’s sex and G0 partitioning were determined
only by a ranking rather than by a ranking and the projected
Xþ1 marker, the Seneca output tree (2) could have a different
partial order. Terminological “skewing” (Lounsbury 1964) is a
mechanism for subverting partial ordering. A lexical tree for
the Omaha terminology (Ackerman 1976) would be a composite
nested structure that projects seven classes onto G0.
Jones uses many constraints to do all the classification work
because he believes the logic of human kin classification stems
from a domain independent OT “grammar faculty.” My model
suggests a domain specific grammaticalization scenario in which a
dedicated kin classification mechanism evolved to mark unilineal
descent in primate social organizations (Kapsalis 2004; Strier
2004). The nested tree structure emerged as protohuman repro-
ductive coalitions required representations marking bilateral
Figure 1 (Miers). Nested binary classification trees for 3G kin space: G ¼ generation; LIN ¼ lineal; CO ¼ collateral;
C ¼ matrilateral; F ¼ patrilateral; X ¼ cross; // ¼ parallel; M ¼ mother; F ¼ father; Z ¼ sister; B ¼ brother; D ¼ daughter;
S ¼ son. Dashed lines ¼ projections of terminal nodes.
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descent and affinity (Chapais 2008; Fox 1967). Strict ranking
coupled with variable parity checking evolved as a “once and for
all” solution to the problem of tracking forms of structural endo-
gamy (White 1996) created by the extension of kinship to second
and higher cross and parallel collaterals. Constraint rankings do
not define marriage “rules” but rather denominate kinds of related-
ness. A classification tree is thus a cognitive spread sheet used to
generate reference terms for recruiting and counting social part-
ners. An account of this model, “Structural endogamy and the
grammar of human kin classification,” is available at my website.
Kinship, optimality, and typology
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Abstract: Jones uses a mechanism from the linguistic theory, Optimality
Theory, to generate the range of kin systems observed in human cultures
and human languages. The observed distribution of kinship systems
across human societies suggests that some possibilities are preferred
over others, a result that would indicate Jones’ model needs to be
refined, especially in its treatment of markedness.
The Optimality Theory (OT) mechanism Jones proposes is a uni-
versal account of the structure of kinship systems. Such OT
accounts should relate to typology in two ways. First, they
should be able to predict the attested range of variation in a
domain using different rankings of a plausible (and, one hopes,
restricted) set of constraints. Second, the markedness constraints
employed should make predictions about the relative frequency
of occurrence expected for the different patterns that can be
generated. We explore here the quantitative distribution of kin
systems and suggest that it is emphatically nonrandom in a statisti-
cally significant sense, and that at least some common patterns do
not necessarily support the markedness scales proposed by Jones.
The notion of an evaluation metric that could select one from
amongst a set of candidate grammars, so important for early
work in generative grammar (see, e.g., Chomsky 1965, pp. 34–
47; Chomsky & Halle 1968, ch. 9), has no relevance to the mech-
anism of OT. This model uses input values taken from a set of uni-
versal cognitive categories fed to a universal generative system to
produce candidate output forms. The candidate forms are evalu-
ated against a set of ranked constraints; again this is assumed to be
a universal set: “The ranking in a particular language is, in theory, a
total ordering of a set of universal constraints.” (McCarthy 2001,
p. 6) Different outputs result from varying the relative ranking
of the constraints, but none of the resulting grammars is simpler
or more economical than any other; the cognitive machinery is
the same in each case. The relatively small range of variation
observed in phonologies, the subfield of linguistics where OT ori-
ginated and has been most explored, is attributed to the fact that
markedness constraints are grounded in facts about the articula-
tion, perception, and processing of speech (Gordon 2007).
All other things being equal, Jones’s analysis would predict that
no kinship system would be more economical to generate than
any other; however, Jones does propose some markedness con-
straints which should restrict the variation. It is therefore an
interesting question whether the observed distribution of differ-
ent kinship systems across the cultures and languages of the
world is random or not, and whether the distributional evidence
supports the proposed markedness constraints.
We take as a sample for analysis the kinship systems classified by
Murdock (1970). This sample is accepted by Jones (2003) as the best
available source and provides up to 564 data points for eight subsys-
tems of kinship. Given that this approaches being a sample of 10% of
the world’s languages, we take it as adequate for an initial explora-
tion of the question. The results of our investigation of the data
are presented in Table 1. These results were obtained using an
analysis based on the Minimum Message Length (MML) principle,
comparing a multinomial distribution with all classes equi-probable
versus a model with probabilities inferred by MML with a uniform
prior (a ¼ 1) (Wallace 2005, sect. 5.4.2, p. 248; Dowe 2008, fn. 151).
By using only these two rival models, we are being generous with
our probabilities reported in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the probability of any of the patterns in the
subsystems of kinship analysed by Murdock occurring by chance
is vanishingly small. Although in one case (Murdock’s Table 8)
the probability is many orders of magnitude larger (undoubtedly
largely a result of the smaller sample in this case), that result still
represents a minute possibility. Therefore the possible variation
in kinship systems is constrained.
It is not possible to comment in all cases as to how these results
relate to Jones’s markedness scales, but in the cases where a
direct relation can be made, the results are equivocal (see Table 2
for numerical data). For uncle and aunts (discussed in detail in
Jones 2003), two patterns are almost equally common. One treats
cross-kin relations as marked, with father’s brother and mother’s
sister collapsed with the parent terms, while the other pattern has
special terms for both the parallel and the cross-relation. The first
pattern treats cross-kin relations as more marked than parallel
relations, in accord with Jones’s markedness scale, but the second
pattern does not. In the case of siblings, the most common
pattern has four distinct terms coding both sex and seniority. In
Table 1 (Musgrave & Dowe). Probability of the frequency
distributions reported by Murdock (1970) occurring by chance
(as estimated using MML techniques)
Table Number Kin Subsystem Probability
Number of
data points
1 Grandparents c.8.1  102194 563
2 Grandchildren c.2.3  102155 550
3 Uncles c.7.8  102127 564
4 Aunts c.3.8  10289 563
5 Nephews and
Nieces
c.3.7  10258 535
6 Siblings c.3.2  10265 561
7 Cross Cousins c.6.0  10255 556
8 Siblings-in Law c.1.1  10239 440
Table 2 (Musgrave & Dowe). Categories marked in the most
common patterns for three kin subsystems
Kin
Subsystem Pattern
Number
of cases
Sample
Size
Uncles Cross-kin marked 170 564
Cross- and parallel kin marked 151 564
Aunts Cross-kin marked 149 563
Cross- and parallel kin marked 151 563
Siblings Sex and relative seniority
marked
130 561
Cross
cousins
(unmarked) 171 556
Cross-kin marked 167 556
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some cases, these terms may be in pairs, of which one is formally
marked relative to the other; this could only be established by con-
sulting the original sources. But it is not obvious that these data
confirm Jones’ view that junior kin are marked relative to senior
kin. For cross cousins, one of the two common patterns does not dis-
tinguish this relation at all, while the other does. Again, only one
possibility matches Jones’s markedness scale. Overall, the match
between Jones’s markedness scales and these results is not strong.
Jones’s analysis of kinship terminology using OT is promising
with respect to the first of the typological goals mentioned
above. His (2003) discussion shows that it generates the
common possibilities in at least one subsystem. However, the
simple test reported here suggests that the analysis has some
work to do still to meet the second goal.
The applicability of theories of phonological
contrast to kinship systems
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Abstract: With the goal of broadening the range of possible extant
theories of phonological contrast from which kinship studies can draw,
I outline, and briefly apply to the Seneca vs. English kinship systems,
three approaches developed for predicting universals and variations of
vowel system contrast.
Jones’ proposal, that kinship systems can be insightfully handled
by recent linguistic framework of Optimality Theory (OT), is
laudable for modernizing the structuralist hypothesis of
kinship-language homology. Both phonological and kinship
systems clearly share a number of formal properties (e.g., a
finite set of elements chosen from a larger contrast space; sym-
metric organization; differential treatment of marked categories),
and kinship terms, being linguistic items, must arguably form
part of any broad theory of language structure. Jones’ effort
falls within the program of Cross-Modular Structural Parallelism
(see, e.g., Anderson 1992; Nevins 2010), a hypothesis which seeks
to minimize differences between levels or domains of linguistic
structure that are not specifically required from a difference in
representational “alphabet.” In effect, both the organization of
a single existing system and a theory of universals and impossible
systems should use the same cognitive architecture, so vowels
and kinship terms will exploit the same formal mechanisms of
contrast and neutralization while differing in the particular
alphabet of representations, for example, referring to features
such as [þ/-collateral] and [þ/-cross] rather than [þ/-rounded].
With the parallelism hypothesis in mind, the question becomes
how to deploy the same architecture in different cognitive
domains, and what that architecture specifically is. To this end,
let us consider three different approaches to paradigmatic con-
trast and markedness, drawn from morphology and phonology.
In doing so, I wish to make the main point that, despite its
name, Optimality “Theory” is not in itself a specific theory of
such relations or their constituent parts; it is a procedure for
expressing conflict among different formal constraints. As a
result, Jones’ endorsement of OT as the right model from phonol-
ogy for representing kinship is arguably a choice at the wrong
level, similar to saying that the best word-processor for typeset-
ting mathematical formulae is a battery-powered laptop. OT is
more like a hardware into which many particular constraint soft-
ware applications can be loaded.
For example, OT does not determine a phonological analysis
of, say, Bulgarian unstressed vowel reduction: The “heavy
lifting” of falsifiable predictions includes OT-independent
decisions such as whether stress is represented in terms of metri-
cal feet or grids; whether mid-vowels form a natural class with
high-vowels to the exclusion of low-vowels, and so forth.
Whether to implement these analytical claims in a monostratal,
declarative, and parallel model of processing versus a serialist
and procedural architecture depends on the application to par-
ticular data structures. As Jones himself says, “OT doesn’t say
what the rules of language are – rules differ among linguistic
domains – instead, it describes how rules interact” (sect. 1).
With this in mind, recall the key phenomena Jones sets out to
capture in the article: (1) markedness relations between cat-
egories – the system of contrasts expressed in one language but
not another – and (2) a range of cross-linguistic variation. The
example of Seneca kinship as explored in the article shows
three differences from the English system:
(A) A distinction between cross cousins and parallel cousins,
and a syncretism of parents and their parallel siblings.
(M ¼ MZ=MB; F ¼ FB= FZ, as opposed to English,
where M=MZ ¼ MB; F= FB ¼ FZ).
(B) An elder versus younger distinction in siblings (cf. English,
where both are “brother”).
(C) Sibling/parallel-cousin syncretism.
We turn to three frameworks developed for vowel systems
and/or inventories of inflectional contrasts and their application
to Seneca versus English kinship:
1. Dispersion Theory (e.g., Flemming 1995; see also Lindblom
1986) views contrasts and inventories as the result of system-wide
pressures to minimize the number of categories crowding the
vowel space, while maximizing certain important distinctions
where possible. This is effectively Jones’ approach to Seneca,
Figure 1 (Nevins). Seneca kinship contrasts under a successive division algorithm.
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capturing the three properties (A–C) in terms of the pairwise con-
straint rankings below. Cross-linguistic variation is derived by re-
ranking the same universal set of constraints, which are either of
the DISTINGUISH-CATEGORY or MINIMIZE-TERMS types:
A. DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN .MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLING
TERMS;
B. DISTINGUISH GRADE .MINIMIZE SIBLING TERMS;
C. MINIMIZE COUSIN TERMS . DISTINGUISH DISTANCE.
2. Hierarchical Contrast (e.g., Dresher 2009; see also Goode-
nough 1967 for kinship) derives an inventory from a pre-existing
set of binary or privative/unary distinctions, through a successive
division algorithm that halts when all terms constitute their
own terminal nodes. In this approach, crosslinguistic variation
emerges from the order in which features combine, or in which suc-
cessive divisions are made. Seneca is captured as in the tree below.
3. Feature-cooccurrence constraints start with universal bans on
marked categories and combinations that can be “turned off” in
certain languages (Calabrese 2005; Noyer 1997; see also Archangeli
& Pulleyblank 1994, and see Greenberg 1966 for kinship). Marked-
ness is directly encoded in the definition of a feature. Crosslinguistic
variation results from the options to turn on/off a universal set of
neutralization rules. Assuming binary features in which the positive
value represents the marked value, Seneca versus English results
from certain features being “disallowed”:
Seneca: neutralize [þcollateral] with [-collateral] throughout
English: neutralize [þcross] with [-cross] throughout
English: neutralize [þelder] with [-elder] throughout
Much work in phonology and morphology is devoted to comparing
theories in terms of predictions for typology of possible languages,
order of the acquisition of elements, and diachronic changes. These
approaches differ in the data structures assumed and the correspond-
ing discovery procedures for contrast. For example, Dispersion
Theory assumes no componential features (and thus has less commit-
ment to representational structure); Hierarchical contrast highlights
the relations of contrast versus noncontrast in categories, rather
than markedness; Feature-cooccurrence invokes no ranking pro-
cedure, unlike the other two. Deciding among such theories
applied to kinship includes evaluating their success in expressing
impossible syncretisms (e.g., F ¼MB= FB), as well as necessary
implicational relations (e.g., a gender contrast among cousins
implies one among siblings, but not vice versa). The choice among
these frameworks is largely independent from implementation
within an OT or other architecture. Just as OpenOffice is the same
software when running on a laptop or a desktop, the theories dis-
cussed above can be plugged into OT or into a serial and derivational
framework. Enthusiasm for OT does not inextricably commit one to a
Dispersion approach to contrast, and nor, importantly, vice versa.
Further dialogue and research in the area of applying theories
of contrast and markedness to kinship, therefore, can disentangle
which predictive components are attributable to architectural
principles, such as a system of ranked violable constraints and
which are attributable to specific analytic components, such as
systemic tension between minimizing terms and maximizing
certain distinctions, or the choices involving the particular set
of distinctive features defining the “alphabet” of kinship terms.
The algebraic logic of kinship terminology
structures
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Abstract: Jones’ proposed application of Optimality Theory assumes the
primary kinship data are genealogical definitions of kin terms. This,
however, ignores the fact that these definitions can be predicted from
the computational, algebralike structural logic of kinship terminologies,
as has been discussed and demonstrated in numerous publications. The
richness of human kinship systems derives from the cultural knowledge
embedded in kinship terminologies as symbolic computation systems,
not the post hoc constraints devised by Jones.
Human kinship involves what it means to be kin, to act like kin,
and how we are kin in a mutually understood manner through
kinship relations. Kinship relations can be expressed either gen-
ealogically, by recursively tracing from one individual to another
(Bennardo & Read 2007; Leaf & Read 2010; Read 2001; 2010;
submitted) using parent, child and spouse relations, or by kin
terms that identify categories of genealogical relations: “if there
is any universal here . . . all speech communities use both cat-
egory and genealogy . . . in explaining kinship to themselves and
to others” (Parkin 2009, p. 165). That is, we should view “the
genealogical and the terminological spaces as co-existing concep-
tual structures with overlap arising through application of the
symbols from these two conceptual structures to the same
domain of persons.” (Read 2001, p. 80; contra Jones’s misrepre-
sentation in sect. 5.2).
But why two systems, and what is the relationship between the
two systems? Jones does not address the first question and wants
to answer the second by mapping genealogical relations to kin
terms with OT rules. To see the problem, start with the usual
answer to the first question, namely that categorization makes
the combinatorial explosion produced through genealogical
tracing cognitively manageable.
The categories, as we will now show, are determined through
computing kin relations directly and without reference to geneal-
ogy using a kin term product for a pair of kin terms, K and L,
defined as the kin term, M, that Ego would (properly) use for
alter2 when Ego (properly) refers to alter1 by the kin term L
and alter1 (properly) refers to alter2 by the kin term K (Read
1984; 2001; 2007 among others). For English speakers, the kin
term product of daughter and uncle is cousin, for if you (Ego)
refer to a man (alter1) as uncle and that man refers to a girl
(alter2) as daughter, then you know to refer to that girl as
cousin from knowledge of your kinship terminology even
without knowing the genealogical relations involved.
That people in all societies compute kin relations through
kin terms products is well documented through numerous
ethnographic examples quoted in Read (2001; 2007). For
example:
“Kinship reckoning on Rossel [New Guinea] does not rely on knowl-
edge of kin-type strings. . .. What is essential in order to apply a kin
term to an individual X, is to know how someone else, of a determinate
kinship type to oneself, refers to X. From that knowledge alone, a
correct appellation can be deduced. For example, suppose someone
I call a tıˆdeˆ ‘sister’ calls X a tp:ee ‘my child’, then I can call X a cheˆneˆ
‘my nephew’, without having the faintest idea of my genealogical con-
nection to X” (Levinson 2006, p. 18; emphasis added).
This computational knowledge embedded in a kinship termi-
nology can be made explicit through systematic elicitation of
kin terms using kin term products with the kin terms for the
core, structural positions in a family (Leaf 2006; Leaf & Read
2010) and displaying the structural relations among the elicited
terms through a kin term map (see Fig. 1). The form of the
map is terminology specific. From this map we can calculate
kin term products without reference to genealogy; for example,
the kin term product, nephew of grandmother, yields first
cousin once removed since one goes from self to nephew in
the map by the kin term product, child of child of parent, and
that product takes us from grandmother to first cousin once
removed.
We now construct (hence predict) the genealogical definitions
of the English kin terms from the kin term map. First map the
primary kin terms to their corresponding genealogical categories:
mother ! fmg, father ! ffg, son ! fsg and daughter ! fdg.
Commentary/Jones: Human kinship, from conceptual structure to grammar
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2010) 33:5 399
Then express any kin term as a product of primary kin terms and
compute the set product for the corresponding genealogical cat-
egories to determine the predicted category of genealogical
relations for that kin term. For example, from the kin term
map, uncle ¼ son of grandmotherþ son of grandfatherþ
husband of daughter of grandmotherþ husband of daughter of
grandfather, so uncle ! fmm, fmgfsg < fff, fmgfsg < fmm,
mfgfdgfhg < fff, fmgfdgfhg ¼ fmms, fms, ffs, fms, mmdh, mfdh,
ffdh, fmdhg ¼ fmb, fb, mzh, fzhg, where < is set union, b is
the genealogical relation brother, z is the genealogical relation
sister, h is the affinal relation husband, and genealogical strings
are written in the reverse order from kin term products. Using
this procedure, we obtain 100% agreement between predicted
and actual genealogical definitions of kin terms (see Fig. 2).
This accounts for the genealogical definitions of kin terms upon
which the OT rules are based. The rules, then, are just describing
Figure 1 (Read). Kin term map for the American kinship terminology based on kin term products with the primary kin terms parent,
child and spouse. An arrow indicates the result of taking the kin term product of the kin term at the base of the arrow with the primary
kin term represented by that arrow. Double-headed arrows are used in lieu of a pair of parallel arrows.
Figure 2 (Read). Predicted mapping of American kin terms shown in Figure 1 onto genealogical positions in a genealogical grid. The
predicted mapping agrees perfectly with the genealogical definition of kin terms. D – male marked position, W – female marked
position, ¼ – spouse relation, vertical line – parent/child relation, horizontal line – sibling relation. Note: 2nd Cousin Once/Twice
Removed not shown due to size of the grid.
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the inverse of this fundamental mapping to genealogy deter-
mined from the cultural knowledge embedded in the system of
kin terms.
Even more problematic, we may generate a kinship terminology
using kin term products in accordance with established universal
properties of kinship terminology structures and without reference
to genealogy (Read 2001; 2007). Terminology structures begin
with a core structure of ascending kin terms generated using
either (1) a parent kin term as a generating term (this accounts
for the properties of descriptive kinship terminologies such as
the American/English terminology) or (2) a parent kin term and
a sibling kin term as generating terms (this accounts for the prop-
erties of classificatory terminologies such as the Seneca terminol-
ogy discussed by Jones), then expand the structure with a
structure of descending kin terms isomorphic to the ascending
structure (along with structural equations that define reciprocity
between ascending and descending generating kin terms), then
introduce sex marking of kin terms, and lastly generate affinal
terms through a spouse, generating the term. The kinship termi-
nology generated in this manner has the form of an algebraic struc-
ture, hence the use of algebraic formalism to express the
underlying generative logic. The grammar of a kinship terminology
lies in this generative account (see Read 2001, table 2; Bennardo &
Read 2007, Fig. 1), not the OT rules as they only address the con-
sequences of the generative logic of a terminology.
Lastly, the rules posited by Jones violate the required univers-
ality of constraints: “Optimality theory hypothesizes that the set
of well-formedness constraints is universal: not just universally
available to be chosen from, but literally present in every
language” (Prince & Smolensky 1997, p. 1605; emphasis
added). Jones uses terminology specific constraints (see
especially Note 1) and achieves the appearance of universality
only through low ranking of constraints irrelevant to a terminol-
ogy. Consider the terminology of the !Kung San, a hunter-gath-
erer group in the northwestern part of Botswana among whom
I did fieldwork. Their kin term usage depends on a name giver-
name receiver relationship established when a newborn is
named for a close relative (Marshall 1976). A constraint based
on the name giver–name receiver relationship would not be uni-
versal and placing it low in the ranking for other terminologies
does not make it universal. Without universality, OT rules
reduce to description and hence have unclear connection, if
any, to cognitive processes.
Genealogy (and the relationship between
opposite-sex/same-sex sibling pairs) is what
kinship is all about
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Abstract: What are the theoretical implications of a universal genealogy?
After the demise of relativism in kinship studies, there is much to be
gained by joining old formal-structural analysis of kinship to recent
cognitive-evolutionary approaches. This commentary shows how the
logic of kinship terminologies, specifically those of the Seneca-Iroquois,
can be clarified by looking at the relationship between opposite-sex/
same-sex sibling pairs.
The target article is a sound, original and well-argued examin-
ation of one of the most fundamental topics in the history of
anthropological kinship theory. Among its numerous merits,
I would single out the much-needed connection the target article
establishes between traditional formal and structural analyses, the
cognitive anthropology of the 1960s, and more recent cognitive-
evolutionary perspectives on the human mind and behavior in
general. Many post-Schneiderian kinship studies are characterized
by a relativist and social-constructivist perspective. By contrast, the
target article clearly posits genealogy as the key constituent of any
kinship system – not in terms of a substance (biogenetic connec-
tions) but as a structure, a system of relations (see Salazar 2009).
Arguably, though the relationship between the substance of geneal-
ogy, human biological reproduction, and its structure is not contin-
gent, the latter can be systematically analyzed independently of the
former (cf. Read 2001). That is the reason kinship terms, as Jones
correctly points out, may not have genealogical definitions despite
being genealogically structured. I will focus my comment on what I
believe is perhaps a rather specific but serious limitation in the way
in which Jones’ use of Optimality Theory (OT) deals with the
Seneca-Iroquois terminologies.
The ranking of constraints, which appears to be one of the main
characteristics of this theory, allows for greater flexibility in the
identification of the distinctive features of kinship terms than the
more conventional componential and reductionist/extensionist
approaches. But what I see as problematic is the faithfulness con-
straint of “distinguish matrikin,” which the author places in the
second position in the ranking order. This gives rise to a number
of complications; for example, if matrikin need to be distinguished,
how can we explain that the Father’s Brother’s Son, who does not
belong to Ego’s matrilineage, is classed as a “brother” together with
matrilineal relatives such as Mother’s Sister’s Son? Although Iro-
quois terminologies have normally been associated with matrilineal
societies (despite numerous exceptions including the Yanomamo,
Algonquins, Dakota, and Dogon), Lounsbury’s (1964) reanalysis
of Morgan’s seminal work (1871) seems to eliminate the possibility
of any significant connection between Iroquois equations and
(matrilineal) descent. Stated otherwise, the bifurcate merging
characteristic of Iroquois terminologies (merging of Father with
Father’s Brother and Mother with Mother’s Sister) is not con-
nected to the need to single out matrilineally related relatives.
Thus I simply fail to see in what way the “distinguish matrikin” con-
straint makes any improvement on the more traditional cross/par-
allel distinction. Admittedly, as other authors have pointed out
(Allen 1998; He´ritier 1981: annex 1), a cross/parallel concept
that can be applied equally to relatives of all three central gener-
ations – G0 (Ego’s generation), Gþ1 (Ego’s parents) and G21
(Ego’s children) – has not yet been formulated. I think this may
be the case, as Jones also intimates, because this distinction
derives from a more fundamental one. Contrary to Jones’s argu-
ment, however, this has nothing to do with descent but with
what I take to be, following He´ritier (1996, pp. 62–67), the basic
binary opposition observable in all kinship terminological
systems: that between same-sex and opposite-sex sibling pairs, in
virtue of which opposite-sex siblings are never seen as “closer”
than same-sex siblings. He´ritier contends, correctly in my view,
that this fundamental law of kinship originates in the differential
value of the sexes as is culturally recognized in all known societies.
The four main terminological systems – birfurcate merging (Iro-
quois and Dravidian, plus Crow-Omaha systems), bifurcate collat-
eral (Latin, Sudanese), lineal (our system) and generational
(Hawaiian) – can be all seen as specific developments of the
same-sex/opposite-sex sibling relationship. And even the so-
called “fifth possibility,” a theoretically possible but sociologically
nonexistent terminological system (Hage 1997; He´ritier 1981, ch.
1), is a direct result of the infringement of that fundamental law
of kinship.
It would take me far beyond the scope of the present commen-
tary to elaborate on all the implications of this elementary rule for
each terminological system. Here I will focus on the Seneca-Iro-
quois system, which Jones analyzes as an instance of the workings
of OT. In the Iroquois system, children of same-sex siblings (par-
allel cousins) call each other brother and sister, while children of
opposite-sex siblings (cross cousins), are classed simply as cousins.
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By the same token, children of same-sex (cross) cousins will call
each other brother and sister while those of opposite-sex
cousins will call each other cousins. In keeping with these
simple rules, which clearly derive from the principle according
to which same-sex siblings should be seen as closer than oppo-
site-sex siblings, same-sex siblings are “merged” and become
the parents of all their children, while opposite-sex siblings are
kept separate, becoming “uncles” and “aunts” of each other’s chil-
dren. These rules also account for the fact that the Father’s Broth-
er’s Son is classed as a “brother” regardless of the matrilineage he
happens to belong to, and explain why the Older Mother’s Broth-
er’s Son’s Son is a “cousin” and not a “brother.” Both this individ-
ual and Ego are children of opposite-sex cousins: Ego’s older
mother and her mother’s brother’s son. The simplicity of this prin-
ciple contrasts with Jones’ argument here, which is unnecessarily
convoluted. No further rules, principles or constraints are needed
to generate all kin terms of the Iroquois system.
Despite this problem in Jones’ argument, his concern with dis-
closing “fundamental structures of the human mind” through
kinship analysis is highly laudable. Further research along
these lines will certainly contribute to enhancing anthropology’s
position among the human sciences by deepening our under-
standing of the oldest, most universal and most elementary
form of human relationship.
The shared evolutionary history of kinship
classifications and language
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Abstract: Among monkeys and apes, both the recognition and
classification of individuals and the recognition and classification of
vocalizations constitute discrete combinatorial systems. One system
maps onto the other, suggesting that during human evolution kinship
classifications and language shared a common cognitive precursor.
Jones argues that kinship and language are similar in their dis-
crete, combinatorial structure, and that these similarities point
toward “general principles of cognition or communication.”
Although he does not discuss evolution explicitly, he suggests
that the shared mechanisms underlying kinship classifications
and language may have evolved from the same cognitive precur-
sor. Recent studies of nonhuman primates support this hypoth-
esis. Specifically, they demonstrate that both the recognition
and classification of individuals and the recognition and classifi-
cation of vocalizations constitute discrete combinatorial systems
that interact closely. One system maps onto the other, suggesting
that they share underlying cognitive mechanisms. The close link
between recognition and classification of individuals and vocali-
zations supports the view that, during human evolution, the cog-
nitive mechanisms underlying kinship classifications and those
underlying language shared a common precursor.
Although the physical features and vocalizations of different
animals vary continuously, free-ranging monkeys and apes recog-
nize each other as individuals, both by appearance and by voice.
This in itself constitutes a very simple, discretely coded system of
knowledge that is probably pervasive among group-living animals.
Moreover, from this relatively simple starting point, monkeys,
apes, and perhaps many other species make further, more elaborate
classifications of individuals. Many monkeys, for example, recog-
nize other animals’ dominance ranks. They also distinguish pairs
of individuals who have close behavioral associations from those
whose interactions are less frequent and predictable (reviewed in
Cheney & Seyfarth 2007). In monkeys, close bonds typically mani-
fest in frequent grooming, support in aggressive coalitions, toler-
ance at feeding sites, and other behaviors. They may persist for
many years. In baboons and macaques, for example, males disperse
but females remain in their natal group throughout their lives, and
close behavioral associations are most common among matrilineal
kin – mothers, daughters, and sisters – who almost always form
such bonds; but strong bonds may also occur among less closely
related females, particularly when these individuals have no close
kin present in the group (Schino 2001; Silk et al. 2006; 2010). In
chimpanzees, females disperse but males remain in their natal
group throughout their lives, and close bonds are formed
between males and, more rarely, between females. Such bonds
manifest in grooming, coalitions, meat sharing, and participation
in hunts (Langergraber et al. 2009; Mitani 2006; Muller &
Mitani 2005; Nishida 1983; Watts 1998; Wittig 2010; Wittig &
Boesch 2003).
In baboons, experiments suggest that individuals not only recog-
nize other animals’ dominance ranks and kin relations but also
combine this information to create a representation of social
relations in which ranked individuals are grouped into families
(Bergman et al. 2003; Seyfarth et al. 2005; see also Penn et al.
2008). Observational data on Japanese macaques yield similar
results (Schino et al. 2006). The classification of individuals on
the simultaneous basis of kinship and rank constitutes a conceptual
structure in primates because, while the individual elements may
change over time as animals are born, die, join or leave the
group, the overall structure remains constant. Moreover, animals
treat one another differently not just because of their own behavior,
but also because of their membership in a particular kin group. For
example, from the moment of its birth, baboons treat an infant that
belongs to a high-ranking matriline differently from the way they
treat an infant that belongs to a low-ranking matriline. This differ-
ence in behavior arises not because infants behave differently but
because they belong to different kin groups. In this respect, nonhu-
man primates’ recognition of kinship and rank can be thought of as a
conventionalized system, based on discrete elements – individual
identity, kinship, and rank – combined in a rule-governed
manner (Cheney & Seyfarth 2007).
Nonhuman primate vocalizations also constitute a very simple,
discrete, combinatorial system of recognition and classification.
Most calls are individually distinctive, and individual recognition
by voice is common. Many call types are also used only in
particular circumstances (reviewed in Seyfarth & Cheney
2010). Baboons, for example, give acoustically different alarm
calls only to particular predators, territorial calls only during
encounters with other groups, screams only by lower-ranking
to higher-ranking individuals, threat vocalizations only by
higher-ranking individuals to lower-ranking individuals, and so
on. Listeners, moreover, recognize these predictable relations.
In the playback experiments cited above, where A was dominant
to B, listeners showed little response to playback of the sequence
“A threatens B and B screams” but responded strongly to the
sequence “B threatens A and A screams” (Bergman et al.
2003). In sum, just as nonhuman primates recognize individuals
and classify them according to rank and matrilineal kinship, the
same animals recognize and classify vocalizations according to
caller identity, context, and the “rules” of call delivery.
Jones notes that in humans, we sometimes view kinship and
language as separate cognitive domains. By contrast, among non-
human primates the recognition of individuals, kin groups, and
rank relations (on the one hand) and the meaning of vocalizations
(on the other) are inextricably bound together. Both are discrete,
combinatorial systems, and each influences the other. When
young animals learn to recognize their matrilineal kin, they do
so in part by learning to recognize these animals’ vocalizations;
conversely, a caller’s identity, rank, and kin group membership
help to determine the meaning of a call or a sequence of calls to
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a listener. When a baboon hears Sylvia giving threatening
vocalizations to Hannah and Hannah screaming, the listener’s
interpretation of this sequence draws not only on her identifi-
cation of the call types and the contexts in which they are given
but also on her recognition of the callers, their ranks, and their
matrilineal kin groups. In this respect, the cognitive processes
involved in the recognition and classification of individuals
overlap significantly with the cognitive processes involved in the
recognition of call meaning. Such data offer indirect support for
the hypothesis that, during the course of human evolution, the
cognitive mechanisms underlying kinship classifications and
those underlying language evolved from a common source.
Lexical universals of kinship and social
cognition
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Abstract: Jones recognizes the existence of “primitives of conceptual
structures,” out of which “local representations of kinship are
constructed.” NSM semantics has identified these primitives through a
cross-linguistic search for lexical universals (“NSM” stands for Natural
Semantic Metalanguage and also for the corresponding linguistic
theory). These empirical universals provide, I argue, a better bridge
between cognitive anthropology and evolutionary psychology than the
abstract constructs of OT, with dubious claim to conceptual reality.
A decade ago anthropologist Raymond Fogelson (2001, p. 41)
wrote: “The study of kinship, which played such a prominent
role in the development of anthropological theory, now seems
to be a dead topic. . .. Only time will tell whether the subject
will be revived, reincarnated, or reinvented. . ..” (See also Sousa
2003 on “The fall of kinship”).
It is to Jones’ great credit that he is trying to revive this subject,
which is central to the understanding of social life and social cogni-
tion. I also appreciate Jones’ defence of the inherent link between
“kinship” and “genealogy” (or “reproduction”) and his recognition
of the existence of “primitives of conceptual structure,” out of
which “local representations of kinship” are constructed (Fig. 1 of
the target article).
On the other hand, I see as a weakness of Jones’ account its
dependence on a particular formal theory (OT) and its lack of atten-
tion to the question of metalanguage. The “constraints” approach
depends on metaterms like “matrikin,” “generation,” “sex,” and
“cousin,” which don’t have equivalents in the languages of the
people concerned and so have dubious claim to conceptual reality.
As I see it, the fundamental facts are that all languages have
words for “mother” and “father”, and in all probability “wife”
and “husband”, and that in all languages kinship systems are
built on the bedrock of these four concepts. This fact is often
obscured by the polysemy of the words in question (Wierzbicka
1992; Shapiro 2008), but Jones acknowledged it in earlier work
(Jones 2004). In the target article, however, the focus is so
much on theory that the empirically established lexical universals
of kinship seem to disappear from view.
Jones’ approach to kinship, which is wedded to OT, is vulner-
able to the criticism that D’Andrade (1995, p. 30) directed at
componential analysis of kinship as it was practised in the 1960s:
“This type of analysis seems specialized, arcane, and formalistic.”
The charge of ethnocentrism aimed at traditional anthropological
analyses of kinship by, for example, Wallace and Atkins (1969,
p. 364) applies as well. More recently, Leaf (2006, p. 306)
noted: “The kin types were symbolized by one or two letters so
as to seem abstract and schematic, but in the end the ideas they
represented were only those of the American kinship system, M
or Mo for Mother, F or Fa for Father. . .B for Brother, Si or Z
for sister. . .sometimes with added qualifiers for age and the like.”
Jones doesn’t use symbols like M, F, B and S, but in his com-
parison of English and Seneca he, too, relies on kin types taken
from English, such as parent, sibling, child and cousin – con-
cepts for which there are no words in Seneca itself. Analysing
Seneca kinship terminology through such terms means, I think,
imposing on it a perspective alien to it.
For my part, I contend that an adequate, non-Anglocentric fra-
mework for the comparison of kinship systems can be based on
empirically discovered lexical and conceptual universals, begin-
ning with “mother,” “father,” “husband” and “wife.” In addition,
such a culture-neutral analytical framework can build on the set
of empirically discovered “semantic primes,” like “people,” “do,”
“happen,” “body,” “before,” and 60 or so others, which, evidence
suggests, can be found as words, or distinct word meanings, in all
languages. (See Table 1.)
According to the findings of NSM-based investigations
(Goddard 2008; Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002; Wierzbicka
1996; 2006; 2010 and many other references listed under the
bibliographical links at http://www.une.edu.au/bcss/linguistics/
nsm/), there are two sets of universal concepts: a few dozen in-
definable semantic primes (“atoms of meaning”), and a smaller
set of “semantic molecules” – concepts that are complex and
can be defined in terms of primes but which function as units
in the construction of culturally variable compound ideas. (In
addition, there are many molecules that are language-specific.)
The four lexical pivots of kinship – “mother,” “father,” “wife”
and “husband” – belong to the second set (Wierzbicka, forth-
coming). Other semantic molecules which, evidence suggests,
are universal and which are highly relevant to kinship, are the
three mainstays of social cognition: “men,” “women,” and “chil-
dren” (Goddard 2010; Goddard & Wierzbicka, forthcoming).
Concepts lexicalised in all languages allow us to bring hypoth-
esized conceptual structures into the orbit of recognizable
human ways of speaking; they give us an empirically grounded
analytical framework that overcomes both the “technicism” of
kinship algebras, old and new, and the Anglocentrism of descrip-
tions based on language-particular English kin types.
Jones proposes rules and constraints that may make sense from
the point of view of OT theorists but which are anything but
“experience-near” or psychologically real. How such rules
could be learned by ordinary speakers, and how they can be ver-
ified by researchers, is far from clear. It is also far from clear how
formalization in terms of OT can provide a window onto “how
people think about kinship” (as envisaged in Jones 2004, p. 211).
In the end, one can’t help feeling that the old key questions of
“psychological reality” (Burling 1967), “the native’s point of view”
(Geertz 1976), and “the insider’s understanding” (Shore 1996)
have vanished from view in the target article, amid concerns
about “faithfulness constraints,” “scales limiting allowed permu-
tations in constraint ranking,” “markedness scales,” and other
similarly abstract and theory-dependent analytical constructs.
As Kronenfeld (2001, p. 158) notes: “The formal analysis that
best represents the regularities of the terminology may not
necessarily be best at representing the cognitive operations by
which native speakers navigate the system.”
The “seven faithfulness constraints” Jones proposes depend on
English concepts such as “parent” and “sibling,” “sex,” “gener-
ation” and “age,” which have no equivalents in most languages
of the world. By contrast, the seven building-blocks of kinship
and social cognition recognized in the NSM theory – “mother,”
“father,” “wife,” “husband,” “men,” “women” and “children” –
are, evidence suggests, lexical universals, experience-near and
empirically verifiable. If in our portrayal of local systems of
kinship we rely on such universals (as it is done in NSM-based
analyses), we can capture generalizations about the structure of
such systems by recognizing recurrent semantic components
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and recurrent kin name extensions both with and across languages
and cultures. Why not start building bridges between cognitive
anthropology and evolutionary psychology on these empirical,
culture-neutral, and theory-independent human universals?
Author’s Response
Thinking about kinship and thinking
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Abstract: The target article proposes a theory uniting the
anthropological study of kin terminology with recent
developments in linguistics and cognitive science. The response
to comments reaches two broad conclusions. First, the theory
may be relevant to several current areas of research, including (a)
the nature and scope of the regular, “grammatical” side of
language, (b) the organization of different domains of conceptual
structure, including parallels across domains, their taxonomic
distribution and implications for evolution, and (c) the influence
of conceptual structure on social structure. Second, the theory
compares favorably with alternatives, including (a) the theory that
kin terminology is not really that complicated, (b) the theory that
kin terms mirror social categories, (c) componential analysis, and
(d) kinship algebra. If further research in anthropology,
linguistics, and other fields supports the theory, and confirms the
psychological reality of proposed mechanisms, then kinship may
emerge as a model system for the study of important issues in
cognition and social organization.
The target article sets forth a theory – call it the Concep-
tual Structure and Grammar (CS&G) theory – of kin ter-
minology. In presenting the theory, I find myself in the
position of a matchmaker, trying to broker a marriage
settlement between the anthropology of kinship and
current work in linguistics and cognitive science. In
responding to commentators’ appraisals of the proposed
match, I first say more about how the two sides might
live together, then take up objections to the match from
supporters of rival theories of kin terminology, and
finally say something about the theory’s prospects.
The first section of the response is concerned with how
the CS&G theory situates the study of kin terms and
kinship rules within several current research programs in
the cognitive sciences. This section addresses comments
about the relationship of kinship grammar to grammar
more generally, as understood within the framework of
Optimality Theory. It also discusses comments relating the
conceptual structure of kinship to other domains of concep-
tual structure, especially the structure of physical space, and
relating human and nonhuman conceptual structure.
Finally, this section takes up a topic raised by a number of
commentators, the relationship of kin categorization to
kinship and social organization more broadly, positioning
the current theory within a larger program of investigating
how conceptual structure affects social structure. According
to Levinson, “The neglect of kinship in current anthropol-
ogy and in the cognitive sciences is not far short of a
scandal”: In this section I try to show that the cognitive
sciences have much to gain from ending this neglect.
The second section responds to criticisms and claims
from defenders of alternative approaches. Some commen-
tators argue that the present theory is too complicated and
could be replaced by a simpler, more intuitive approach.
Others favor sociocultural rather than cognitive-linguistic
accounts of kin categorization. And others advocate
alternative formal theories: componential analysis and
kinship algebra. This section addresses these comments,
while expanding on the treatment of Seneca terminology
presented in the target article, and bringing in other ter-
minologies. Throughout, I try to show that specific criti-
cisms of the CS&G theory don’t hold up, and that the
theory has advantages over the alternatives.
Table 1 (Wierzbicka). Universal semantic primes (English exponents), grouped into related categories
I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING  THING, PEOPLE, BODY substantives
KIND, PART relational substantives
THIS, THE SAME, OTHER  ELSE determiners
ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH  MANY, LITTLE/FEW quantifiers
GOOD, BAD evaluators
BIG, SMALL descriptors
KNOW, THINK, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR mental predicates
SAY, WORDS, TRUE speech
DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH actions, events, movement, contact
BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, HAVE, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING) location, existence, possession, specification
LIVE, DIE life and death
WHEN  TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME,
FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT
time
WHERE  PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE space
NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF logical concepts
VERY, MORE intensifier, augmentor
LIKE  WAY similarity
Note. Primes exist as the meanings of lexical units (not at the level of lexemes). Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or
phrasemes. They can be formally complex. They can have combinatorial variants or “allolexes” (indicated with ). Each prime has well-speci-
fied syntactic (combinatorial) properties.
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A concluding section considers what directions the
theory might take in the future.
R1. Conceptual structure and grammar,
meet kinship
A number of commentators respond to a major thesis of
the target article: that kinship, and kin terminology specifi-
cally, is tightly structured, even “grammatical,” and the
study of kinship has multiple connections with ongoing
research programs in linguistics and other highly struc-
tured domains of cognition and interaction. Some of
these connections are reviewed below.
R1.1. Kinship grammar as grammar
The present theory may have implications for the nature
and scope of grammar. The distinction between
grammar – the rule-governed, generative part of
language – and the lexicon – the arbitrary, memorized
part – is commonly equated with the distinction
between syntax and words-plus-morphemes. (Leaf, for
example, seems to equate these as a matter of definition.)
But even if we somehow ignore phonological grammar,
these two distinctions don’t really line up very well.
Many items in the lexicon are bigger than words, including
idioms like “kick the bucket,” and syntactically anomalous
constructions like “the ___ [comparative phrase], the ___
[comparative phrase]” (e.g., “the more, the merrier”; Jack-
endoff 2002, pp. 167–82).
Conversely, the evidence from kin terminology implies
that, in some semantic fields, words behave like pieces of
grammar. More precisely, kin terminologies (the way kin
types are split and merged), rather than kin terms (the
actual words used for kin), are grammatically structured.
Like the inflections of frequently used regular verbs, kin
term meanings may be memorized but are apparently
also subject to an OT-style process of evaluation often
enough to keep them grammatical.Hogeweg, Legendre,
& Smolensky (Hogeweg et al.) present their own version
of the distinction between kin terminology and kin terms.
They also clarify the difference between (1) theories of
how the contribution of words to meaning varies with
context, and (2) the present theory of how the context-
independent meanings of kin categories are structured.
The CS&G theory is just one example of the very wide
range of application of OT. In his comment, Biro´ asks,
“Will Optimality Theory colonize all of higher cognition?”
The target article suggests an answer: OT-style grammar
can colonize only “grammar-friendly” domains of
language, domains that support a successful process of
constraint discovery. In constraint discovery, language
learners explore their motor, perceptual, and conceptual
capacities to discover universal prototypical and distinctive
features. Since others in the community are doing the
same, learners can count on constraints being mutually
known and can move on to using linguistic evidence to
determine how constraints are ranked. Different linguistic
environments may differ in how thoroughly they encou-
rage learners to explore different regions of constraint
space, but in any region they explore, learners are
expected to discover (not copy) much the same con-
straints. For example, most languages don’t encourage
their learners to explore the constraint space for sign-
language phonology, but in those that do, learners seem
to end up finding the same constraints (Brentari 1998).
ContraBloch and Hudson, then, theories of constraint dis-
covery have more substance than the banal observation that
learning plays a role in constraint acquisition; they require
that constraints be grounded in precultural universals.
Another take on these issues comes from Miers and
Nevins. Miers outlines a version of Optimality Theory
applied to kin terminology that departs substantially
from the standard version in its treatment of faithfulness
and markedness. This work might have a place within
the framework outlined by Nevins, who discusses a
range of theories in phonology that may deliver some of
the same results as OT without using OT. Following the
hypothesis of Cross-Modular Structural Parallelism,
Nevins suggests that phonology and kin terminology may
represent the same linguistic architecture operating on
two different “alphabets.” If this proposal can be made
to work, it may offer a new approach to delimiting the
potential scope of grammar. Clearly this is a large topic
that deserves more attention than I give it here.
R1.2. Kinship space and other conceptual spaces
Because different domains of conceptual structure represent
very different sorts of content, we might expect them to be
organized very differently. However, according to the
target article, the conceptual structure of kinship borrows
much of its organization from the conceptual structure of
space. This result is consistent with other research finding
parallel organization across semantic fields. Together with
evidence regarding conceptual structure in nonhuman
primates, this may have implications for the evolution of
cognition; I discuss several relevant responses below.
Bennardo’s work considerably advances our under-
standing of the extension of spatial thinking to more
abstract domains (and counters the skepticism on this
score of El Guindi and McConvell). He demonstrates a
relationship between universals of spatial cognition and
universals of kinship cognition. But he goes further,
finding systematic covariation between cultures of space
and kinship: A culture that prefers one frame of reference
over another for representing space is likely to make a par-
allel choice in representing kinship. This work goes
beyond the target article in demonstrating the integration
of culture across cognitive domains.
Seyfarth & Cheney (see also Cheney & Seyfarth 2007)
review evidence that many nonhuman primates not only
recognize their kin, but also have abstract representations
of social categories that facilitate social inference. They
note that some of these representations, and the vocaliza-
tions associated with them, may be categorical rather than
metric, digital rather than analog. Their observations
imply that the organizing principles of human kin terminol-
ogy – sex, kinship distance and grade (rank), and group
membership – are probably primitives of social cognition
in nonhuman primates and other social mammals and
birds. Thoughts about kinship and other social relationships
may be the first abstract thoughts that any animal had.
What are the roots of social cognition? Cross-domain
parallels in the organization of conceptual structure
might reflect the human gift for metaphorical thinking,
but the evidence for abstract thinking about social
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relationships in nonhuman primates suggests an evolution-
ary scenario. The mental organs adapted to representing
space seem to have been exapted to represent more
abstract relationships, starting with kinship and social
organization. Modeling kin relationships as relationships
in an abstract kinship space would have some immediate
payoffs, allowing inferences like: “If A is above B and B
is above C, then A is above C,” and so on. This scenario
implies that homology as well as adaptation has played a
role in the evolution of the mind. The conceptual structure
of kinship may be adapted for doing genealogy and solving
social problems on Pleistocene savannahs, but it may also
owe some of its organization to a more ancient history.
R1.3. Kinship, from conceptual structure to social
structure
Conceptual structure is likely used not only in communi-
cation, but in cognition and social interaction more gener-
ally. In the target article, the focus was on kin terminology,
which gives a particularly clear view of the conceptual
structure of kinship. However, as a number of commenta-
tors remark (or complain), there is more to human kinship
than kin terms (Bloch, Gerkey & Cronk, Knight,
Levinson). This section responds to these comments by
briefly sketching the broader relevance of the CS&G
theory to social coordination and social structure. The dis-
cussion covers some of the games people play involving
their kin and how conceptual structure may influence
the outcomes of these games. This may be part of a
larger story, of how universal conceptual primitives facili-
tate convergence on shared moral norms in a number of
social domains.
Marriage, in particular deciding who may marry whom,
is one social arena in which human beings often find
themselves playing coordination games. An accepted set
of rules, even if partly arbitrary, that divide each person’s
relations into marriageable and unmarriageable on the
basis of kinship can regulate sexual competition and
foster suprafamilial alliances.
Another family of coordination games involving kin may
involve what I have labeled group nepotism (Jones 2000;
2004). Altruism toward kin is a public good. Natural selec-
tion favors higher levels of kin altruism if people coordi-
nate their assistance than if each acts separately. When
two brothers, for example, must choose how much help
to give a needy third brother, their effective coefficient
of relatedness when they act independently is the standard
Hamiltonian 1/2; when they act together it ranges up to
7/10. (The mathematics involved is covered in Jones
[2000] as “The Brothers Karamazov Game.”) Especially
in large groups of distant kin, the evolutionarily expected
level of altruism toward the needy is much higher if
groups can impose enforceable public commitments on
their members. This may be relevant to the distribution
of gains from collective action in large descent-based
groups like the Lamalera whale hunting parties (Alvard
2003) cited by Gerkey & Cronk, and more generally to
the establishment of norms of generalized (rather than
balanced) reciprocity among kin.
The norms that govern marriage and socially imposed
altruism toward kin have some of the same structure as
the rules that govern kin terminology. Both terms and
norms are sensitive to genealogical distance, but allow
other principles to orient and reshape kinship space. Kin
terminologies often treat parallel or unilineal relations as
closer than cross or non-unilineal; marriage rules often
use the same distinctions to divide kin into those too
close to marry and those preferred or prescribed as
spouses. Kin terminologies sometimes move affines into
the consanguine category – for example, treating a
sister-in-law as a kind of sister; marriage rules sometimes
follow suit, extending incest taboos to affines (He´ritier
2002). Kin terminologies may treat certain classes of
sibling as equivalent – for example, equating a woman’s
son and her sister’s son; norms of sharing may be built
around the ideal (often evaded in practice, of course) of
the unity of the sibling group. More generally, both
terms and norms impose categorical distinctions on a con-
tinuously varying world. “[K]inship systems have a digital
character” (Levinson) and “a formal kinship system is
designed to minimize scope for disputation: It does this
by eliminating shades of grey” (Knight).
The parallels between kin terminology and social organ-
ization are a familiar topic in social anthropology. They are
commonly assumed to result from the influence of each
culture’s social structure on its terminology (see sect.
R2.2). But I suggest there is something more going on:
Norms and terms have some of the same structure
because they draw on the same conceptual building
blocks. Both of these causal pathways are discernible in
Figure 1 in the target article. The first pathway starts from
“local organization” and follows the arrows along the
bottom row to “kin terminology.” The second starts from
“primitives of conceptual structure” and follows the arrows
either to “local organization” or to “kin terminology.”
The dependence of both moral codes and semantic
grammar on universal conceptual primitives may be a
general phenomenon, applying to more than kinship
(Pinker 2007, pp. 228–33). For example, in making judg-
ments about the morality of causing and avoiding harm,
people normally do not rely on the maxim of the greatest
good for the greatest number, but turn instead to intui-
tions deriving from the conceptual structure of causation
and agency (Mikhail 2007; see Wierzbicka for the corre-
sponding conceptual primitives: because, do, and happen).
The hypothesis, then, is that the CS&G theory is rel-
evant to the social organization of kinship because the
ingredients of conceptual structure go into the making of
social structure. The outcomes of coordination games
depend not just on material factors, but on the mutual
knowledge that players bring to the table, including knowl-
edge deriving from precultural universals of cognition.
This hypothesis, although rooted in an evolutionary per-
spective on human behavior, departs from theories in
human behavioral ecology in which social organization is
the unintended by-product of individual strategizing
among inclusive-fitness-maximizers – monads with
gonads. Representations of the social order – not just as
it is, but as it should be – play a role in making society.
R2. Kinship, meet conceptual structure and
grammar
The previous section reviewed the potential relevance of
kinship to several research programs in the cognitive
sciences. This section considers the other side of the
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exchange: the relevance of recent work in linguistics and
cognitive sciences to kin terminology. The section offers
a defense in detail of the CS&G theory against a range
of criticism, especially from advocates of rival theories.
Some of Kronenfeld’s remarks serve to frame the dis-
cussion here. He notes that the target article considers
only a portion of English and Seneca terminology, and
he asks what the present theory buys us that we don’t
get from other approaches. This section addresses both
these issues. In reply to several commentators who raise
questions about the mechanics of the theory, I expand
the discussion of the Seneca case, and also show how the
proposed constraints apply to some of the Chinese data
presented by Liu, Ge, Mai, & Luo (Liu et. al.) I hope
this part of the reply offers some assurance that the
present theory can handle not just hand-picked examples,
but challenges raised by sharp critics, and additional data.
Some commentators defend alternative approaches,
including sociocultural explanations of kin terminology,
componential analysis, and kinship algebra. I offer some
comments on these, and indicate what seem to be the
advantages of the present theory.
This section is necessarily somewhat technical. Readers
unfamiliar with the details of kin terminology might
choose to skim in particular sections R2.2 (especially the
middle) and R2.3.
R2.1. Is the theory too complicated?
Behme, Hudson, and Wierzbicka argue that the CS&G
theory is too complicated and unintuitive. Hudson starts
off by proposing the “easier explanation” that the structure
of kin terminologies is overtly represented in native speak-
ers’ terms. (See Coult 1966 for an early version of this.)
Hudson argues that, for example, the availability of the
inclusive term parent in English allows the construction
of further categories like aunt (parent’s sister) and grand-
father (parent’s father). But then he takes it back. As he
observes, the concept Sibling seems to be involved in
defining cousin (Parent’s Sibling’s Child), even though
the word sibling is used infrequently or not at all by
many English speakers. (In my anthropology classes, stu-
dents usually define cousin disjunctively, as something
like aunt’s or uncle’s child.) Examples like this, rather
than an unnatural love of complexity for its own sake,
have led anthropologists to postulate extra levels of rep-
resentation beyond what is overtly expressed. Thus the
advocates of componential analysis propose distinctive fea-
tures as an underlying level of representation of kin terms,
while the practitioners of kinship algebra distinguish the
abstract structure of kin categories from the actual termi-
nology, with the latter derived from the former by adding
sex distinctions and/or cross-sex equations.
Wierzbicka proposes that kin terms specific to one
language can be defined based on a few core kin terms lex-
icalized more-or-less universally, “father,” “mother,”
“husband,” and “wife.” This proposal is part of a larger
program of assembling a collection of universal semantic
primitives that can serve as building blocks for defining
culture-specific words and concepts.
I have no quarrel with the specific primitives on Wierz-
bicka’s carefully crafted list. However, the principle that
we explain the natives’ use of language using only trans-
lations of terms shared by the natives with everyone else
runs into problems when we turn from the lexicon to
grammar. For example, the difference in verb argument
structure between “She rolled the ball” and “The ball
rolled” turns on universally lexicalized concepts from
Wierzbicka’s list, such as because, do, and happen. But
to explain in detail which micro-classes of verbs take
what constructions, and how this varies across languages,
it is necessary to look “under the hood” at the internal
structure of these concepts. This level of representation
is not so evident in the lexicon, nor so readily accessible
to the consciousness of native speakers (Pinker 2007, pp.
65–73; see Legendre et al., 2006, for an OT treatment
of verb micro-classes across languages.) The same
applies to kin terms. We need to know something about
the feature structure or other relational properties of kin
types to explain why ”mother and father” is a natural
class but ”mother and husband” is not.
In short, kin terminology is not simple. Like other areas of
grammar, it involves nonovert representations. It’s not clear
what the metric for complexity is, but the CS&G theory is
not notably more complex than any well-developed alterna-
tive. If anything, the theory has the advantage of borrowing
some of its complexity from other domains of language and
cognition. The machinery of Optimality Theory, and maybe
even the local version of optimization supported here, is
imported from outside the domain of kinship, while the con-
ceptual structure of kinship takes some of its organization
from the conceptual structure of space.
R2.2. Does kin terminology derive from social
organization?
Variation in kin terminology is correlated with variation in
social organization. For example, bifurcate merging aunt
and uncle terms are more common in societies with matri-
lineal and/or patrilineal descent groups or other social
categories (Murdock 1949, pp. 156, 164–166, 180–183;
Whiting et al. 1988). (Bifurcate merging aunt terms
means one word for Mother and Mother’s Sister,
another word for Father’s Sister; bifurcate merging
uncle terms means one word for Father and Father’s
Brother, another word for Mother’s Brother.) The
Seneca, with bifurcate merging terminology and matrili-
neal descent groups, fit this generalization.
Correlations between kin terminology and social organ-
ization and culture have led some anthropologists to argue
that sociocultural explanations can supersede cognitive-
linguistic ones in accounting for what is systematic in kin
terminology. Hudson, Behme, Leaf, and perhaps Levin-
son support social structural explanations of kin terminol-
ogy. El Guindi argues for understanding kinship as
holistically “embedded in cultural knowledge,” effectively
denying the content/structure distinction proposed in the
target article. Jordan & Dunn argue that a historical
approach to kin terminology “immediately reduces the
amount of variation that needs to be accounted for by
the OT framework.”
The real question is whether arguments of this kind can
be cashed out in the form of hypotheses linking social cat-
egories and statuses to terminology in detail. The record of
past attempts is not encouraging. A number of anthropol-
ogists have proposed explanations of kin terms along the
lines of “‘K’ means ‘woman of my mother’s patriclan,’” or
“‘L’ means ‘resident male of my father’s hamlet,’” but
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these typically have been shown not to predict the assign-
ment of kin terms very accurately (Gould 2000, pp. 371–
78; Lounsbury 1965). Seneca cousin terms provide a case
in point: They are quite regular, but, as Kronenfeld,
McConvell, and Salazar note, the division they establish
between classificatory siblings and cross cousins doesn’t
map cleanly onto any social-structural divide. On present
evidence, the effect of social organization on kin terminol-
ogy is mostly loose and indirect, filtered through cognitive-
linguistic principles.
Ideally, then, a theory of kin terminology should be con-
sistent with two findings: first, kin terminology correlates
with social organization; second, there is no one-to-one
mapping between kin terms and social categories. The
CS&G theory accounts for both findings by positing an
indirect connection between social structure and kin ter-
minology. Local social organization, acting probabilisti-
cally and with some time lag, influences the local ranking
of universal kin term constraints. This ranking in turn gen-
erates kin terminologies through constraint interaction
governed by principles of Optimality Theory. This is
shown in Figure 1 in the target article, where a series of
arrows runs along the bottom row from “local organiz-
ation” to “kin terminology.”
The rest of this subsection reviews a specific case, the
relationship between matrilineal descent and cousin ter-
minology in Seneca, comparing several alternative
approaches (Leaf, McConvell, Salazar) and taking a
side trip through Chinese cousin terms (Liu et al.) to
show the strength and flexibility of the present theory.
The last two paragraphs summarize the argument.
According to Leaf, “Seneca terminology embodies
Seneca social conceptions just as English terminology
embodies English social conceptions.” He writes that
Seneca cousin terms “form groups based on a specific con-
trast between own matrilineal clan as against all other
clans. . . . Own brothers and sisters are grouped with
mother’s sister’s children and contrasted with all other
relations on one’s own generation. Children of ha-nih
(father and father’s brother) who are also children of
own mother are in own sibling group, children of other
ha-nih are in the all others group.”
But Leaf’s account of Seneca terminology is wrong.
Morgan, whom Leaf cites, is quite clear that the Seneca
contrast is not between mother’s sister’s children and all
other cousins, but between cousins linked through same-
sex parents and cousins linked through opposite-sex
parents (Morgan 1997[1871], pp. 156–157, 160–161,
162, Plates VI, VIII) – not matrilineal versus nonmatrili-
neal cousins, in other words, but parallel versus cross.
The belief that social organization is directly reflected in
kin terminology seems to have led Leaf to misread the
evidence.
McConvell and Salazar approach the same topic from
the other end. Both note the ubiquity of parallel/cross dis-
tinctions in kin terminologies and propose that the rel-
evant distinction is the sexually symmetrical one between
links through same-sex and opposite-sex siblings. McCon-
vell suggests this could be handled by a DISTINGUISH PAR-
ALLEL/CROSS constraint. Applied to the Seneca case, this
would achieve descriptive adequacy at the cost of severing
the connection between kin terminology and social organ-
ization. The two commentators take this course because,
although sympathetic to the use of Optimality Theory,
they are skeptical about one of the constraints in the
target article, DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN. This constraint
requires that kin in Ego’s matriline (stippled in Fig. 2)
be distinguished from kin in the adjacent matrilines of
Mother’s Brother’s Child (vertical stripes) and Father,
Father’s Sister, and Father’s Sister’s Child (horizontal
stripes).
There are two issues at stake here. One involves the
placement of the boundary between adjacent matrikin. It
may be possible to redraw this boundary to make more
room for the parallel/cross-sibling distinction McConvell
and Salazar emphasize.1 But this revision, whatever its
merits, is of little consequence in the present case. The
more relevant issue is that McConvell and Salazar treat
parallel versus cross as a single, sexually symmetrical dis-
tinction. But DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN is asymmetric
with respect to sex – it registers distinctions based on
different maternal links, not different paternal links, con-
sistent with Seneca matrilineality.
Clearly some discussion is needed of how a sexually
asymmetric constraint can generate the sexually sym-
metric terminology of Seneca. The rest of this subsection
supplies this discussion, showing how DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN interacts with other constraints to generate a
sexually symmetrical cousin terminology in the case of
Seneca, while its patrilineal counterpart, DISTINGUISH
PATRIKIN, interacts with a differently ranked set of con-
straints to generate the sexually skewed Chinese cousin
terminology. This discussion, rather than uncovering a
fatal flaw in DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, as McConvell and
Salazar suppose, ends up showcasing a major strength
of Optimality Theory: one constraint can produce a
variety of effects, depending on how it interacts with
others.
To show how the present theory generates different
cousin terminologies, we start with the following abbre-
viated version of the Seneca ranking, DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN » DISTINGUISH SEX » MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIB-
LINGS. (We ignore relative age here.) We can follow the
process in slow motion if we stick to replacing just adjoin-
ing pairs of elements at each move. With the two parallel
cousin types, Mother’s Sister’s Child and Father’s Broth-
er’s Child, the first move is to replace Mother’s Sister
with Mother (same matriline, same sex), and Father’s
Brother with Father (same matriline, same sex), generat-
ing Mother’s Child and Father’s Child respectively.
These replacements obey the injunction to MINIMIZE
PARENTS’ SIBLINGS – including embedded Parent’s
Sibling – and don’t violate higher ranking constraints.
These outputs become inputs on the next round.
Because Father’s Child does not belong to Father’s matri-
kin and so is not adjacent to Mother’s matrikin, it can be
merged with Mother’s Child, as some type of sibling.
On the other hand, the high-ranking DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN bars mergers of the two cross cousin types,
Mother’s Brother’s Child and Father’s Sister’s Child
with Parent’s Child.2 The best the lower-ranking MINI-
MIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS can do is to insist that these
two types be combined into a single cross cousin term.
Thus DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, interacting with other con-
straints, can generate a standard parallel/cross distinction.
But in other contexts, DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN and
DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN produce different effects.
Chinese cousin terms, presented by Liu et al., offer a
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serendipitous opportunity to show that the present con-
straints work well across a wider range of terminologies,
an important desideratum in OT. In Chinese terminology,
a father’s brother’s children are separate both from sib-
lings and from other cousins. Other cousins are lumped
together, not distinguished as parallel or cross. In other
words, Chinese terms skew patrilineally.
The patrilineally skewed constraint, DISTINGUISH
PATRIKIN, can generate the basic pattern of Chinese
cousin terms as part of the ranking DISTINGUISH PATRI-
KIN » DISTINGUISH DISTANCE » MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIB-
LING’S ____ » DISTINGUISH SEX. (We ignore sex and
relative age of cousins here, and some obvious mor-
phology.) There are two crucial differences here from
the Seneca ranking. First, Chinese assigns high rank to a
constraint attuned to patrilineal rather than matrilineal
distinctions, reflecting the patrilineal character of tra-
ditional Chinese society. Second, the constraint DIS-
TINGUISH DISTANCE ranks high, and prevents parents’
siblings and embedded parents’ siblings from being
merged with parents and embedded parents. The distance
constraint prevents Mother’s Sister’s Child from being
equated with Mother’s Child, thus blocking the parallel
cousin/sibling equations seen in Seneca. In this context,
MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLING’S ____, in interaction with
lower-ranking constraints, enforces a merger of nonpatri-
lineal cousins, rather than cross cousins.3
In summary, the asymmetrical constraints DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN and DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN can generate
either symmetrical parallel/cross distinctions like those
in Seneca, or asymmetrical distinctions like those in
Chinese, depending on how they interact with other con-
straints. At least for now, it seems that the two skewed con-
straints are necessary, but an additional unskewed
parallel/cross constraint is superfluous.
In the end, the criticisms of Leaf and of McConvell
and Salazar complement each other. Leaf presumes a
direct connection between Seneca matrilineality and
Seneca terminology, and gets the facts about the latter
wrong. McConvell and Salazar argue that the parallel/
cross distinctions observed in Seneca and other terminol-
ogies reflect the operation of one or more underlying par-
allel/cross principles, and leave Seneca terminology
divorced from Seneca social organization. In spite of
their different conclusions, these commentators share
the assumption that the principles governing kin terminol-
ogies should be visible on the surface. By contrast, the
present theory, which distinguishes between underlying
constraints and the surface distinctions generated by
constraint interaction, has more room to accommodate
systematic but indirect connections between social struc-
ture and kin terminology.
R2.3. Componential analysis
Componential analysis treats kin terms as bundles of dis-
tinctive features; the theory lacks separate machinery for
handling markedness and kin term extensions. Kay
defends “li’l ol’ componential analysis” as an alternative
to the CS&G theory, which he claims cannot handle
Seneca descending generation terms or extended cousin
terms. This subsection corrects several mistakes in Kay’s
comment, shows how the CS&G theory deals with some
special characteristics of Seneca kin terms, and compares
componential analysis and other approaches to distant kin
terms.
Kay claims that the proposed constraint DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN can’t handle Seneca terminology for children
and siblings’ children. These include sex-of-Ego distinc-
tions with female and male speakers using different terms
for their kin. The pattern to be explained goes as follows:
the Seneca term for ‘daughter’ is also used for Woman’s
Sister’s Daughter and Man’s Brother’s Daughter. The
term for ‘son’ is also used for Woman’s Sister’s Son and
Man’s Brother’s Son. Four additional terms cover
Woman’s Brother’s Daughter, Woman’s Brother’s Son,
Man’s Sister’s Daughter and Man’s Sister’s Son. According
to Kay, “Here the OT analysis fails. Ego’s sister’s child is a
member of Ego’s matriline regardless of Ego’s sex.”
However, the second sentence is true, but irrelevant to
the issue at hand. What matters is Ego’s children’smatriline
(not Ego’s matriline, as Kay has it), because some of Ego’s
sibling’s children, and not others, are classified with Ego’s
children (not with Ego) as ‘daughter’ and ‘son.’ Whether
Ego’s children belong to Ego’s sister’s matriline depends
on the sex of Ego: “yes” if Ego is female, “no” if Ego is
male. DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN gets this right.
The machinery for handling a terminology of this sort
was discussed in Jones (2003b). It can be used to
account for markedness relationships involving sex-of-
Ego distinctions. We begin with a notation for inverse
kin terms: if X is K to Y, then Y is K21 to X. If John is
uncle to Dylan, then Dylan is uncle21 (i.e., Man’s Sibling’s
Child) to John (ignoring uncles by marriage; see also
Gould 2000, p. 28). In this notation, the six Seneca
terms above are female and male versions of Child,
(Father’s Sister)21, and (Mother’s Brother)21. This nota-
tion shows that Seneca does not distinguish nieces and
nephews from aunts and uncles as clearly as English
does. This is evident not only in the distribution of terms
but in their morphology. The Seneca term for my
mother’s brother is roughly ‘he-uncle-me,’ while the
terms for the inverse, my sister’s daughter/son (man
speaking), are built from the same root and are roughly
‘I-uncle-her/him’ (Kay 1975). The inverseness of Seneca
descending generation terms is there in plain sight.
The target article presented a DISTINGUISH GRADE
constraint. The constraint keeps ascending and descend-
ing generations separate, and older and younger kin
within a generation. In doing so, it prevents a kin type
from being equated with its inverse. But Seneca presents
an in-between case, in which some descending generation
terms are neither completely distinct nor completely sep-
arate from the corresponding ascending generation terms.
We can handle this by breaking DISTINGUISH GRADE into
two constraints, one of which is more lax about enforcing
hierarchical distinctions. Consider the following constraint
ranking:
DISTINGUISH GENERATIONS & DISTANCE
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN
MINIMIZE COUSINS
DISTINGUISH GRADE (LAX)
DISTINGUISH SEX
MINIMIZE SIBLINGS’ CHILDREN
MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS
MINIMIZE SIBLINGS
DISTINGUISH GRADE (STRICT)
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MINIMIZE CHILDREN
DISTINGUISH DISTANCE
This repeats the constraint ranking for Seneca from the
target article, with several changes: (1) DISTINGUISH
GRADE comes in a lax version, which allows partial
equations of inverses, and a strict one, which doesn’t, (2)
two markedness constraints have been added for the first
descending generation, and (3) DISTINGUISH GENER-
ATIONS has been tweaked to allow mergers in equidistant
generations (see Note 2 in target article).
The new constraint ranking handles the special features
of Seneca terms for descending generations (and younger
siblings) without much extra machinery. Changing the
ranking can generate distinctions found in other
languages. For example, moving MINIMIZE CHILDREN
up one place would produce a terminology with distinc-
tions between Father21 (Man’s Child) and Mother21
(Woman’s Child). And the same trick of breaking up faith-
fulness constraints into graded lax and strict versions can
handle other sorts of morphological variation, like
whether Seneca sex distinctions are carried by roots or
affixes, or how English -in-law, grand-, and great- affixes
work (a topic raised by Leaf).
Kay also rejects the proposed analysis of Seneca cousin
term extension by one-adjoining-pair-at-a-time replace-
ment. “[N]o such set of local rules can account for the
Seneca cross/parallel facts.” This is wrong. Take the kin
type that he gives, the fourth cousin “father’s mother’s
father’s mother’s brother’s daughter’s son’s son’s child.”
Note that in many cultures, nobody starts with such an
elaborate formula when reckoning kin terms; they would
begin with “My father’s ‘cross cousin’ is father to that
person” (Levinson, Read). In other words, Kay’s
formula is to kin terminology what one of Proust’s long
sentences is to syntax: a possible case that one would be
unlikely to encounter in everyday life. Nonetheless, a set
of one-adjoining-pair-at-a-time replacement rules follow-
ing the constraint ranking in section 3.1 in the target
article gives the right answer, with no need to “imagine
rewrite rules that look. . .at nonadjacent nodes.”4
Kay claims that “componential analysis, gets the whole
job done . . . with less machinery.” This is not quite right.
Componential analysis gets the job done in fewer steps
(in a highly artificial example), but at the cost of more
machinery, in the form of a special Iroquois-cross distinc-
tive feature. This is problematic, regardless of whether we
use componential analysis or Optimality Theory. There are
a variety of ways of extending terms to more distant kin
(Godelier et al. 1998): Does each of these call for a new
distinctive feature or a new constraint?
Perhaps rules for distant kin term extensions are
open-ended and transmitted through explicit instruction,
more like rules for games or poetic forms than rules of
grammar. In this case, there would be no theoretical
problem with multiplying distinctions indefinitely. Or
perhaps humans have specialized adaptations for classify-
ing kin all the way out to second cousins. This is Miers’
position, if I have understood him correctly.
But there is a more parsimonious possibility: Distinc-
tions may emerge through the interaction of a limited
set of constraints according to rules of local optimization.
To explore this further, let us return to the second-
cousin formula Mother’s Mother’s Brother’s Son’s Son.
In Seneca, the categorization of this relative as a cross
cousin rather than some kind of sibling depends only on
the sexes of the two linking relatives in the parental gener-
ation. The sex of the two linking relatives in the grandpar-
ental generation is irrelevant. In other terminologies, the
opposite is true: A cross-sex connection in the grandparen-
tal generation determines the classification regardless of
the sexes in the parental generation. And in so-called Dra-
vidian terminologies, sexes in both parental and grandpar-
ental generations make a difference to the outcome. This
looks like a markedness/faithfulness trade-off between
neutralizing linking-sex distinctions in one generation or
the other, and accounting carefully for both generations,
in the course of local optimization. In other words, it
looks like a good fit for the machinery developed in the
target article. At this stage, we cannot be sure this is the
right approach, but it seems worth exploring.5
One final note on distinctive features: while componen-
tial analysis probably doesn’t work as a complete theory, it
can generate some common patterns on its own. For
example, we can get from bifurcate merging aunts
(Father’s Sister=Mother’s Sister ¼ Mother) to bifurcate
collateral (Father’s Sister=Mother’s Sister=Mother)
by activating a distance (or lineal/collateral) distinction.
Musgrave & Dowe, however, think this has to do with
differential markedness: that in the first case, but not the
second, cross-kin are marked relative to parallel. On the
standard definition of markedness (Jones 2004) this is
wrong. The reason the distance distinction doesn’t split
Father’s Sister in the second case is that there’s no dis-
tance inside Father’s Sister to split, not because the type
is marked. For an example that does involve differential
markedness, see the relative age distinctions among
Chinese uncles in Liu et al.’s comment, which are acti-
vated for the unmarked but not the marked type.
R2.4. Kinship algebra
Read lays out the basics of kinship algebra, an alternative
approach to kin terminology. He argues for a strict separ-
ation between (1) kin terminologies as formal systems to
be studied in the framework of abstract algebra, without
reference to genealogy, and (2) rules mapping kin ter-
minologies onto genealogy. Lyon also cautions that
“kinship terminologies can be produced without reference
to any notion or instance of genealogical relatedness.”
I respond with a parable.
Once upon a time, Professor P developed a formal
theory of the shape of pants, called pants geometry.
Pants geometry borrowed from topology and other
branches of mathematics, taking into account, for
example, that pants are highly symmetrical from right to
left, but not from top to bottom. With a modest set of par-
ameters, the theory claimed to account for the shapes of
everything from bell-bottoms to lederhosen to skorts.
With this theory in hand, Professor P announced that
pants could be defined in purely geometric terms
without reference to the human form. He also reminded
his readers that many pants, including most of those
given as birthday presents, are never worn. He declared
that the old anthropomorphic definition of pants as a
garment worn on the lower body and covering the legs
separately had at last been overturned, and deplored the
sloppy habit of referring to pants “legs.”
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Of course Professor P’s victory over anthropomorphism
in the field of pants studies was illusory. It’s not just a
coincidence that pants and people have legs and seats,
that men’s pants generally have flies and men have . . .,
etc. Similarly, it is not a necessary truth, but an empirical
finding in need of theoretical explanation, that every
society has a system of terms systematically related to
one another in such a way that they can be mapped onto
genealogical positions, and that the natives themselves
can do this mapping – even if those terms are used for
nongenealogical purposes as well.
I suggest that a contrast proposed by Sperber (1996, pp.
134–46) is useful here, between the evolved (or proper)
domain of an adaptation, and its cultural domain (see
also Sperber & Hirschfeld 2004). For example, humans
in all likelihood have evolved machinery for assessing the
mental states of others (the evolved domain of “theory of
mind”), but they also employ this machinery in culturally
specific ways in attributing mental states to ghosts,
oracles, storms, and agents of disease (the cultural
domain of theory of mind). Perhaps the way to break out
of the seemingly endless argument about what kinship
terms “really” mean is to ask instead about the evolved
and cultural domains of kin categorization. From this per-
spective, Read’s achievement is an exceptionally rigorous
characterization of the machinery for tracking genealogy
(and maybe for doing other things; see sect. R1.3).
There are more down-to-earth differences between
kinship algebra and the current approach. Part of what
characterizes kin terminologies, according to kinship
algebra, are structural equations. Some of these are uni-
versal, defining the very domain of kinship (e.g., Sibling
of Sibling ¼ Sibling), others are found in some terminolo-
gies but not others (e.g., the English rule Spouse of
Sibling ¼ Sibling of Spouse). These equations have conse-
quences that ramify through kinship systems and give
them much of their structure. But there is the same
problem with structural equations as with replacement
rules: it’s not clear within the theory what limits there
are on allowed equations.
R2.5. Comparing theories
By way of a summary, let’s return to Kronenfeld’s ques-
tion: What does the present theory buy us that we don’t
get from other approaches? Some of the alternative
theories imply that kin terminology is psychologically
simple, perhaps because its complexities derive from the
social system rather than the mind. But these theories
seem to have trouble accounting for kin terminology in
detail. The other alternatives, which allow for autonomous
cognitive-linguistic processes, have different strengths and
weaknesses. Componential analysis has identified a set of
distinctive features, comparable to those in phonology,
that help to define the natural classes into which kin
types are organized. Yet markedness effects are generally
left out, and descriptive adequacy achieved only at the
cost of multiplying contrived, undermotivated features.
Derivational approaches, including reduction rules and
kinship algebra, are successful in showing how rules for
extending kinship terms out from a small core can
account for patterns of variation in particular cases, but
leave unanswered questions about what replacement
rules or structural equations are allowed. As Levinson
writes, “[p]revious approaches, such as componential
analysis and reduction rule analysis. . .have each captured
part of the phenomenon but somehow have failed to give
us an exhaustive way to think about the typology of kinship
systems.”
Ideally we would like to get the best of each of these
approaches in one package. In a package deal, for
example, we might find that the range of possible replace-
ment rules is somehow constrained by the need to respect
distinctive features. This deal, I claim, is what the present
theory offers, by including distinctive features and mark-
edness effects in a unified framework, and handling deri-
vations by stepwise optimization. That the deal also
includes a new take on the relationship between social
structure and kin terminology, and on the conceptual
structure of kinship, makes it even more of a bargain.
R3. Prospects
Suppose, as the preceding section argues, that no insuper-
able impediments stand in the way of the Conceptual
Structure and Grammar theory of kin terminology. In
that case, what are some directions the theory might
take in the future?
Several commentators (Behme, Bloch, and Levinson)
claim that there is little evidence for the psychological
mechanisms proposed in the target article. But whatever
truth there is in this charge stems not so much from any
weakness of the theory as from the woefully underdeve-
loped state of the study of kinship and cognition. The
information we have on kinship terminologies across cul-
tures is currently some of our best evidence in this area,
and a lot more could be done with it. However, the typo-
logical evidence needs to be supplemented with other
linguistic evidence, from morphology, pragmatics
(Bloch, Hogeweg et al.), and language history (Jordan
& Dunn), and from semantic fields beyond kinship (Ben-
nardo). And the methods of cognitive science, including
developmental studies, need to be brought to bear.
The research reported by Liu et al. is an excellent
example of what can be done. The authors correctly ident-
ify the major constraints active in Chinese kin terminology
according to the present theory, and find significant effects
in the expected direction for most of these (except for the
relative age constraint) on the processing of kin terms.
This is an important preliminary indication that work on
kin terminology has identified real psychological pro-
cesses. (For additional results along the same lines, com-
paring the processing of kinship formulas by English and
Tongan speakers, see Bennardo & Read 2010.) It may
turn out that Levinson’s remark, “It is quite unwarranted
(despite the normal claims of OT) to think that any one
native speaker has this kind of meta-knowledge in his or
her head,” is too skeptical.
Finally, it is possible that the future will demonstrate
not just the psychological reality of some version of the
machinery proposed here, but its broader value to the
human sciences. In the study of grammar, for example,
kin terminology may be of interest as involving an elemen-
tary variety of recursion more tractable than that found in
syntax (Read 2008). And in the study of social cognition
and social structure, the interplay of universals and vari-
ation in the rules dividing kin into marriageable and
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non-marriageable may offer new insights into the combi-
natorial structure of moral systems. If the CS&G theory
can develop as a progressive research program, kinship
may emerge as a model system for the study of important
issues in cognition and social organization.
NOTES
1. In the target article (including Figs. 2 and 3) and the reply,
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN counts a man as a member of his
mother’s and sister’s matrikin, and DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN
counts a woman as a member of her father’s and brother’s patri-
kin. Suppose we revise this. Let DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN count a
woman, her sisters, and her parents as members of one matrikin,
and her brothers and their wives as members of an adjacent
matrikin. And let DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN count a man, his broth-
ers, and his parents as members of one patrikin, and his sisters
and their husbands as members of an adjacent patrikin. This revi-
sion builds a parallel/cross-sibling distinction into both con-
straints. It also lumps wives and husbands together as parallel
(members of the same matrikin and patrikin), but these can be
separated by DISTINGUISH AFFINES as needed. There may be
some advantages to this. Together with a new markedness con-
straint, MINIMIZE CROSS-SIBLINGS, the revised constraints can
now handle parallel versus cross-sibling terms (e.g., Woman’s
Sister versus Man’s Sister). See Jones (2010) for details; either
of the revised constraints here is equivalent to DBIF there.
2. DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN bars mergers of cross cousins with
parents’ children. Here we spell this out on a case-by-case basis
(with standard abbreviations including Z for Sister): Mother’s
Brother’s Child (MBC) ! Father’s Child (FC) is barred
because MB and F are in adjacent matrilines; MBC ! MC is
barred because MBC and MC are in adjacent matrilines; FZC
! MC is barred because FZ and M are in adjacent matrilines;
FZC ! FC is barred because FZC and FC are in adjacent
matrilines.
3. How this works: Mother’s Sister’s Child (MZC) is not
indexed as falling either inside Ego’s patriline or in an adjacent
one. So DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN allows this kin type to merge
either with FBC (Ego’s patriline) or with MBC and FZC (adja-
cent patrilines). The decision falls to a lower ranking constraint.
Here we assume that DISTINGUISH SEX assigns more constraint
violations to the double sex change in MZC ! FBC, thus
pushing MZC to merge with non-patrilineal cousins instead.
However, if the ranking were changed by inserting DISTINGUISH
MATRIKIN above DISTINGUISH SEX, the decision would go the
other way, resulting in a merger of MZC and FBC, and a distinc-
tion between siblings, parallel cousins, and cross cousins, as seen
in other (Sudanic) terminologies.
4. The rules are:
1. Replace a doubly embedded parent’s sibling (___Parent’s
Sibling’s___) with a doubly embedded parent of the appropriate
sex,
2. Replace a singly embedded parent’s sibling (Parent’s Sib-
ling’s___) with a singly embedded parent of the appropriate sex
only if this is consistent with DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, and
3. Replace a parent’s child with a sibling of the appropriate
sex.
The result, applied to Kay’s formula, and using standard abbrevi-
ations including S for Son and Z for Sister, is FMFMBDSSC !
FMFFDSSC ! FMFZSSC ! FMMSSC ! FMBSC !
FFSC ! FBC ! FC ! Sibling, where underline and
bold show what will be and has been rewritten. The role of
Optimality Theory here is to put constraints on possible replace-
ment rules – in this case producing a markedness effect where
unilineal distinctions are neutralized in processing more distant
cousin terms.
5. Some more details; put one of the following constraints:
DISTINGUISH MATRIKIN, DISTINGUISH PATRIKIN, or, if you
insist, DISTINGUISH PARALLEL/CROSS,
in one of the places marked by a number in the following ranking:
(1) » MINIMIZE ___ PARENTS’ SIBLINGS’ ___ » DISTINGUISH
AFFINES » (2) » MINIMIZE PARENTS’ SIBLINGS’ ___ » (3) » MINI-
MIZE PARENT’S SIBLINGS » (4).
The corresponding kin terminologies are:
(1) Dravidian. Four replacement rules,
(a) MZ ! M,
(b) FB ! F,
(c) ___MB___ ! ___EF___,
(d) ___FZ___ ! ___EM___,
where E is Spouse. Also, nothing bars the standard replacements
Parent’s Child ! Sibling and Parent’s Spouse ! Parent.
The result, applied to Kay’s formula, is FMFMBDSSC !
FMFEFDSSC ! FMFEZSSC ! FMMZSSC !
FMMSSC ! FMBSC ! FEFSC ! FEBC ! MBC ¼
‘cross cousin.’ Moving DISTINGUISH AFFINES further down in
the ranking can result in a stronger version of Dravidian termi-
nology, with rules like MB ! EF and FZ ! EM, and ‘cross
cousin’ further reduced to ‘spouse’ or ‘spouse’s sibling.’
(2) Iroquois. See replacement rules in the previous note, and
discussion of Seneca in target article.
(3) Cheyenne. Cousins equated with siblings, bifurcate
merging aunts and uncles.
(4) Generational. Cousins equated with siblings, aunts and
uncles equated with parents.
We assume generational distinctions rank high and distance dis-
tinctions low. On this account, Dravidian and Iroquois cousin
terms fall along a markedness gradient with respect to unilineal
or parallel/cross distinctions, addressing the concerns of Kro-
nenfeld and McConvell about where Seneca extended
cousins fit into the larger picture.
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